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Artykuły

Nr 1(26) (2024): New Energy Regimes

Lifting the Resource Curse in Africa’s Energy Sector

Przesłane
12 August 2024
Opublikowane
11-09-2025

Abstrakt

The aim of the article is to examine the resource curse – a phenomenon where resource-rich countries paradoxically experience economic underperformance and social instability – in Africa, especially the Sub-Saharan part of the continent. In the introduction, the energy sector and the oil-rich states in Africa are described. The article then analyses academic discussions on the use of concepts such as the “resource curse,” the “Dutch disease,” and “rentier states,” and the entanglement of this debate in post-colonial relations between the Global North and the Global South. Next, the causes and social, economic, and environmental implications of the resource curse in Africa’s energy sector are outlined. Drawing on multi-disciplinary perspectives from history, economics, political science, and development studies, the article explores the complex interplay of factors that contribute to the resource curse phenomenon in three illustrative African countries: Nigeria, Angola, and Ghana. In summary, the key policy responses – the possible “cure” for the resource curse – are characterised.

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