STATE**OF**AFFAIRS/13

SOCIAL THEORY: CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

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
/// SOCIOLOGY UNDER STATE SOCIALISM

ISSUE EDITORS: MATTHIAS DULLER AND MIKOŁAJ PAWLAK

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INTRODUCTION: VARIETIES OF SOCIOLOGY UNDER STATE SOCIALISM

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Viewed from afar, the political situations of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe under communist rule appear to have been roughly the same. It may thus seem obvious that the experiences of sociologists – and their institutional and epistemological situations – were also the same. But when we look more closely, it turns out that due to diverse national pre-war traditions, the different natures of socialist regimes, and the power of links to Western sociology, conditions were much more diverse than might have been expected. In this issue of *Stan Rzeczy* (*State of Affairs*) we bring together the writings of scholars from Poland, the Czech Republic, Belarus, Hungary, Romania, Albania, and Sweden to explore the diversity and similarity of sociology in these countries in terms of sociologists' roles, attitudes toward Marxism as a live tradition and official ideology, the development of concepts, the inclination to engage in empirical research, and so on. The inspiration came from three sessions organised by Matthias Duller, an editor of this issue, at the Interim Conference of the ISA Research Committee on the History of Sociology "Monuments, Relics, and Revivals" held in Warsaw in June 2016.

The present special issue is devoted to the history of sociology in Eastern Europe under state socialism. Most of the articles that follow deal with specific aspects of sociology in one or more countries; one article presents a framework for thinking about the topic in general. Here in the introduction we will place the subject in the context of social sciences beyond the socialist orbit.

The stunning rise of the social sciences after the end of the Second World War is not only interesting to social scientists for self-reflective pur-

poses but is a historical phenomenon worth studying in its own right (compare Backhouse & Fontaine 2010, 2014). The social sciences were elevated in connection with the global movement championing the sciences as the dominant and only legitimate knowledge system (Drori et al. 2003). While the centre of scientific knowledge undoubtedly moved from Europe to North America, the expansion of the science system was not just a simple process of diffusion from North America outwards but was a reaction to the challenges of the post-war era everywhere in the world.

   Two of these challenges are of particular importance for the social sciences: the unparalleled pace of modernisation, and the Cold War, a military and cultural confrontation of competing "systems" with different answers to modernisation. Both have been discussed at great length in studies on the history of the social sciences in the Western world. Although it is obvious that the former Eastern bloc was affected by modernisation and the Cold War to at least the same degree as the West, such discussions in its regard are extremely rare. This special issue is intended to help fill the gap.

   Modernisation, societal transformation, and the position of men and women in the modern world engendered the intellectual predisposition to make human affairs a matter of systematic inquiry, and provided a favoured object of study: from Comte to Marx and the founding fathers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, sociology has involved the study of modernity. On a global level, however, modernity's institutional "take-off" – to use a famous metaphor from modernisation theory – occurred only after the end of the Second World War. Then practically all societies, from "first world" capitalist democracies to "second world" socialist societies and "third world" postcolonial states, invested heavily in economic growth, industrialisation, social welfare, and, of course, the science and education that were supposed to provide the knowledge for these developments. The number of countries with a national science-policy organisation, for example, rose from less than twenty in the 1930s to over ninety in 1990 (Drori et al. 2003: 3). Most importantly, worldwide the university system expanded dramatically. The average number of students per 100,000 inhabitants rose from 160 in 1920 to 3,446 in the year 2000 (Fleck 2011: 14–15) – a more than twenty-fold increase. Research and teaching personnel increased at a similar rate.

   The same period was marked by the military and ideological confrontation of East and West, or of socialism versus capitalism. Over the past two decades there has come to be a burgeoning literature on how the Cold War influenced the social sciences not only in terms of institutional ex-

pansion but also on the level of ideas (see e.g., Engerman 2010; Gilman 2016; Isaac 2007, 2011; Isaac & Bell 2012; Simpson 1998; Solovey & Cravens 2012). While a large number of studies describe the emergence of academic fields such as rational choice theory (Amadae 2003), game theory (Erickson 2015), modernisation theory (Gilman 2003; Latham 2011), and international relations (Guilhot 2011) in the context of the Cold War, only recently has research expanded to include the socialist countries of the Eastern bloc and the channels of communication between East and West (Boldyrev & Kirtchik 2016). To connect the discussion of the social sciences under socialism with the literature of Cold War social science would be a very fruitful undertaking, because it would help to distinguish the modes of political influence and interference in the social sciences that are typical of autocratic regimes from those that also appear in democracies.

The social sciences under state socialism are commonly viewed with a focus on the totalitarian aspects of the situation: the instrumentalisation of the social sciences for ideological legitimisation; propaganda; censorship; and coercion (e.g., Keen & Mucha 2004). This view assumes that the natural role of the social sciences is to evaluate social realities critically, and the social sciences' position is thus perverted under a regime that claims the exclusive right to interpret those realities for itself.

The restrictions the authoritarian regimes imposed upon the social sciences were undoubtedly severe and diminished those disciplines' scientific and social potential. But reducing the story to the opposition between political regimes (seen only as suppressors of social science knowledge) and social scientists (in latent or open opposition to the regimes) is a historical construction that might please the self-image of liberal intellectuals today but leads to other aspects being overlooked. Polish sociologists are especially proud that many of them adopted anti-regime positions. In other countries of the region – for instance, in Czechoslovakia and Hungary – sociologists were also strongly engaged in political opposition and in some cases had to pay the price of being expelled from academia or forced to emigrate. Yet no such fundamental opposition can be observed in Albania, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, or Romania.

As with the notion of varieties of capitalism we can thus talk about varieties of socialism: diverse modes of the political implementation of Marxism-Leninism, and, in our case, the disparate architecture of the social sciences in communist countries. The socialist states were transforming from Stalinism in the 1950s to other forms of state socialism. The divergence between these forms was especially visible in the degree of openness of

intellectual debates in different countries at different points in time. None of the regimes were monolithic: there were factions in the communist parties and academia; intellectuals disagreed over how to interpret Marxism, socialism, and the social realities.

Most importantly, the totalitarianism-focused view tends to ignore the dilemma facing even the most repressive communist regimes: they needed reliable expertise and learned reflection about their political projects while at the same time they feared feeding independent and potentially dissident or revisionist political thought. Even during the Stalinist period, when the term "sociology" was banned and declared a bourgeois science, the study of society advanced, either in the form of historical materialism or under other names. During the thaw period, sociology was reintroduced to universities in some countries. Often, communist regimes consciously decided to help develop the social sciences, for the simple reason that the authorities thought such knowledge was needed in their societies. Some social scientists did indeed become critical intellectuals and dissidents; the vast majority did not, but adapted to the realities and produced research within the confines of what was possible.

Drori et al. (2003: 199) argue that communist scientific expansion was almost entirely driven by the natural sciences, while the social sciences were kept at a minimum. They base their judgment on an analysis of citations from an international database, which was likely incomplete. Looking at two state socialist societies, Yugoslavia and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), a completely different picture emerges. In the academic year 1965–1966 almost half of the students in "liberal" Yugoslavia (46%) studied in the humanities and social sciences (UNESCO 1968: 43). In the GDR – an example of particularly tight dictatorship throughout its existence – the SED leadership invested heavily in the social sciences, rather than suppressing them, with the goal of constructing a loyal intelligentsia (Connelly 1997). New scholarships and early career programmes were introduced in the late 1940s and early 1950s under direct party control. Around 60% of the beneficiaries were from the social sciences and humanities (Duller et al. 2018; Jessen 1999: 56–59). This indicates that the socialist regimes, certainly no less than Western democracies, felt an acute need for social-science knowledge and actively invested in its expansion. The relation between the nascent social sciences and the regimes differed strongly between countries and periods: in the GDR, for instance, sociologists were loyal intellectual extensions of the Communist Party; in Yugoslavia, there was relative tolerance for critical intellectuals; and in Hungary and Poland in the 1980s

the social sciences often had a dissident inclination. In looking at each of these countries, the complex dynamics in the relation become obvious. There were various phases of greater openness, such as in Poland after 1956, in Czechoslovakia in the years before 1968, and in Romania during the early Ceauşescu years, but such periods were often followed by conservative backlashes in the name of "normalisation" or reconsolidation.

The aim of this special issue is thus to present empirical studies and to counter the conventional assumption that state socialism created the same conditions for sociological inquiry in all countries of the Eastern bloc.

Ideally, comparative studies are needed to advance our understanding of how political conditions and intellectual histories in the social sciences are related to each other. So far, most comparative efforts in the history of the social sciences have proceeded by assembling case studies (usually national ones) and by leaving the comparisons implicit and up to the reader. The exceptions to the rule are Voříšek (2008, 2012) and Koleva (2018), and for the West, Fourcade (2009). The lack of comparisons is unfortunate, but is likely due to a more general lack of empirical studies from which meaningful comparisons can be drawn.

Recently, an important source for the history of sociology in a large number of countries has been the *Sociology Transformed* series published by Palgrave Macmillan. Along with studies on sociology in many other regions, it currently features three studies on Eastern Europe (Bucholc 2016; Skovajsa & Balon 2017; Titarenko & Zdravomyslova 2017).

The current issue of *Stan Rzeczy* provides empirical studies on the varieties of conditions in which sociology existed under state socialism, in a way that promotes comparisons.

Why do we use the term "state socialism"? Because it is a good descriptor of the evolving political systems of countries ruled by communist parties. While the governing of these countries was driven by communist ideology, it was the web of institutions, the authorities at all different levels – in a word, the state – that shaped socialist societies more than anything else. The same political conditions also determined the shape of the social sciences in each of the countries. Intellectually, Marxism influenced the social sciences enormously, being the base of the official state ideology. The institutional settings, however, were more important, as they allowed social scientists to manoeuvre within the limits of official discourse with different degrees of freedom. Basic material conditions, such as access to literature, travel, conferences, and tighter or looser webs of censorship, had a more profound impact on social scientists' intellectual output than

did the intellectual tradition of Marxism. As it turns out, serious Marxist scholarship was often a tool used to criticise Communist Party rule and was associated with dissident scholars rather than with conformists, who deemed lip service to Marxism sufficient.

We hope this issue will throw some light on the diversity of intellectual life in Central and Eastern Europe. The subject is important because the academic institutions formed in the period of state socialism still constitute the organisational base for the social sciences in the region, and many authors and ideas from this period still inspire younger generations of sociologists. Other ideas came to be forgotten in the period after the breakup of the system, but some are now being revived.

Communism in Central and Eastern European countries was a project of radical modernisation. Sociology, as a study of modern society, was deeply interested in this project, and rapid industrialisation and urbanisation were fascinating topics of inquiry. Yet, under the influence of Marxism as the official state ideology, certain research subjects were hard to approach. In many instances, social reality was not changing along the lines assumed by the doctrine. The key problem was change in the social structure. According to the doctrine, societies under state socialism should be transforming into classless societies. Yet social stratification seemed to persist. In some countries, revealing such research findings or even asking such research questions could be dangerous. In less harsh political systems, persons writing about social stratification struggled to reconcile the theory and the results. One of the outcomes was a very interesting sociology of social stratification, which was developed by Polish scholars such as Włodzimierz Wesołowski.

The elites and sociologists of Central and Eastern Europe defined their societies as peripheral societies engaged in catching up with the West. Indeed, state socialism was a grand project of modernisation and of escaping the peripheral position. Yet Eastern and Central European sociologists continued to perceive their societies as peripheral and looked to the cultural centre for theories to help them understand those societies. Depending on how closed the intellectual life of a given country was, this could be more or less easy – or nearly impossible. In Poland after 1956 sociologists had the opportunity to travel to the USA. They applied the theories they encountered there and also quite quickly adopted survey research techniques. What is also important in the context of Central and Eastern Europe is that quite a large body of theoretical works were translated into Polish. In other countries, as is interestingly described in this issue by Andrei Dudchik,

the diffusion of Western sociological theories was possible via the trick of criticising bourgeois science. Authors made ceremonial use of historical materialism while discussing other theoretical frameworks.

However, this issue also teaches us not to treat Marxism solely as the official ideology of the communist countries. Marxism was revised and in some cases served as a useful framework for explaining and understanding the social processes in Central and Eastern Europe. It cannot be forgotten that the accusation of revisionism was a very dangerous tool in political debates. Still, some sociologists managed to construct interesting and inspiring interpretations of Marxism. The example of Polish Marxism-influenced sociology is discussed in this issue in the article by Maciej Gdula.

Since the fall of communism, communist regimes have conventionally been described as hostile to their societies. This is true: human rights were violated and before 1989 the Central and Eastern European states could by no means be called democracies. Nevertheless, we also have to admit that there were certain areas of social progress under state socialism. Thus dividing matters into black and white would seem to be an oversimplification, and yet the question that is often asked about sociologists is whether they were on the side of the state or of society during this time. Some were active (and some merely passive) members of communist parties, while others engaged in research on political mobilisation and joined the political opposition.

The present special issue of *Stan Rzeczy* is divided into four sections: sociology in Central and Eastern Europe; national sociologies; research, concepts, and perspectives; and reviews. The first paper, by Georges Mink, is a section on its own because it is the only paper that attempts a general characterisation of sociology in Central and Eastern Europe under socialism. It is based on a number of interviews the author conducted with sociologists in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR during the 1980s. Although, as we argued above, such a perspective is only part of the story of sociology under state socialism and is close to the totalitarianism-focused view, the article provides rich insights into the lives and thinking of a cohort of sociologists and delivers an explicit conceptual discussion of the different roles sociologists played vis-à-vis state power.

The section titled "National Sociologies" discusses sociologies in four very different academic contexts: Romania, Poland, Belarus, and Albania. Stefan Bosomitu covers the entire history of Romanian sociology under socialist rule and places it in the context of political history. Among other things, the article shows the importance of individual figures such as Mi-

ron Constantinescu (a former sociologist and later influential member of the communist regime, who played the key role in re-establishing the sociological discipline after 1965, see also Bosomitu 2014). In addition, Bosomitu provides an instructive discussion about the continuity of the strong pre-war tradition of Romanian sociology.

In her essay on the phases of sociology's development under communist rule in Poland, Agnieszka Kolasa-Nowak concentrates on the issue of modernisation. According to her, sociology has developed in parallel with changes in the regime. She distinguishes three phases in the history of Polish sociology under state socialism: first, it was a social laboratory for structural changes; then it became interested in social engineering (i.e., the sociotechnics project was developed); and in the 1980s it turned to critical analysis of the communist system. Yet Kolasa-Nowak claims that Polish sociology under state socialism was consistent in its main focus on catching up with the imagined modernised world.

Andrei Dudchik's article is particularly interesting as little has been written about sociology in Belarus. Dudchik presents two types of struggles in which the founding fathers of Belarusian sociology engaged. The first was the struggle for independence from philosophy. The second concerned the independence of sociology in Belarus from Soviet sociology. Belarus was just one of the USSR's sixteen republics. Sociology in Belarus was conducted in Russian and was influenced by trends from Moscow and Leningrad. Yet, as it departed from philosophy for empirical research, it focused mainly on local experience.

In an article entitled "The Autonomisation of the Cultural Field in Late Socialist Albania and the Emergence of Early Sociological Research" Sokol Lleshi and Teuta Starova address the issue of Albania's unique experience with sociology and attempt to compare it to the experience of other countries of the region. This is a very interesting case study, as Enver Hoxha's model of state socialism was one of the most radical in Europe, and sociology did not have much opportunity to develop there.

The section entitled "Research, Concepts, and Perspectives" consists of four articles: on sociological inquiries in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Sweden. The paper by Piotr Filipkowski, Judit Gárdos, Éva Kovács, and Vera Szabari compares the sociologies of lifestyle developed in the 1970s in Poland and Hungary. A very interesting finding of these authors is that although research on lifestyles in the two countries was conducted independently, there are striking similarities in the assumptions and approaches that were utilised in studying Hungarians and Poles.

The sociology of lifestyle is also discussed by Michal Kopeček in his paper on applied sociology in Czechoslovakia. The sociology of lifestyle, next to the sociology of industry, was employed there in the project of building a socialist society. Kopeček demonstrates how sociological inquiries that supported the official scientific and technological revolution were developed in parallel with shadow and critical studies of the same aspects of Czechoslovak society. This study shows how sociology was involved in the "construction" of society under state socialism and how it also easily became involved in the "construction" of society under the neoliberal project after 1989.

In "The Warsaw School of Marxism" Maciej Gdula compares the achievements of Warsaw-based, Marxist-oriented sociologists with those of the famous Warsaw School of the History of Ideas. According to Gdula, the school of sociological inquiry created by Julian Hochfeld and his disciples cannot be captured by the dichotomy between official Marxism and revisionist Marxism. Hochfeld and his disciples were engaged on a truly empirical research program oriented towards improving society.

The article by Sven Eliaeson is distinct from other works included in the issue because it approaches our topic from the outside. In an exposition reaching back to late medieval times, Eliaeson unfolds the history of the concept of civil society in Sweden both as a "real" historical object of study and as an analytical tool for the study of a real object. Contrasting the Swedish concept with the very different meaning of "civil society" in 1980s Poland, the article provides an extremely original perspective on how sociological thinking – often far beyond the awareness of sociologists themselves – is dependent on historical conditions.

This issue also contains seven book reviews (works published in German, English, and Polish).

With the exception of Sven Eliaeson's article on the Swedish model of civil society, the present special issue is restricted to state socialism in Central Eastern Europe. State socialism, though, has existed in many other parts of the world. We certainly need more research on sociology under state socialism in Asia or in Cuba: sociology is developing very rapidly in China, for example. This issue proves that sociology is useful in understanding various types of societies. Yet it also provides material for understanding how various political conditions and worldviews influence sociological thinking. State socialism was an extreme case, but the study of extreme cases often proves helpful in understanding social processes. Zdeněk Konopásek (2000) claimed that understanding communist Czechoslovakia

was a good way to understand any modern society. In Western liberal democracies there are also social scientists who justify the social order and those who are marginalised because of their critical stances. In the extreme case of state socialism these processes are more visible and methodologically easier to describe. Thanks to the papers collected in this issue we can understand how political and structural factors shape the minds of social scientists.

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SOCIOLOGY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

SOCIOLOGY OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SOCIOLOGISTS WORKING IN TOTALITARIAN AND POST-TOTALITARIAN REGIMES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, 1945–1989[1]

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We are apt to forget that the production of sociological knowledge in Sovietised countries was not a linear process of accumulating survey data and analysis and that while most sociologists had chosen the profession as a vocation, they might suddenly find themselves ejected from a quiet academic career into total professional inactivity. The institutionalisation of sociology in Central Europe was a complicated process and the discipline did not fully acquire its independence until 1989, though many sociologists did find a way to express themselves freely before then, particularly when communism began to decline, either by remaining anonymous or taking up a position on the opposition side. Toward the end of the communist regime, sociology was neither entirely submissive or fully autonomous; it continued "obedient" in what was a sort of "chiaroscuro" academic environment, as attested by the extremely high frequency of publishing in "internal" or "grey" publications – what Eastern Europeans called the "second circuit," less dangerous than samizdat: neither public or private, small print runs, texts accessible to no more than a few hundred privileged readers. Nonetheless, the progress that began to be made as early as the 1950s was impressive. Initially, the steamroller of Soviet ideology flattened

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[1] This text is part of a book in preparation on sociology, sociological production, and the producers of sociology, that is, sociologists working under the Soviet system in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and incidentally, Soviet Russia.

sociology down to a "bourgeois science" practised by the "lackeys" and "salaried slaves" of capitalism, while declaring that its only purpose was to "counter-attack true Marxist-Leninist social science." The violence with which sociologists were excluded was equalled only by the Soviet and Sovietised states' megalomaniac ambition to dominate and control the social sciences. "In the early 1950s [in Sovietised Europe], the Marxists wanted to replace sociology with historical Marxism. [...] State power, state money, the state police and state censorship were behind the 'historical materialists,' helping them combat ordinary sociologists" (Karpiński 1985: 250).[2] But as Raymond Aron pointed out quite early on: "In fact, Central European professors converted to sociology the day they stopped merely citing the laws of historical evolution as formulated by Marx and began questioning Soviet reality itself by way of statistics, questionnaires and interviews" (Aron 1963: 14). Russian sociologists recall this moment with a note of pathos: "1950 marked an extremely important event for Soviet sociology: historical materialism moved outside the universities and entered 'real life.' This event was comparable to a scientific revolution [sic!]. A similar revolution had taken place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century when the Chicago sociologists 'went out into the streets'" (Batygin & Deviatko 1995: 29).

This description may seem something of a caricature. And yet despite the gradual policy shift from outright expulsion of sociology from the sciences to institutionalisation of the discipline, sociology did not entirely cease its "obedient" ways until communism collapsed. The lightning-speed development of what became in the 1970s and 1980s a fashionable discipline did not mean that retrograde institutions had disappeared (compare the sociology institutes close to party central committees and created for exclusive government use) or that there was no danger of regression. The Czech sociologists who drove the cognitive development of the discipline in the late 1960s, for example – and who of course had no intention of serving the "normalisers" of the Prague Spring – paid for their sins either by emigrating or doing all sorts of odd jobs to survive. Many Hungarian and Russian sociologists chose expatriation to the West and the fall in professional status thereby incurred, over censorship constraints.

Very quickly, however, the various contradictions between knowledge and power, obedience and professional ethics, began to open up new opportunities.

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[2] All translations of cited fragments are my own.

The situation for sociology and sociologists in a Soviet-type political system might be summarised thus: sociologists were competing with ideologists anxious to preserve their monopoly grip on the labour of presenting and interpreting "social facts"; the effect of sociologists' labour of observation was to contradict the dogmas of the dominant ideology. Toward the end of the 1980s, the boldest representatives of the discipline, Elemér Hankiss included, had the feeling they were constantly moving on the "razor's edge" (see Mink 1987a).

Given the partial emancipation of alternative sociology, communist governments were faced with the choice of either eradicating sociology from universities and academies or "domesticating" it. Those with liberal, reformist inclinations (Kadar) or technocratic (Gierek) or modernising ones (Jaruzelski, Gorbachev) chose the latter solution. This in turn generated a new space between state power and the "human" sciences, a space in which newly reactivated *national* professional traditions had to be taken into account, together with all the sudden new international contacts and the connections that were developing between sociologists and what were as-yet embryonic civil societies. The powers-that-be accepted this situation because they thought they could derive all sorts of benefits from it. Batygin and Deviatko cite the following anecdote: "In late 1955, the Soviet delegation was preparing its contribution to the Third World Congress of Sociology in Amsterdam. The delegation's tasks were formulated thus: to study our ideological enemies, and to establish contacts with bourgeois sociologists who have progressive sociological opinions. […] For decades most of those sent to participate in world congresses were ideological functionaries" (Batygin & Deviatko 1995: 31).

National sociology itineraries were caught between two boundaries: on one side, the state; on the other, the sum of individual sociologists' strategies. A fundamental given of all such strategies (at least those developed within an institutional network) was the sociologist's position *vis-à-vis* the state, since the state had a monopoly on recruitment, jobs, and funding. An entire panoply of attitudes developed in the space that had been opened up, ranging from sociologists extremely close to the powers-that-be (some even belonged to the power elite) to sociologists at odds with the state. Several salient professional profiles can be distinguished.

My work relies on an extensive interview survey of sociologists in the 1980s.[3] The interviews were conducted in quite diverse places – above all,

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[3] The surveyed sociologists belonged to various generations (nota bene: a number of them requested to remain anonymous). **Poland:** Władysław Adamski, Jakub Karpiński, Grażyna Gęsicka, Janusz

in my home in Paris, but also in Budapest, Warsaw, Prague, and Moscow. One interview even took place in New Delhi on the occasion of an international sociologists' conference in 1985. Previously, the survey has only been used in part, for minor publications. Today, it provides an invaluable self-portrait of sociological milieus under the late Soviet system. The interviews occurred during the period from 1984 to 1990. They were of the semi-structured variety and used a set of repeatable questions. A large number concerned the interviewee's personal and professional trajectory (the comparative aspect of our analysis); other questions were ethos-related and could involve casual, voluntary exchanges of political opinions with the interviewer. In conducting the survey I collaborated with Dr Paweł Kuczyński in Poland and Dr Zuzanna Elekes in Hungary. I surveyed sociologists from Czech and Russian territories myself.

I also based my empirical analysis on a study of sociologists' works, particularly those concerning social structures and describing the social system and/or socio-political system. Given the premises of my research, I omitted branches of sociology other than the sociology of social systems (structure). My central hypothesis was that the evolution of professional behaviours and theoretical approaches is caused by active competition between the political power's dogmatic monopoly over social diagnoses and the growing vitality of the corps of sociologists. Such an approach derives from an interpretation of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolution, but it also takes into account the neo-institutional paradigm (the influence of institutional-systemic frames and leading ideas about behaviour – ethoses). Neo-institutionalism declares that there is a correlation between professional attitude, the struggle against regulation, and paradigmatic competition with the obligatory dogmas legitimating an authoritarian power of the Soviet type. This hypothesis takes into account the variability of systemic conditions, while the analysis also includes a historical approach. In other words, the 1950s, when the Soviet system was nearly hermetic, were not like the 1970s and 1980s, which were years of increasing crisis. The power elites themselves, by making dogma flexible for the sake of socio-technical diagnoses, opened new areas for sociologists' activities. In my analysis I have

also used the interactionist paradigm, on the assumption that the group of sociologists operates in a field (in Pierre Bourdieu's sense). That field thus becomes an interactive network, which shapes and influences the evolution of academic attitudes and is divided along two axes: the political power and the opposition; and the professional ethos and society.

Consequently, the article is structured around two themes: on the one hand, it typologises the sociologists' positions on the power/opposition axis; and on the other, it shows the evolution of theory in the academic sphere under the varied impulses to which sociologists are subject, that is, the desire to be a neutral expert or to serve society. The field is affected from outside by a dual contextual logic: by political control ensuing from the legitimating coercion of Soviet-type authorities, and from the need, which rises with the crisis, for those same authorities to understand social reality in order to make the necessary political adaptations.

/// Sociologists on the Side of the Communist Power

At least three such profiles crystallised into a movement that gravitated around the Communist Party in power. Those closest to the Party could be called "teleological counsellors to the Prince," that is, Party members aspiring to join the highest spheres of authority as "organic intellectuals." For them, science was clearly a means of attaining an ideological objective: the purpose of sociology was to help the Regime manage its transitory difficulties – including as a tool for manipulating public opinion. When it became clear that Sovietised societies were inherently – that is, as a result of their own logic – inegalitarian, these Party sociologists sought above all to remedy the legitimacy problem, or void, created by that fact. They invented justifications based on "dynamic" conceptions of egalitarianism or a "meritocracy," thereby rendering ideologically conceivable, and therefore legal, the fact that some social groups were acquiring wealth at the expense of others – for example, the workers, who were, of course, theoretically, the social base of the regime. Ingenious at thinking their way through and around Marxist doctrine, these sociologists fabricated the category of "deserving workers" (i.e., foremen), a kind of worker-aristocracy that, by its merits, came nearer to "real socialism" than the rest of the working class. Here they had patently borrowed the "affluent workers" concept from Western sociology. And it was a sociologist in military uniform, Colonel Stanisław Kwiatkowski, who was appointed by General Jaruzelski to head the new Polish Polling Institute: not so the Institute could lie to the popu-

lation about the nature of the 1981 coup – the communists had already learned that lying was entirely counterproductive – but to generate and diffuse half-truths that might destabilise social resistance.

There were two other categories of sociologist who deliberately sailed along in the wake of the powers-that-be: "technocratic counsellors to the Prince" and "entryist counsellors." The first type were convinced themselves, and desirous of convincing any listeners, that the social sciences were neutral; they positioned themselves equidistant from the state and civil society and their aim was to find an enlightened interlocutor within the state elite through whom state policy might be inflected. When after many attempts it became clear this would not work, they lost faith and became cynical.

"Entryist" counsellors drew on the two preceding styles. They thought of themselves as "ambassadors" of society while claiming to have inside knowledge of the powers-that-be and their vulnerabilities thanks to their connections with the state. Their credo was that sociology should work to attenuate conflictual situations caused by the failure of communication between communist governments and their fairly anti-communist populations. Manipulated by their informers, these sociologists suffered from split identities and the rapidly weakening credibility of the role they had assigned themselves – especially since the only way to convince the governments of their good faith was to censor themselves.

/// Itineraries Ranging from an Emphasis on the Professional Ethos to Full Commitment to the Cause of Society

Everything in this matter was a question of emphasis. A sociologist's uppermost concern might be his or her professional career, the scientific ideal – in which case a degree of self-abnegation was required – or serving the population and perhaps the political opposition. In the first group, there were "independent scholars" on one side and "careerists" on the other. For the former, remaining neutral with regard to the state was a matter of principle. They therefore kept their distance from social movements and conflicts between governors and the governed. Academically, they took refuge in highly specialised areas with particular vocabularies, far from both ideology and current empirical events, and showed a predilection for methodological inquiry or the history of social thought. Intensely concerned about their professional status, they were sensitive to competition within

the professional hierarchy and therefore censored their own hypotheses and findings. In fact, they were not too different from their "careerist" counterparts, whose ambition to attain professional success took them as far as joining the Party without sharing its convictions, because, as they saw it, "passive" membership was the only way forward in the profession.

/// Sociologists on the Side of Society

Then there were the different types of sociologists under the *ancien régime* who sought to serve society. For "independent experts," the goal was wide diffusion of their empirical findings. They often specialised in the sociology of factory management, a field that the communist authorities allowed to develop as a way of obtaining supervision for good workers and information on factory workers' attitudes. Independent experts refused to let their research be instrumentalised by state actors. Sensitive to what they understood as the erosion or corruption of what the regime proclaimed were socialist society's dominant values (equality, justice, etc.), they tended to investigate pathological phenomena of social and labour life, laying responsibility for them on the authorities. Faced with preventive censorship, they sought to have their research published abroad or through independent channels.

"Independent experts" often overstepped the boundary and became outright opponents of the state as "experts of the social movement," though this type of sociologist was only really found in countries where social movements had in fact developed, namely, Poland and Hungary. In Poland, independent experts sporadically served the Solidarity trade union movement; in Hungary, they worked with the poor, the Roma, conscientious objectors, environmentalists, and retirees. They valued research on values, and were not averse to expressing conviction-based judgments – at the core of which was the notion of truth – in their analyses.

At the far end of the spectrum were "activist sociologists," whose actions reflected an absolute refusal to compromise with the authorities, though this put them in very real danger of losing institutional and material status. Activists ended up joining the political opposition. Some dispensed with methodology in the interest of quick diagnoses that went against "official" sociology, about whose findings they were sceptical; they claimed official findings were based on biased observations as respondents had surely not answered sincerely.

/// The Effects of Communist-Regime Sociology "Obedience"

The effect of these sociologists' research was to destroy the idyllic image of a harmonious society, but this hardly liberated the sociologists themselves from a paradoxical dependence on the communist government. As communist-regime sociology had no control over its products, it was extensively used as an instrument – at first, against the will of the "producers." For example, sociologists' claim of a strong correlation between extensive growth (the Soviet model, the understanding that economic growth requires the qualitative mobilisation of all resources) and overall upward social mobility actually supported, if indirectly, the idea that socialist planning was "progressive," "rational," or even "infallible." So not only did sociologists who made that claim accredit the founding dogma of Sovietisation, but due to their own professional credentials they instilled in the minds of system actors an explicit representation of Sovietisation as legitimate. Once the issue of inequality had been accepted as a legitimate research subject for sociology (in the 1960s in Poland and Hungary), the governments themselves could declare a need to modernise social dogma, and could therefore legitimate a kind of meritocracy – precisely the one on which government stability depended. Sociology itself, then, had given the governing powers the argument they needed.

In fact, "obedient" sociology was driven by the paradox of using a science whose inherent tendency was the denunciation of the illegitimacy of the powers-that-be to legitimate those very powers. What could be more logical than a sociologist forced to work in conditions where the party-state's social doctrine had absolute priority over any and all type of independent social thought – and party-states were of course quick to intervene and "rectify" any thesis that could be considered deviant – what could be more logical than that such a sociologist would seek to make independent judgments in the interest of society? And yet that logic also came into conflict with the sociologist's desire for independence. In fact, sociologists actually avoided criticising the dominant doctrine because they had confused the interests of society with the possibility of "freely" practising their own profession. In the end, the tree – that is, one's own "freedom" – concealed the forest. An example here would be the highly sophisticated (for the time) studies of social stratification done in the 1970s in Poland. Being allowed to use Western methodological tools did indeed amount to a political victory, but the studies themselves reached the conclusion – just before the Solidarity workers' union emerged on the scene in 1980 – that Polish

society was in the process of reducing the tensions caused by unequal social status, or at least that acting on a single-status dimension could effectively reduce feelings of injustice.

Another example concerns what has been called the Soviet power's "opinion poll-itis" (*sondażomania* in Polish). According to this argument, the Soviet power was already "senile" and incapable of grasping what the governed thought of their governors. It resisted opinion polls at first because they discovered heterogeneity within the population and contradicted such dogmas as the friendly alliance between workers and peasants, the primacy of internationalism over patriotism, and the thesis that attitudes and values were unanimous. But the powers-that-be let sociologists convince them that opinion polls were a neutral technique that might replace democratic consultation. During the 1970s and 1980s, opinion polls proliferated. They were conducted under the egis of opinion centres founded by and linked to those same powers-that-be, which also provided an amount of financial and material resources that would have made such honourable Western institutions as Gallup Polls green with envy. The government's paradoxical aim at the time was to demonstrate to the population the diversity of opinion existing within it so as to short-circuit any general understanding that society was in fact unanimously against the governing power (see Mink 1975, 1981, 1988).

Sociology thus manifested its obedience in many ways, some of which were quite circular. To legitimate their discipline in the eyes of power, some sociologists were willing to use all their scientific prestige to legitimate that power. In some cases, this meant sociologists "knowing" or "being apprised" of what topics had become taboo so they could deliberately avoid discussing them.

/// Imposed Figures and Views of "Communist" Society after the Fall of Communism

There was no break-up or implosion of the "corporation" of sociologists after the fall; sociologists were not persecuted for collaborating with the *ancien régime* or socially declassed and there was barely any change in position distribution. Critical but "entryist" sociologists did forfeit their top positions to apolitical or dissident sociologists, and this change corresponded to a slight generational shift as sociologists in their forties and fifties, who had been prevented by Party sociologists from attaining the highest pro-

fessional positions (e.g., head of a prestigious or well-funded opinion institute), were propelled into positions of responsibility.

Moreover, since the research tools were already present, previously acquired knowledge could be recycled for the entry into the post-communist era.

In fact, the handicap that put the newly post-communist sociologists at a disadvantage had to do with the vicissitudes of sociology as a discipline, how it was practised, the approaches, paradigms, hypotheses, and objects of observation that it "chose" at the time or that came to the fore – as if the freedom of movement of sociologists everywhere had somehow been "mortgaged."

/// Domination of the Sociology of Structure over the Sociology of Change or Action and Its Effects

At just the time the ideological borders of the Sovietised world opened up a chink, sociology worldwide came to be heavily dominated by the already traditional distinctions between social dynamism and stasis (Comte) and between structure and function (Spencer). For Piotr Sztompka, these conceptual dichotomies amounted to an original sin that moved the sociological "corporation" to construct two artificially separate sets of theories, one to explain wholes and continuities, the other to understand and explain change and breaks in continuity. The dominant conviction was that the only objects that sociologists could observe and the only types of social logic at work were those pertaining to a "social order," to structural regularity and a tendency to balance "systems," or to social wholes or enduring "social institutions." In this general understanding, change was disqualified as a "disruptive factor and foreign object" and excluded from sociological analysis. Zygmunt Bauman recently explained how the cognitive horizon was determined, not to say closed, in the 1950s, 1960s, and, though less firmly, the 1970s as well. He refers to the episode in American sociology where Alex Inkeles asked Wilbert Moore to describe "social change." At that time (1963), sociological theory dictated that sociologists were to see all change as an "abnormal" state. Moore answered by proposing to develop a full-fledged theory alongside of the structural paradigm – as if the two phenomena were independent of each other. The absence or weakness of a sociology of action fit very nicely with the communist taboo against collective social movements made up of workers or led by intellectuals.

Let me briefly review the long, difficult struggle of Eastern European sociologists to win acceptance and even dominance for explanatory paradigms that refused to grant any heuristic value to the Soviet dogma of a "harmonious society" composed of workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia. This propagandistic triad, with its representation of the social structure as a whole free of any major antagonism, had the force of law. It was inscribed in Soviet-world constitutions. And according to the Marxist scheme, it was scheduled to disappear: differences between the three components would be eroded or levelled, thereby "homogenising" them.

The first sociologists to criticise this schema were the Marxists, who had been granted permission to practise their profession by the communist powers-that-be – though they were, of course, under close surveillance. Paradoxically, it was when they found themselves faced with the dilemma of loyalty to the dogma or to a professional ethos that several of them chose to practise partially "disobedient" sociology. The work and history of the Marxist current amounts to little more than attempts to render official dogma operational. In the 1960s, Marxist sociologists in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia made two observations that led them to start systematically inventorying sources of conflict and centrifugal forces in the new social structure:

a) Unlike capitalism, socialism did not engender structural conflict between two essential classes, that is, owners of the means of production and owners of labour power (only). The fact that capitalists and large landowners had been stripped of their property meant that the binary opposition between workers and capitalists no longer held. The mechanism that used to generate inequality – that is, private ownership of the means of production – had ceased to operate, and the dichotomous class division based on one class's constant appropriation of the added value created by another had been abolished.

b) But empirical observation had demonstrated that despite the fact that the fundamental antagonism between workers and capitalists could no longer function as the basis for a description of how individuals were positioned in the social structure, the particular condition of workers had not disappeared. In fact, most of the dimensions characteristic of class situation remained in place. So, little by little, through a gradual shift from concepts to indices, Marxist sociologists slipped the grip of the idyllic official representation and began working to impose the conflict-of-secondary-interests

paradigm. Those conflicts were situated in the distribution sphe-
re. The relevant theory here was Julian Hochfeld's "maximising
advantage and minimising suffering" (Hochfeld 1963). The socio-
logy school of Budapest, protected by Andreas Hegedus, took up
where Hochfeld's thinking left off (see Mink 1987b). These so-
ciologists managed to start with the dominant doctrine and open
up a space of observation. The sociologist Zsuzsa Ferge, who was
close to Hegedus, considered that members of society assess exi-
sting inequalities with reference to the theory that social equality
can exist. This explains why, following her rationale, relatively mi-
nor inequalities can cause tensions (Becskehazi & Kuczi 1995). In
this way the idea was introduced that there could be competition
between different social groups around what were in fact tempo-
rary conflicts of interest that did not fundamentally call the system
itself into question.

But Marxists sociologists ran up against what appeared to be a theo-
retical obstacle yet was in fact a political one. If the only inequalities in
socialist society were those inherited from the pre-communist past, which
were therefore doomed to wither away, then what was driving development
of the new inequalities? It was this question that proved fatal to the regime.
When Zygmunt Bauman (1964) or Włodzimierz Wesołowski (1962) raised
the question of political power and the determinant role of an individual's
position in the political hierarchy – the implication being that the politi-
cal elites were in a good position to appropriate the famous value added
(Jacek Kuroń and Karol Modzelewski's theory is the culmination of this
line of thought (1967)), it was clear that the cognitive resources of what was
known at the time as the revisionist Marxist approach had been exhausted.
That door was now closed, and sociologists wishing to reopen it would
have to become open opponents of the powers-that-be.

Then began the era of "Marxist-Weberian" sociology, ushered in with
a wave of research on multidimensional stratification conducted in Hun-
gary by Zsuzsa Ferge, Istvan Kemeny, Rudolph Andorka (Hungarian Sta-
tistical Office 1967) and others; in Poland by Włodzimierz Wesołowski
and Maciej Słomczyński (1977); and in Czechoslovakia by Pavel Machonin
and his team and their renowned survey.

That the social structure remained the exclusive ideological domain of
the political power is attested by what happened to these Czechoslovakian
sociologists. The price Pavel Machonin paid for investigating Czechoslo-
vakian socialist society was twenty years of conducting entirely unrelated

studies in a farming cooperative; his colleague Zdenek Strmiska chose exile in Paris. After the Prague Spring of 1968, it became dangerous to distance oneself at all from the social dogma of the harmonious society. It was Machonin's team who put forward, in *Ceskoslvenska Spolecnost* [Czechoslovak Society], the hypothesis that the communist powers-that-be enjoyed privileges in all dimensions of social life.

While analyses of social stratification improved knowledge of Soviet-type societies, particularly by quantifying inequalities and differentiations, they did not provide insight into change mechanisms since the stratification paradigm can only explain functions, or at best how dysfunctions are absorbed; it cannot probe how social actors came into being, or social movements rooted in unequal distribution of civil and political rights.

Enriching the stratification paradigm with interactionism and behaviour theories, as Andrzej Malewski did in his studies of Poland (1964), should have encouraged sociologists to look for discontinuities in the social structure in terms of status incongruence and dissonance, in line with the hypotheses of Gerhard Lenski or Léo Festinger. Paradoxically, however, whereas the enriched stratification paradigm took over for nearly a decade (the 1970s) due to the work of Wesołowski and his team, it generated a counterhypothesis, that is, the "theory of the decomposition of class characteristics," whose corporatist aim was to demonstrate the professionalism of sociological study by demonstrating its ability to objectively identify all dimensions of social diversity using reliable tools. This ultimately led to formulating the explanation that differences found in the level of individuals' social positions ("high," "low") did not engender discontent or frustration because there were other compensations. For example, a doctor who was paid less than an unskilled worker did not manifest "categorical" discontent because his prestigious position on the social ladder compensated for any potential feeling of deprivation. Conversely, discontent was not generated among workers with manual skills that had been relegated to the bottom of the prestige scale, because such skills gave them greater material satisfactions than those found in occupations of higher repute. Clearly, sociologists had made a paradoxical finding that was of great comfort to the political powers-that-be: their decision to underline the superiority of their professional techniques – that is, their objectivity, which derived from their being at least partially professionally independent of communist ideology – had generated data that was reassuring on the question of the stability of a social system which was, in fact, already being undermined by the first public movements of contestation.

In Poland the increasing number of signals that the political and social system was unstable, particularly at the end of the 1970s, gave rise to a "populist" school of sociology that described Soviet-type society as increasingly inegalitarian. It used extremely strong, irreducible binary oppositions, now openly setting the political powers-that-be – them – against the population (or the working class or civil society): us (Malanowski 1981; Tymowski 1977). Timorously, sociologists began to focus their research on the communist *nomenklatura*, beginning with the middle echelon (Wasilewski 1978), in order to identify beyond any doubt the determinant differentiator role played by the political factor and to publicise that finding.

In the 1980s, the question became why, when normalisers in Czechoslovakia had effectively "starved" sociology, sociologists in Poland and Hungary developed such divergent approaches to their respective societies (though they did share a remarkable ability to demystify communist dogma). Sociologists in both societies described the *symptoms* of a new dual class structure, whereas it was primarily in Hungary that some sociologists set out to describe their *mechanisms* and therefore their *causes*. Sociologists investigating symptoms set about, for example, calculating income gaps, which had attained a range of 1 to 20 (not to mention the income of members of political rank), or defining the poverty line and describing manifestations of it, thereby daring to invalidate the last taboo of socialist propaganda – the claim that communism had definitively eradicated the phenomenon of poverty so particular to capitalist regimes. Sociologists investigating mechanisms blamed the new social divisions on the individuals who dominated distribution and redistribution mechanisms. György Konrád and Iván Szelényi (1979) found a growing correlation between belonging to the Communist Party and possessing management skills attested by increasingly high educational degrees (see also Szelényi 1986–1987). While belonging to the *nomenklatura* had always been essential for anyone wishing to gain access to the ruling class, in the late 1980s education and political adhesion were gradually becoming necessary for access to distribution and redistribution mechanisms. In support of this thesis, studies of social mobility began to show that the political and educational elites (the intelligentsia) increasingly overlapped and "reproduced." This in turn led to the thesis that the intellectuals were "on the road to class power" in socialist countries (a way to avoid saying they had taken over).

The priority in both approaches was to examine and explain the stability of the Soviet system, and this included reflecting on possible adaptations of deviant mechanisms (Iván Szelényi, Elemér Hankiss, Rudolph

Andorka). The exhaustion of the "structuralist" paradigm led some Polish sociologists to try a systemic approach (Andrzej Rychard, for example, was interested in how system and anti-system could cohabit and endure without legitimacy or legitimation (Rychard & Sułek 1988)) or to return to a sociology of values and representations to measure individuals' views and assessments of the situation. The latter approach confirmed the "sociological void" that had already been identified in the mid-1950s by Stefan Nowak's survey – the void, that is, between two extremes of identification: the Family and the Nation (Nowak 1966) – while still other sociologists probed what enabled a political system that seemed devoid of legitimacy to endure. For Mirosława Marody (1988), "collective good sense" – a variant of the "Kadarian compromise" concept – functioned as a kind of substitute for political legitimacy: individuals concocted survival niches for themselves within a system they did not endorse.

These two opposed approaches did produce different ways of conceptualising social reality. The claim among sociologists interested in mechanisms was that because the political power was by nature totalitarian, it dichotomised the structure: on one side, the Party and its elites; on the other, a more or less undifferentiated population. For sociologists of this persuasion, the structure of socialist societies was completely different from that of democratic, market societies. Sociologists interested in symptoms, meanwhile, went no further than researching stratification, and they claimed that socialist society was a variant of industrial society and was therefore composed of the same classes or strata.

The truly innovative approaches were those that, following the Hungarian economists, stressed the distribution and redistribution mechanisms peculiar to Soviet-type systems. Szelényi, Hankiss (1986), and Tamás Kolosi showed that Soviet-type societies were dual: two types of society cohabited, "governed" by different distribution systems – state redistribution mechanisms and market mechanisms. Hankiss went so far as to posit a parallel society, an echo of the concept of parallel economy.

We can see the usefulness of this paradigm of dual society for explaining what Weberian sociology could not: how a system that had exhausted its legitimation resources could continue to exist. But we can also see its usefulness in explaining the atypical end of that system: how and why it could manage to dissolve peaceably. For the paradigm showed how, in Soviet-type systems, political position determined an individual's overall social status by means of a "corrective" effect that became stronger with the later "invisible" "spontaneous" pressure towards privatisation and so

towards a kind of market. With this paradigm it became possible to grasp precisely what was transitory and shifting in the social situation of post-communist countries – countries where the power of market-based distribution mechanisms was increasing at the expense of state redistribution mechanisms. If we wanted to use Pierre Bourdieu's, James Coleman's, or Robert Putnam's concepts about the convertibility and mobility of different types of capital, we could say that in Soviet-type systems social position was largely determined by political capital, together with cultural capital in the final phase. So the higher one's education and/or useful skill level, the greater one's chances of attaining a top position in the various hierarchies and enjoying the advantages that came with it. In 1989, political capital, coalescing with social capital (networks), could finally culminate in economic capital, which then became determinant for the individual's social position in post-communist society. This argument dominated studies of the post-communist elites, as we shall see.

The underside of these debates on socialist society was a battle over methodology in which a number of Eastern European sociologists, including Stefan Nowak, were active. In response to what had been the absolute domination of historical materialism and dialectic, a debate developed on how the scope of sociological laws and discoveries were related to research costs. The economic argument concealed an ideological purpose: to disqualify those in favour of applying Marxism in sociology. To summarise the argument briefly, on one side was the objective of formulating great universal laws such as "The proletariat alone can put an end to social injustice because of its position in the capitalist socio-economic system," on the other, the gradation of hypotheses into micro, meso, and macro, with the understanding that only micro hypotheses were worthy of sociological investigation because they were based on a limited number of variables and indices and therefore empirically verifiable at a feasible financial cost. (This was universalism versus naturalism.) Gradually, the small group of methodology specialists and logicians who had introduced positivism and the quantitative approach (strongly influenced by Paul Lazarsfeld's methodology) grew to include the young sociologists who were once again being trained in faculties of sociology and philosophy at the University of Warsaw, University of Łódź, and Jagiellonian University in Kraków. By the 1970s and 1980s, and with varying degrees of intensity depending on the researcher, quantitativism and positivism had become the dominant approach, and the supremacy of English-language and especially American sociology was no longer contested. Analogous phenomena have been

noted in "free society" sociology, particularly in France, where all dominant theoretical approaches gave priority to big systems: Durkheimism, like Marxism, dictated the law in university departments until the 1950s and even 1960s. The two worlds were of course still differentiated by the vital factors of oppression, state control, and political and professional risk-taking that had serious existential consequences. And those differences varied with the degree of intolerance in each Sovietised country. The situation of Hungarian sociologists was completely different from that of East German sociologists, and the situation of Czechoslovakian or Russian sociologists differed radically from that of Polish sociologists.

But Eastern European sociologists were not cut off from the world or from major developments in international sociology, especially from the mid-1950s and 1960s. The Poles, Bulgarians (Congress of Varna), Hungarians, and Soviets took an active part, namely by way of the International Sociology Association.[4] What separated them was their more or less subjective assessment – based, of course, on their observations of communist censor behaviour in their respective countries – of what was empirically acceptable to the authoritarian powers and what could be taken up and adapted to the circumstances of the Soviet-type political regime that these sociologists were an organic part of and with which they entertained complex relations, as explained above. Despite their contact with international and especially American sociology, Eastern European sociologists developed their own vision of what sociology is and should be. The result was that when their situation of political dependence finally ended they found themselves face-to-face with their discipline in its "raw state," the ways it had evolved outside "their world," and with a world that presented new enigmas.

/// Conclusion

It is worthwhile describing the context of early post-communism: specifically the resources available for the first sociological research (early 1980s)

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[4] There are many indicators for assessing and ranking in international competition in connection with a particular academic discipline: number of indexed references, vitality of the related professional association, quantity of production in the home language and translations, and presence in international networks of excellence. Here it is worth noting that during the period under study, several presidents and vice-presidents of the International Sociological Association – the association most representative of the sociology research being done throughout the world – were Polish: Jan Szczepański (1966–1970) and Piotr Sztompka (president, 2002–2006), not to mention Stanisław Ossowski (vice-president, 1959–1962) and Magdalena Sokolowska (1978–1982). Szczepański, Ossowski and Sokolowska, then, held office during the communist regime.

on communism and post-communism, the uncertain beginnings of this research, how it was perceived, and its blockage points.

Overall, Eastern European sociologists ended up developing convictions similar to their Western counterparts, though they were at times more dogmatic due to their prior political situations. The rejection of non-positivist approaches; the belief that sociology was its own, independent discipline, which must remain free of influence from "parasite" disciplines; faith in an all-encompassing theoretical synthesis or the quest for a paradigm which, if not unique, would at least be dominant – not to mention the near-monopoly of American sociological thinking – were features shared by "free society" and "obedient" sociology. The only real difference was the emphasis. For example, in Western academic institutions, post-Marxist, anti-positivist sociology could cohabit with rising positivism, whereas Marxism and critical Marxist approaches were no longer really acceptable in the East, except in circles close to the state power. There was, however, one substantial difference: at the end of communism, Eastern European sociologists not only had to deal with the worldwide "crisis in sociology" but also to free themselves from the "habit" of operating under political constraint and to assimilate other constraints, this time originating in the liberal economy. The major changes in international sociology that had lastingly destabilised sociology under communism also upset post-communist arrangements for sociology. It could almost be said that in the encounter between Eastern and Western sociology, each seemed attracted to the other's role. Whereas "obedient" sociology wagered nearly everything on the positivist, "scientistic" approach and therefore on quantitativism – which was paradoxically easy to practise under communism due to the abundant "funny money" proffered by the Marxist state (despite the fact that the research in question attacked its ideology) – in the democratic countries, qualitative approaches, largely influenced by philosophy (particularly phenomenology) and psychology, not to mention psychoanalysis, were gaining ground again. The normative boundary between "quality" (i.e., quantitative) sociology and "poor" (qualitative) sociology disappeared in the West well before communism collapsed in Europe. And it was not easy for Eastern Europeans to admit that their discipline was unlikely to become an exact science similar to natural science when this was the very argument they had used to combat Marxism, which they viewed as "non-science."[5] Yet another dimension of traditional sociological understanding

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[5] The split referred to here is not the one between facts and values, between "spontaneous" sociologists ("experts") and objective sociologists (who distanced themselves from their research

raised problems for the entire group, not to say generation, of Eastern European sociologists who began practising in the 1950s and 1960s. I'm referring to the axiom of the superiority of modern, modernising civilisation – precisely the type of civilisation that had been fairly thoroughly attained in Europe, the United States, and Japan and toward which the rest of the world seemed to be moving or to wish to move. For Eastern European sociologists – and Raymond Aron – developments in the West and East were two different facets of one and the same process. This assumption remains strong even now, when in fact many of the new social phenomena that gave signs of emerging in the twentieth century do not at all fit into an analysis in terms of modernisation.

The profusion of sociological and para-sociological schools in Europe eclipsed American sociology as little else could. "Despite globalisation, there was no reason to suspect that national intellectual traditions would converge" (Szacki 2003: 859). "American sociology not only ceased to be attractive to other countries – it had become so between the two world wars and immediately after the second one – but also began to undergo influences from European sociology, which recovered the position it had lost during the first half of the twentieth century" (ibid.). For sociologists who had been applying approaches shaped by the domination of communism, it was surprising and intensely bewildering to discover this surrounding reality.

Last, the pre-eminence of the empirical, which helped free sociology from the grip of philosophy (itself considered a pre-science), simultaneously instated sociology as an objective science and receded to such a degree that it became possible to reopen areas of sociology that had been heavily influenced by philosophy. Here, as in the case of the other trends mentioned, the ideological gap between Eastern European and Western European sociologists – the former more zealous positivists than their counterparts from democratic countries – made the Easterners extremely wary of the way social theory was evolving (Jonathan Turner described it as being like a philosophical discussion group). Moreover, according to Jerzy Szacki, the question of what properly belongs to sociology and what does not was no longer relevant. Eastern European sociologists, seasoned

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object) hypothesised by Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron in *Le Métier de Sociologue* (1967), though it does resemble it. Bourdieu et al.'s epistemological doctrine is strongly criticised today by sociologists who see their discipline as the dual practice of observing facts and making them intelligible (restoring them) to the studied society in the form of expertise. On this question see Singly 2002.

fighters in a battle for the purity of their discipline, could only have been shocked and offended at first by what looked like scientific eclecticism.

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/// Abstract

The model of society put forward by Marxist theoreticians as descriptive of a post-revolutionary society had a quasi-constitutional status in countries that claimed to adhere to Soviet-type socialism, particularly those of Eastern Europe. As the model's main function was to legitimise the actions of those who wielded power, it acquired doctrinal significance. In the Eastern European countries, the history of the sociology of social structure and stratification clearly illustrates the conservative nature of official doctrine. However, the real mechanisms of society, in so far as they deviated from the official paradigm, upset doctrinal stability and may consequently have led, if not to a revision of the official dogmas, then to the acceptance of a certain degree of flexibility. In order to understand the development of the theoretical analysis of social stratification and social inequalities (the most sensitive area of debate) in totalitarian and post-totalitarian Soviet-type societies, it must be noted that post-war sociology has reflected a continuing effort by sociologists to create an independent scientific framework for their discipline. This is why we try, in this article, to combine evaluating the attitudes of different Eastern European sociologists from across the

political spectrum with the evolution and adaptation of their theoretical approaches and creativity.

Keywords:
sociology of social structure, sociologists and the sociology profession, Soviet-type regimes (totalitarian and post-totalitarian), social diagnosis competition in Soviet-type regimes

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NATIONAL SOCIOLOGIES

SOCIOLOGY VERSUS IDEOLOGY IN COMMUNIST ROMANIA: SOCIOLOGY'S RE-EMERGENCE AND ROLE

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By the end of the Second World War, Romanian sociology was an academic discipline with a distinguished tradition. It was hoping to obtain international recognition during the 1939 International Sociological Congress, which was scheduled to take place in Bucharest, but the outbreak of the Second World War annulled what was supposed to be Romanian sociology's "finest hour." Interwar Romanian sociology was to a certain degree synonymous with its most important figure, Dimitrie Gusti, who was also the founder of the Bucharest Sociological School (the "Monographic School"), a scholarly infrastructure built around an impressive institutional network. Dimitrie Gusti became the chair of the Sociology Department of the University of Bucharest just after the end of the First World War, and subsequently initiated several projects that led to the institutionalisation of sociology in Romania. He was the founder and manager of various institutions: the Association of Science and Social Reform (1919–1921), the Romanian Social Institute (1921–1939, 1944–1948), the Romanian Institute of Social Sciences (1939–1944), and the Village Museum (founded in 1936). He also initiated the publication of several periodicals: the *Archive for Science and Social Reform* (1919–1943), and *Romanian Sociology* (1936–1944). Gusti and his "school" focused on monographic rural studies, and initiated intensive research into Romanian villages. The main purpose was to implement an extensive project of modernising Romanian society through social intervention, community development, and social engineering. Gusti's project was extensively supported and financed by the state authorities,

through the Prince Carol Royal Cultural Foundation, which Gusti managed from 1934 on. Gusti's school brought together important intellectuals of the time and its most outstanding figures were Henri H. Stahl, Traian Herseni, Mircea Vulcănescu, and Anton Golopenția.

The post-war geopolitical arrangements put Romania within the Soviet sphere of influence, a factor that determined the country's subsequent evolution. The Soviets favoured the uninfluential Romanian Communist Party, a small organisation which had been outlawed in the previous two decades. Within a couple of years, the communists had managed to gain full political control: by 1945 they were already dominating the Council of Ministers; in 1946 they won the elections (which were grossly falsified); and in 1947 they forced King Michael I to abdicate and instituted the Popular Republic.

After the establishment of a Soviet-type communist regime in Romania, sociology was labelled "bourgeois" and subsequently banned. Political repression and the ideological inflexibility of the communist regime delayed the re-institutionalisation of the discipline for almost two decades. It was only rehabilitated in the early 1960s when a fortunate and supportive political and ideological context allowed it to re-emerge and separate itself from the other social sciences. My paper will discuss not only the institutional articulation of the re-emerging discipline, but mainly how sociology was re-imagined and re-contextualised as a discipline expected to provide the data and means for a new cycle of modernisation. The role that the political regime intended to assign to sociology – as a science in charge of "technical social modernisation" (Cotoi 2011: 142) – is revealed by an overview of Romanian sociology's major themes during the socialist period, and will also be considered. In order to better understand the role sociology was assigned within communist society, it is important to ask a few questions: on what theoretical framework did sociology re-emerge in the early 1960s? To what extent did sociology manage to individualise itself in relation to the official ideology, and especially in relation to historical and dialectical materialism? What role did the political power assign to sociology, and what were sociology's main functions and/or purposes?

/// Post-war Eastern European Sociologies: The Historical Context

The establishment of communist regimes within the countries that entered the Soviet sphere of influence conditioned the post-war history of social sciences in Central and Eastern Europe. From a general survey of the sub-

ject, it is easy to ascertain a similar pattern in all these cases. The annul-ment of the previous aggregated forms of the discipline – especially in the countries with an important tradition in the field (i.e., Poland, Czechoslo-vakia, and Romania), was a common, similar, and unitary phenomenon. The political power's first step was a general denunciation of the "old struc-tures." The next focused on institutions and individuals. The main purpos-es of this strategy relate to the newly established regime's need for control, but also to the desire to institute Marxism-Leninism as the only legitimate ideology (Mespoulet 2017: 3). Everything that existed outside the accept-ed canons of dialectical and historical materialism was frequently labelled bourgeois and reactionary, and subsequently censured or banned (Szamta & Wysienska 2000: 2116–2123). Like the other social sciences, sociology was unconditionally affected. Perceived as a "bourgeois pseudo-science" or even a "reactionary science," sociology was removed from the academic field and curricula (Keen & Mucha 1994: 6), the research infrastructure was dismantled, and the professionals of the discipline were compelled to "migrate" towards other fields, mainly anthropology, folklore, and statis-tics. The ideological dogmatism and the implicit immobility diminished in the next decade, particularly during the Khrushchev thaw (Weinberg 2004: 11; Zemtsov 1986: 3–4). Several important changes occurred. The most important involved the term itself. "Sociology" left the dictionary of taboo words and was accepted both in academic and political discourse. The "bourgeois pseudo-science of society" became "bourgeois sociology"; the Soviet Union and its satellite states responded with Marxist sociology (Batygin & Deviatko 1994: 14–15), which was infrequently confused, at least initially, with historical materialism. Other advances led to a resump-tion of academic contacts with the West, and the participation of Eastern European scholars in international debates and institution-building (Shalin 1978: 173). Although strictly monitored by the political power, this global, cross-border dialogue was an important step in the development of sociol-ogy in Eastern Europe.

The subsequent evolutions of sociology in the Soviet Bloc countries followed a specific pattern: the emergence of a national professional organi-sation, the establishment of the first university departments or research centres, and the appearance of specialised periodicals (Voříšek 2008: 90–91). The re-institutionalisation of sociology was determined by several cir-cumstances, both internal and external. The process that led to the revival of the discipline was confronted with various initiatives and actors, but each and every time the political power was the one that approved and

"validated" the re- institutionalisation (Voříšek 2008: 91). It is important to note that the revival of sociology seems to have been a common phenomenon among these countries, despite their differences, that is, their distinct historical pasts, heterogeneous traditions as regards sociological research, and divergences in intellectual trends (Wiatr 1971: 1–19). Nonetheless, the process was neither unitary, nor simultaneous. There were different stages in the evolution of sociology, with the causes behind these differences being related either to certain previous intellectual traditions, or to the inconsistency and reluctance of the political regimes (Sztompka 2004: 159–174).

/// Continuity or Rupture in Post-war Romanian Sociology?

A debate initiated by the review *Sociologie românească* [Romanian Sociology] in their first issue of 2005 gives an accurate idea of how the history of Romanian sociology under socialism is currently perceived by the professionals of the discipline. In an interview, under the heading "Rupture and/ or Theoretical-Methodological Continuity between Pre-war Sociology and Sociology in the Communist Period: The Status of the Marxist-Leninist Paradigm; Defensive Strategies of Sociology,"[1] several sociologists expressed opinions that summarised the issue (Buzărnescu et al. 2005: 5–37).

One of the interviewees stated that there was a clear rupture between interwar and post-war sociology and that the rupture was particularly visible in the first decade after the communist regime came to power, when sociology was "creatively denied." However, he also asserted that there was a kind of continuity between the two, as exemplified by the destinies of Henri H. Stahl or Traian Herseni, interwar sociologists who resumed their activity in the communist period. Moreover, another phenomenon that would confirm the "continuity" was represented by the (monographic) field research that was being conducted even when sociology was banned. Despite being subsumed to other purposes, these enquiries sought the verification of scientific hypotheses. The same author further argued that there had been no Marxist-Leninist paradigm in Romanian sociology under socialism, as no professional had seriously adopted such an outlook. Another interviewee asserted that the establishment of communism led to an obvious rupture in sociology, a science with a "critical vocation," since historical materialism, conceived as a "dogmatic and simplistic version of Marxism," was substituted for sociological analysis. The same interviewee also suggested that the influence of interwar Romanian sociology (and es-

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[1] All the quotations in this paper have been translated into English by the author.

pecially of the Bucharest Sociological School) on post-war sociology was conspicuous, particularly after 1965. The other opinions expressed seemed to suggest the same perspective as regards Romanian sociology in the aftermath of the Second World War. The year 1948 was labelled the point of an obvious break, marked by the dissolution of university departments and specialised research facilities. Nonetheless, the existence of a connection that signalled continuity between interwar and post-war Romanian sociology was firmly asserted. The "durability" of the discipline was ensured by the "tradition of monographic research," which was preserved and perpetuated, even if it was undertaken under the "scientific umbrella" of other disciplines: philosophy, statistics, economics, and geography.

The main ideas expressed in the above debate summarise a general trend in Central and Eastern European countries that attempts to identify and associate the epistemic framework of national sociologies within autochthonous intellectual traditions. In the Romanian case, the continuity between interwar and post-war Romanian sociology is rather a postsocialist narrative, even if the topic was also discussed and disputed at the time, as will be explained later. Other important factors of the post-war "rupture" were also overlooked. The controversial rapports between interwar sociology (mainly the Bucharest Sociological School) and the political power (Momoc 2012), the allegiance of several sociologists to the Iron Guard (a far-right/fascist Romanian interwar movement)[2] (Boia 2011: 158; Momoc 2012: 248–288), and the active involvement of several other sociologists in the authoritarian regimes in Romania during the Second World War (Boia 2011: 235, 312) were insufficiently addressed.

/// A Controlled Re-institutionalisation of Sociology (1959–1977)

A descriptive history of the re-institutionalisation of sociology in communist Romania can be easily compiled. In May 1959, the National Sociological Committee (NSC) was established (T.B. 1962: 225). The same year, the NSC was affiliated to the International Sociological Association (ISA), and a Romanian delegation participated at the IV International Congress of

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[2] The Bucharest Sociological School gathered intellectuals with diverse political backgrounds: Henri H. Stahl, Gheorghe Vladescu-Răcoasa, and Mihail Pop were known for their sympathy for the Left; Miron Constantinescu was a member of the clandestine Communist Party; Dumitru C. Amzăr, Ernest Bernea, and Traian Herseni were members and doctrinaires of the Iron Guard (an interwar Romanian Fascist movement). While Dumitru C. Amzăr chose exile after the end of the Second World War (refusing to return to Romania while occupying an office at the Romanian Legation in Berlin), Ernest Bernea and Traian Herseni were imprisoned for their prior political convictions by the Communist authorities.

Sociology, organised in Milan and Stresa (Italy) (T.B. 1962: 226). Several years later, in 1963, after almost fifteen years of absence, a specialised periodical, *The Romanian Journal of Sociology*, was published by the NSC. Furthermore, in 1965 the Centre for Sociological Research, subordinated to the Romanian Academy, was established (Constantinescu 1970: 11). The same year, the General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, Nicolae Ceaușescu,[3] acknowledged the importance of sociology and the subsequent necessity to reconsider it, in a speech that guaranteed its renewal. In the following years, departments of sociology were founded within the major Romanian universities in Bucharest, Iasi, and Cluj (Costea et al. 2006: 367). In addition, several other research facilities, specialised institutions, and sociological laboratories were initiated in the following years (Constantinescu et al. 1974: 172–180).

Besides these factual details, in order to comprehensively understand the re-institutionalisation process, important issues and questions need to be addressed. First, the establishment of the NSC was not a private (individual or collective) initiative, but an assignment the regime commissioned to several high-ranking officials or representatives in the social sciences.[4] The active interference of the political decision-makers entailed unreasonable control over the scientific framework of the new discipline and consequently altered it. Thus, the "new" sociology emerged as a "captive" science, imposed by the regime. Moreover, the representatives commissioned for the assignment had only limited or peripheral association with sociology (an exception was Tudor Bugnariu, a Marxist philosopher with a bachelor's degree in sociology) (1933) (Bosomitu 2015: 341). Romanian delegations (generally including the same officials of the NSC) participated in the ISA international congresses in 1959 (Milan and Stresa) and 1962 (Washington, D.C.), but aside from its activities abroad, the NSC advanced no clear plan or programme for a complete institutionalisation of the dis-

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[3] Nicolae Ceaușescu (1918–1989), at one time an apprentice shoemaker, he became a member of the clandestine Communist movement at the age of fourteen, being arrested and imprisoned several times during the interwar period. In the post-war years, he occupied influential offices within the party and state structures. After the death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party (1945–1965), he was elected by the Central Committee to be his successor. In 1974, he instituted the office of President of the Republic, to which he was elected every five years until his death. He was overthrown by a huge popular uprising in December 1989. Arrested, he was indicted in a summary trial on 25 December 1989, sentenced to death, and executed the same day.

[4] National Archives of Romania (NAR), Council of Ministers fonds, section Athanase Joja Cabinet, file 15/1959, p. 6: "Address from the Central Committee's Internal Affairs Section."

cipline.[5] In the early 1960s the NSC officials acted mainly as "diplomats," assigned to an ideological rather than a scientific mission (Constantinescu 1972: 9–10; Rostas & Stahl 2000: 170), and seemed to have no interest in the further development of sociology beyond the current structures. Still, the existence of the Committee permitted a cautious and controlled acceptance and receptiveness towards sociology, and indirectly influenced the subsequent evolution of the discipline. Another important element in this process was external pressure (the advancements made in the field by the other socialist countries). In 1963, officials of the Central Committee's Science and Art Section discussed and accentuated the Romanian Academy's non-performance in fields where other socialist academies (mainly the Soviet and Polish academies of sciences) had significantly progressed – the case of "concrete sociology" was emphasised.[6] Due to this specific situation, several initiatives that aimed at a further institutionalisation of sociology were authorised (Rostas & Stahl 2000: 164–165). While the regime made the first steps toward renewal of the discipline, the subsequent initiatives emerged from below – several academics or academic networks concurring that a "blind spot" had appeared in the social sciences field. Tudor Bugnariu, dean of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Bucharest was in charge of one of these initiatives. His inability to negotiate successfully between the political decision-makers and academia led to the interruption and later annulment of his project. In these circumstances, other initiatives surfaced to take advantage of the same opportunity. All were revoked by the return to power of Miron Constantinescu, a Marxist intellectual, senior Communist Party member, and former associate of the Bucharest Sociological School, who assumed dominance over the discipline. Imprisoned during the Second World War for communist activism, Constantinescu became an important member of the Communist Party leadership, occupying influential offices during the first post-war decade. He was later purged and removed from office, after a putsch attempt in 1956. Marginalised by Gheorghiu-Dej's regime – a situation that allowed him to resume his academic career – Constantinescu was to be rehabilitated by Nicolae Ceauşescu after 1965, regaining an important political position (Bosomitu 2015). Constantinescu became the promoter and protector of the "new" sociology (Zamfir 2009), mediating the complex rela-

[5] NAR, Council of Ministers fonds, section Athanase Joja Cabinet, file 15/1959, pp. 7–8: "Statute of the People's Republic of Romania National Sociological Committee."

[6] NAR, Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party fonds, Agitprop section, file 9/1963, pp. 35–37: "Protocol of the Central Committee's Science and Art Section Meeting (November 4, 1963)."

tion between it and the regime's decision-makers, while his political status gave the discipline precedence over the other social sciences (Kolaja 1974: 78; Tismaneanu 2004: 159–160).

The subsequent evolution of sociology in Romania was marked by several events which led to its being marginalised again. In 1970, the Academy of Social and Political Sciences was established in direct subordination to the RCP's Central Committee and assimilated the Romanian Academy's prerogatives and infrastructure in the social sciences field (Buletinul Oficial: 130). This evolution sealed the communist regime's control over the social sciences. One year later, Romania's cultural policies were subjected to a major ideological reorientation, including with the launch of Nicolae Ceaușescu's famous "July Theses" – a mini "Cultural Revolution" that implied the return of dogmatism, conformity, and the dismissal of every attempt at autonomy (Verdery 1991: 107, 113). Moreover, the untimely death of Miron Constantinescu (1974) deprived sociology of his support and influence among party officials and decision-making bodies (Mihailescu & Rostas 2007: 91). It was the start of a gradual decline. In the following years, the research infrastructure was dismantled, and in 1977 the study of sociology was restricted to postgraduate curricula (Costea et al. 2006: 368). All the university departments of sociology and sociological research facilities were disbanded, and after 1977 the only institution that included sociology in its curricula was the Ștefan Gheorghiu Academy of Social and Political Studies – the party academy, which was directly subordinate to the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee.

/// What Kind of Sociology Did Communist Romania Have?

By the late 1960s, sociology was a fully institutionalised academic discipline in Romania – with a professional association, departments in the major universities, an important research infrastructure (research institutes, laboratories), and several specialised periodicals. The first department of sociology was established in 1966, in the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Bucharest. Similar departments were founded a year later at the Babes-Bolyai University of Cluj and Alexandru Ion Cuza University of Iasi. Research laboratories, subordinate to these departments, were founded: in 1966 at the University of Bucharest, in 1968 at the University of Cluj (Kallós & Roth 1970: 123–125) and University of Timisoara, and a year later at the University of Iasi (Bărbat 1970: 127–129). Several others research facilities were subordinated to the Romanian Academy (Cernea 1970: 45–62), and

others were even established outside the academic field, such as the Research Centre for Youth Problems, a government agency founded in 1968 and subordinated to the Ministry of Youth Affairs (Bădina 1970a: 63–71, 1970b: 97–108; Schifirneţ 1999: 137–142).

Aside from this institutional articulation of the discipline, it is important to explain the ideological restrictions and conditions under which the social sciences in general, and sociology in particular, developed in communist Romania. Furthermore, it is necessary to discuss the role that the political regime intended to assign to sociology as a science in charge of "technical social modernisation" (Cotoi 2011: 142), the theoretical and ideological premises the "new society" was to be built upon, and how everyday practices challenged these theses.

The first important issue to be addressed refers to the "paternity" of the new Romanian sociology. As previously mentioned, the post-socialist narratives linked the renewed discipline with its interwar traditions, but the "connection" was rejected at the time (Constantinescu 1971: 209). Re-emergent Romanian sociology tried to individualise itself by appealing to autochthonous intellectual traditions. But these "traditions" never referred exclusively to the intellectual project sponsored by Dimitrie Gusti (of the Bucharest Sociological School) but rather to other preeminent intellectual figures considered to have forged some kind of "Romanian social thinking." This category included Dimitrie Cantemir, Nicolae Bălcescu, Theodor Diamant, Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, and so forth (Constantinescu et al. 1974). A possible link between post-1965 and interwar sociology was frequently dismissed, as the Bucharest Sociological School (and its theoretical framework) was considered to be "idealistic and eclectic." Therefore, "it never resisted the confrontation with social reality," and thus it was continuously "diluted, until it fell apart" (Constantinescu 1971: 208–210). Still, one relevant exception, which was to inspire the post-socialist narratives, must be mentioned. A programmatic article signed by Tudor Bugnariu (dean of the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest) and Traian Herseni (an important former member of the Bucharest Sociological School) advocated the reclamation of interwar traditions in sociology. Although the authors acknowledged the interwar sociology to have been "idealistic," "unscientific," and "obsolete," they also claimed that some of the techniques and methods it had employed could and should be reconsidered. Moreover, the two authors alleged that the "tradition of monographic research" (which was characteristic of interwar sociology), had never been lost, but had evolved during the years of assimilating Marxist

methodology (Bugnariu & Herseni 1964: 7). The thesis advanced by Bugnariu and Herseni was part of a more complex programme that considered a re-launch of sociological research in Romania – which was never accomplished, as previously mentioned. Still, a certain connection or continuity should be acknowledged, mainly in terms of personnel and its flow between the two periods. Even if the majority of the former sociologists were never rehabilitated, or recuperated, by the "new" discipline, some were part of the new project (i.e., Henri H. Stahl, Traian Herseni, Mihai Pop, Vasile Caramelea, etc.), even if they were never to acquire pre-eminent positions.

Another point of this discussion should refer to the degree of autonomy of sociology in relation to the official ideology in general, and historical materialism in particular. There are several hypotheses related to this issue. One suggests that there were no differences between Eastern European sociology and historical materialism, the two terms being synonymous, both referring to the same science about society. Another hypothesis maintained that historical materialism and sociology are two different concepts. The first concept refers to the theoretical and philosophical analysis of society, while the second to empirical investigation and generalisations based on this type of investigation. Finally, a third way would be defined by the idea that historical materialism overlapped sociology as it assimilates the results of empirical sociological research. In this case, it was admitted that historical materialism was more general than sociology because it included sociology; historical materialism was using the facts and conclusions set forth by sociological investigations (Wiatr 1971: 1–19). The Romanian case seems to fall into the second category. In official discourse, the re-emerged Romanian sociology was considered to be closely related to Marxist philosophy – defined as "a binomial unit composed of historical materialism and dialectical materialism." This "Marxist philosophy" was to act as a guide (or standard) not only to sociology but also for all the social sciences. Thus, sociology was not to be mistaken for historical materialism – a trend that was considered "ineffective, and even responsible for the impasse the discipline failed to overcome in the past decades" – but as subordinate to historical materialism, which had its precise role as "theoretical and methodological guide." Moreover, sociology was considered to have an "applicative" character as "its research results may constantly enrich the theory of historical materialism, and serve the political sciences, and scientific socialism" (Constantinescu 1971: 212). This way of defining the discipline may have decisively influenced its technical character during the communist regime (Cotoi 2011: 143–144) – as sociologists focused espe-

cially on empirical investigations, and only formally accepted the Marxist canons. But some authors occasionally challenged this official narrative, as no significant difference was to be perceived between the curricula of historical materialism and sociology (Rostas & Stahl 2000: 167).

A third point of our discussion should refer to the role assigned to sociology in communist society. Addressing this issue, we have to indicate the difference between the official discourse and reality. The official discourse imagined sociology as tri-functional. Aside from the purpose of the discipline, which was defined by its principal functions – the scientific and the critical – sociology was also imagined as capable of developing itself towards social-engineering projects (Mihăilescu & Rostas 2007: 56) – an idea which assigned sociology a third and fourth function, that is, a prospective and prognostic one:

> Sociology is the science that examines the totality of social relations between people and their developments, the actions and the social struggles, but also the social structures and social processes in their development; the aim of this survey is to discover the inner, inherent, and essential correlations between social facts, the constant and essential connections between phenomena, that enables the discovery of regularities and social laws. Discovering the laws of society, or of the social-economic structure, allows making assumptions, and prerequisites for predictions of social development. Therefore, sociology is not only a descriptive and analytical science, but also prospective and prognostic. Sociology elaborates predictions and prognoses (Constantinescu 1971: 275–276).

Despite this desideratum, the reality was quite different. Even if the majority of the discipline's new professionals were provided with scholarships and study trips abroad, to France, Belgium, Austria, or the United States (Bosomitu 2015: 346; Zamfir 2005: 57), connections with the newest trends in international sociology were at a low level. In essence, Romanian sociology remained to a degree reminiscent of the obsolete way of perceiving and defining the discipline – that is, understood rather in terms of a social philosophy and not as being able to develop into social engineering. Moreover, there are more palpable proofs that contradict the official discourse. The discipline regularly emphasised the component of social knowledge and the "objective analysis of social problems." Essentially, the curricula were designed to train sociologists (with a major focus

on the philosophical field) and not social engineers (Mihăilescu & Rostas 2007: 56; Rostas & Stahl 2000: 167). Still, as the theoretical framework of the "new" sociology indicated, the state extensively sponsored studies and research in order to evaluate and comprehend the "new society." Sociology was imagined as an instrument to serve the regime's desire for scientific knowledge. Thus, these studies' main purpose was not necessarily to reveal societal dysfunctions, but rather to challenge the dysfunctions, with the end of offering solutions for overcoming them. But the solutions provided by sociological surveys – when (and if) requested – were frequently acknowledged with extreme caution, and even with suspicion by the decision-makers, who often doubted their benefit. Due to this situation, and to the intricate process that led to sociology's re-institutionalisation (which was, after all, a negotiation between the initial, top-down political programme and the subsequent academic ones that emerged from below), sociology never managed to evolve into a "critical" discourse. A notable exception in this regard is the Law on Global Agreement. Before being promulgated in 1974, the law was used in a year-long social experiment in which it was tested and submitted to thorough sociological analysis in several industrial units in order to predict the effects it might produce (Mihăilescu & Rostas 2007: 53–54).

/// Romanian Sociology's Main Research Themes

The re-institutionalisation of sociology was not an independent phenomenon. It was largely determined by political will but also by the needs of the regime: "The reorganisation and improvement of sociological education, studies, and research is a necessity derived from the actual requirements of socialist society, and the need for a complete and multilateral knowledge of socialist reality" (Constantinescu 1971: 223).

Romanian society underwent massive reconfiguration (both economical and societal) during the first two decades of communist rule: industrialisation and urbanisation; collectivisation of agriculture; massive migration of population from rural to urban areas; and restructuring of cultural and educational systems. All these changes caused significant changes at a societal level, the appearance of new social categories, and the emergence and development of new types of human relationships. Sociology was thus supposed to understand and then decipher the consequences of these processes, and to discern the nature of the new relationships. It was supposed to provide solutions to overcome the regime's problems and impasses. So-

ciology was thus endowed with a functional role (or an operational function); the major themes around which the discipline revived were, in fact, the regime's problems, malfunctions, and failures. Although officially the thematic area of the re-emerging sociology included a variety of topics and concerns (theoretical approaches, the history of sociological doctrines, historical sociology, the methodology of sociological investigations, etc.), in reality it was mainly circumscribed to social realities (e.g., problems, malfunctions). Thus, great attention was paid to social phenomena and processes caused and/or influenced by the general and major policies (social, economic) of the regime. Sociological research focused on studies, investigations, and analyses of sub-systems – some of which were emergent, and with features and characteristics that required analyses for their efficient inclusion within the ultra-centralised macro-system (Costea et al. 2006: 371). The main topics of research were thus related to the industrialisation and urbanisation processes, and the collectivisation of agriculture – phenomena that led to a deep restructuring of Romanian society. Sociological research also covered issues related to the social and political implications of industrialisation and urbanisation, population dynamics (the exodus from rural to urban areas), the management of production, labour productivity, community life, workers' time budgets, and so forth (Constantinescu et al. 1974: 172–180). In addition, sociological investigation gave special attention to subjects related to the sociology of family, the sociology of populations (demography, health and hygiene studies), the sociology of youth (a very important theme in Romanian sociology, as a Research Centre for Youth Problems was founded in Bucharest and subordinated to the Ministry of Youth Affairs), the sociology of education, the sociology of culture, and the sociology of public opinion. Furthermore, problems limited to political practice – for instance, the sociology of mass organisations, the sociology of political propaganda, and the sociology of mass communication – also garnered considerable interest (Constantinescu 1971: 213–215).

These themes received more or less extensive study, which was financed by the state – proving that the regime acknowledged itself to be at an impasse. The type of disciplinary progress aimed at by sociology rarely went beyond empirical enquiries, focusing mainly on data collection and analysis. This tendency towards "technicality" and the cautious manner in which the sociological studies approached the regime's malfunctions were influenced by the complex relationship established between the academic field and the regime. While the re-emergence of sociology was a process that was prompted both from above and below – implying a cautious and

meticulous negotiation between the two sides, the subsequent evolution of the field continued in a similar pattern. Although the regime tried to subordinate and control the production of knowledge, the academic field permanently claimed its autonomy and self-rule, attempting to meet not only the political demands, but also the requirements of scholarship. This intricate relation between the two sides, which was characterised by the regime's claim to control and the academic field's attempts at autonomy, generated specific tensions between the professionals and the political decision-makers, and determined the discipline's gradual but inevitable decline.

/// Conclusions

The history of Romanian sociology during the communist regime is hard to explain. In the early post-war years, the new political regime had a hostile attitude towards sociology, considering it a "bourgeois pseudo-science of society." Thus sociology was banned for almost two decades. A significant political, ideological, and intellectual breakthrough occurred only in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The re-institutionalisation of sociology occurred in the mid-1960s, and led to an explosion of empirical studies, followed by a significant increase in sociological literature. But the discipline began to decline again in the second half of the 1970s. Even if sociology was never banned again, after 1977 it was a marginalised social science. In reality, the "golden age" of Romanian sociology during socialism lasted for just one decade. Within this time frame, the history of sociology was tumultuous, frenetic, and eventful. Still, the major difficulties in understanding this history lie in the difference between what was supposed to happen (or what sociology was supposed to become), and what really happened (what sociology really became).

The official discourse advocated certain ideas as facts, as follows:

a) Romanian sociology was re-institutionalised out of necessity – "the actual requirements of socialist society, and the need for a complete and multilateral knowledge of socialist reality" – as the regime tried to find explanations and solutions for the major reconfiguration society experienced during the first two decades of communist rule.

b) The resurgent sociology was supposed to develop itself detached from its interwar traditions, and the theoretical framework the discipline was supposed to fit was represented by Marxist philosophy.

c) Sociology was assigned an important role within communist society, as it was requested to provide the regime with solutions for the country's malfunctions. Besides the descriptive and analytical functions of the discipline, sociology was imagined to be capable of developing itself as social engineering. It was supposed to elaborate predictions and prognoses on the major social, economic, and cultural policies of the regime.

d) Sociology was supposed to provide the data and the means for a new cycle of modernisation.

The reality was rather different:

a) Romanian sociology was in fact re-institutionalised out of necessity, but the primary aims involved nothing more than establishing scholarly relations with the Western countries. The subsequent evolution of the discipline was also due to inertia – as paradoxical as this may seem – as sociology was largely influenced by external developments in the field.

b) Romanian sociology never developed as a Marxist sociology, and often only formally accepted Marxist canons. This fact influenced its technical character, and the preference for empirical studies and research.

c) Sociology was never fully accepted by the decision-makers as a science capable of offering solutions to the regime's malfunctions. When (and if) solutions were requested, they were regarded with caution, and sometimes with suspicion by the decision-makers. To a certain degree, Romanian sociology retained obsolete ways of perceiving and defining the discipline, which was rather understood in terms of a social philosophy and not as capable of developing as an instrument of social engineering. The sociology curriculum was designed to train sociologists (with a major emphasis on philosophy) and not social engineers.

d) The short time frame of its re-institutionalisation (a decade) never allowed sociology to develop a legitimate discourse on modernisation.

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/// **Abstract**

The post-war history of Romanian sociology followed a tortuous path, similar to the evolutions within other countries of the Soviet Bloc. Defined as a "bourgeois" and "reactionary" social science, sociology was purged from the academic field for almost two decades. Its subsequent re-institutionalisation in the mid-1960s was a process largely influenced by social evolution in Romania (industrialisation, urbanisation, and the collectivisation of agriculture), but also by the desire to re-connect the Romanian social sciences to the international field of dialogue and debates. My paper discusses not only the institutional articulation and development of sociology in communist Romania, but also how the discipline was re-imagined and re-contextualised by the regime.

Keywords:
communist Romania, history of sociology, sociology versus ideology

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POLISH SOCIOLOGY BETWEEN THE PROJECT OF ORGANISED DEVELOPMENT AND THE IDEA OF A RETURN TO NORMALITY

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Although the turning points in Polish sociology have reflected the turning points in recent Polish history, the discipline also displays an interesting continuity in terms of both its dominant subjects and the public role of sociological knowledge in post-war Poland.

I do not intend to make a comprehensive overview of the achievements of Polish sociology, which are much beyond the scope of one article. Nor do I try to synthesise its successful institutional development (compare Bucholc 2016). After being re-established in post-war Poland, sociology grew into a diverse, multidimensional discipline with its own methodological tradition, theoretical achievements, and strong international standing. For over half a century Polish sociology has been constantly changing, and developing new areas of study, specialties, and schools of thought. For all this time it has been considered a part of the global social science discipline, as Polish scholars have both participated in the development of sociology and their works have contributed to the research and interpretation of contemporary social processes. It is not my aim to reconstruct the history of the sociological field in Poland and analyse its divisions, although I am aware of their existence. I am rather looking for Polish sociology's consistency in its approach and main problems in regard to its primary object: Polish society. I assume some continuity in the way the role of sociology and sociological diagnoses have been perceived in Poland.

Sociology under state socialism (not only in Poland) was focused on problems typical of peripheral modernising societies. The conditions and restrictions of social development continued to be a constant topic of soci-

ological research during the entire post-war period. Comparing the socio-logical agenda before and after 1989, the dominant problems concern such issues as induced development in a peripheral and backward economy; the role of social engineering; ideas of modernisation, industrialisation, and Westernisation; and shifting social attitudes as a reaction to deep structural change. Interpretations have wavered between the idea of implementing a modernisation project and a search for the specificities of the "Polish way." There is also an interesting continuity in the public role of sociology. Sociologists in a developing society inevitably participate in the design of transformations and oversee their progress. This creates specific problems for researchers in determining their position in relation to the subject of study.

My intention is to mark some features of successive stages of sociol-ogy's development after the Second World War as seen from today's per-spective. In the beginning, sociology was focused on perception of the communist revolution as a social laboratory. In the 1960s and 1970s, in turn, Polish society underwent enforced industrialisation and urbanisation. In the next decade, studies were dominated by the critical analysis of the communist system in crisis. Finally, after 1989 social scientists started to study the post-communist transformation, which was seen as a "return to normality." All the time, sociological studies oscillated between the moni-toring of project implementation and recording of new grass roots pro-cesses. The social roles of sociologists were complex, and went far beyond the purely cognitive, involving questions of responsibility, commitment, and the usefulness of research. The Polish intelligentsia is imbued with the ethos of serving the public; social scientists also defined their motives in these terms.

/// The 1950s: A Social Laboratory of Structural Changes

The first post-war decade saw a profound transformation of Poland's social reality. Aiming to implement the ideological postulate of "a new order of social justice," the new authorities introduced systemic reforms, reaching the structural foundations of society. Their ideological goal was to activate the country's modernisation potential and enable a civilisational leap for-ward to industrial society. This policy served as a tool for the legitimisation of the new regime, which was imposed by a foreign power. In the first years after the war, the principal objective was to radically intensify and consolidate the transformation of the social structure of traditional rural

society. In line with their ideological and political agenda, communists based their rule on the rhetoric of social revolution. At its core was the postulate of transforming property relations in order to eliminate the "property-owning classes," mainly entrepreneurs, merchants, and the bourgeoisie, as well as the remnants of the landowning class and aristocracy. The land reform of 1944 and the subsequent nationalisation of trade and industry were followed later by the preferential access of peasant and working-class children to higher education; enforced industrialisation; and expansion of urban industrial centres. One of the direct results of these policies was increased rural-to-urban migration, which came on top of the mass movement of populations after the end of the war, with the border changes and the colonisation of the so-called Western Territories (*Ziemie Zachodnie*). This was followed by changes both in the social structure and in the state of social awareness.

The task for sociologists was to follow these processes. Poland became a social laboratory for radical reforms. The first years were essentially a continuation of the pre-war trends in Polish sociology, both in terms of the focus of studies and of interpretations. According to Jerzy Szacki, "maintaining continuity was all the easier for the fact that sociologists, most of them left-wing, were initially convinced that their expertise could be used in the new socio-political order. In general, they did not seem to experience any cognitive dissonance when confronting their theoretical views developed before the war with the new 'social demand' of the new system" (Szacki 1995: 110).[1] The case in point involved mainly a popular pre-war sociological postulate for the social advancement of the lowest social strata, particularly the peasantry. The old diagnosis of the required social reforms was implemented under the new circumstances of the emerging "system of social justice." The rhetoric of social revolution dominated in the 1950s. Such a revolution seemed likely to increase the possibility of the practical application of sociological expertise, and to improve the prospects for social diagnoses. However, these expectations proved futile following the rapid Sovietisation and ideologisation of all spheres of public life and the domination of Marxism-Leninism after 1948. Sociology in fact ceased to exist as a science. All departments of sociology at Polish universities were liquidated, and sociological studies were stopped for a few years.

The discipline recovered quite quickly after the fall of Stalinism, and one of the most productive periods in Polish sociology started. It assumed a new form in terms of both methodology and modes of conceptualisation.

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[1] All translations from Polish are my own.

One of the important factors in this change was the rare openness and international connectedness of Polish sociology. The first trip abroad by a group of Polish sociologists in 1956 was to France, but it was American sociology that had the strongest impact and replaced the Polish pre-war traditions of sociological studies. First established in 1957, contacts between the Ford Foundation and Polish sociologists developed in the years to come, considerably changed the Polish methodological approach, and introduced new methods of research. Such contacts also helped to open new fields of study, such as social psychology; public opinion surveys; the sociology of law, labour and industry; and social engineering (Sułek 2011). Many Polish sociologists, including Marxists, visited American universities, thus contributing to an opening of Marxist sociology to contemporary trends. It also strengthened the influence of non-Marxist sociological theories, which managed to hold their standing until the end of the People's Republic (Mucha & Krzyżowski 2014: 408; Sułek 2007). Poland is perhaps the only country in Eastern Europe where a dogmatic approach to Marxist sociology was avoided. The striving to overcome provincialism and to build a lasting connection with global sociology was strong throughout the post-war decades (Sztompka 1993: 19).

Sociological study at the time was focused on mass-scale phenomena, reflecting the vision that was propagated of the new order – mainly the social advancement of peasants and workers. On the other hand, the disappearance of entire social classes and the social impact of the process did not become a subject of analysis. Indeed, the end of the landowning class was summed up by the observation that "there are no detailed studies because they have not been conducted at all" (Szczepański 1960: 459). A similar silence surrounded the demise of the bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, and entrepreneurs; no particular thought was given to the lasting effects of the Nazi and Soviet policies of extermination or to the post-war nationalisation of trade and industry.

Sociological studies focused on the changes affecting the social categories that were the main target of the ongoing social revolution. New opportunities and changes in the ways of life of young people from rural areas became an important subject of research. The analysis of materials published in the series *Młode pokolenie wsi Polski Ludowej* [The Young Rural Generation of the People's Poland] set a lasting standard of research on the social advancement of the peasantry. The project closely resembled its predecessor from the interwar period, when Józef Chałasiński collected similar materials concerning the trajectories of peasant biographies (compare

Chałasiński 1938). The total of 5,475 texts collected in the 1961–1962 memoir competition enabled a diagnosis revealing a number of new tendencies, such as increasing individualisation and departure from the traditional rural awareness of a collective destiny, the growing value of education, including higher education, and the increasing urbanisation of the culture of the young rural population. This study also showed the increasing spatial, social, and mental mobility of the peasantry, and the beginning of the professionalisation of farming. (Chałasiński 1964, 1967). All these changes had been confirming the postulated trend toward accelerated modernisation of the most traditional social groups. The project of creating a "new man" involved transformation of the young people migrating to urban and industrial centres: "The working class is forming out of new people who have migrated to cities, urban elements – such as domestic servants and the lower strata of the petty bourgeoisie – and, first and foremost, the young people of rural and urban background" (Szczepański 1961: 9).

Apart from the emerging working class, sociologists were also interested in the process of forming a new intelligentsia, with a new progressive consciousness and new social tasks, as constructors of social change. This new intelligentsia was supposed to be produced by the opening of higher education. Józef Chałasiński criticised the "ghetto of the intelligentsia" (Chałasiński 1946). He returned to his assessment of the 1930s and characterised the class as an anachronistic by-product of peripheral capitalism which was detrimental to society under the new system. His extensive and vehemently critical study advocated the need for the emergence of a new intelligentsia. But the actual progress of these developments was quite far from what had been postulated and expected:

> In Poland, the attempt to create an intelligentsia of the working-class and peasant type has failed. The mass process of growth of the intelligentsia by acquiring higher education has occurred as a result of the traditional aspiration to move on from the working class and the peasantry to the intelligentsia. […] In the current, transitory phase, the intelligentsia has already lost its former social significance, but has not yet acquired a new one (Chałasiński 1958: 30).

Sociological studies conducted in the 1960s, when the generational change at Polish universities became a frequent subject of research, revealed that over 80% of the population with higher education had received

it after the war and over 50% of first-year students were of peasant or working-class background (Szczepański 1963). One of the more important findings was that "the number of people who [had] migrated from rural areas to urban centres was about 2 million, most of them between 18 and 24 years of age" (Pohoski 1963). The paths of social advancement were also monitored in the following years. By 1967 the proportion of working-class and, particularly, peasant students had declined, which indirectly confirmed the mechanism of the reproduction of the intelligentsia (Kubiak & Kwaśniewicz 1967).

Another effect of change was the new social category of small farmers working in factories and cultivating their land, the so-called peasant-workers (*chłoporobotnicy*), whose number was estimated at 1.5 million. The emergence of the group, which would remain part of the Polish social landscape for decades to come, was assessed as a positive element of modernisation (Turski 1963). In the period, rural sociology became an important discipline producing a large number of texts devoted not only to rural–urban migration, but also to analyses of the social situation. These were generally focused on comparing the current state of affairs with that in the early twentieth century and the interwar period, indicating the progress made in key areas. Sometimes this even involved repeat studies, as was the case of research on the village community of Żmiąca in the south of the country, first conducted by Franciszek Bujak in the early twentieth century and repeated fifty years later (Bujak 1903; Wierzbicki 1963).

Macrostructural analyses indicated the disintegration of the class structure, a process which was in line with the postulated model of a classless socialist society. However, the next decade saw the first observations of a divergence in status factors and a gradual decomposition of the social order of the People's Poland. These interpretations not only revealed the failure of the project of a communist revolution, but also indicated new, negative phenomena stemming from the reality of "real socialism" (Wesołowski 1975).

/// The 1960s: The Social Effects of Organised Development

The rhetoric of a "social laboratory" gradually subsided and gave way to the paradigm of industrialisation, the key issue discussed at the third Polish Sociological Congress held in 1965 (the first one after the war). This was a time of relative stabilisation and professionalisation of sociology, accompanied by a substantial release of ideological pressure. Marxism was

accepted as a general frame of reference, as socialism was accepted as a political and economic system (Bucholc 2016: 35). Empirical studies were proliferating due to the assumption that Poland was still a place of deep social transformation. Growing methodological competence was an additional factor. The visits of prominent Polish sociologists to research centres such as the Department of Sociology at Columbia University or the Bureau of Applied Social Research helped to introduce new research methods and resulted in the widespread conviction that methodology was the key to "modern" sociology (Sułek 2010: 332).

Industrialisation was approached as a combination of different processes forming the fundamental basis of all the changes and identified as a factor that "made an impact on all current developments in Poland" (Szczepański 1967: 5). It was understood as "a process of developing industry in the countries where it did not exist or was very weak, in the course of which a change occurs from a traditional society to one based on technical civilisation." The role of sociology was to rationally organise the processes in question (ibid.: 7); there was even a special institution established in 1962 for the purpose – Komitet Badania Regionów Uprzemysławianych [Institute for the Study of Regions Undergoing Industrialisation]. In 1971 it was transformed into the Institute of Rural and Agricultural Development of the Polish Academy of Science, which exists to this day.

Throughout the communist period in Poland, industrialisation was perceived as the key factor having a constant and paramount influence on society. In fact, it was treated as a synonym with "building socialism," as it embodied the implementation of the objectives of the system, where accelerated modernisation and closing the economic and infrastructure gap were identified as the main goals. At the time, Polish society was frequently analysed in terms of the product of organised industrialisation, and the positive social effects were considered to outweigh the costs of the process (Sufin 1979). It was not until much later that problems generated by the rapid expansion of industry across the country became apparent. Furthermore, interest in urban studies stemmed from the perception of urbanisation, much like industrialisation, as a vehicle of social development. Drawing on modernisation theory, the transformation of local communities was interpreted as a case of exogenous development induced by centrally planned industrial growth and the expansion of urban cultural patterns promoted by the centralised media. Large-scale studies on urban development were conducted, especially on new forms of housing estates (Jałowiecki 1976; Piotrowski 1966; Turowski 1976, 1979; Ziółkowski 1967).

The research was based on the assumption of almost unlimited possibilities of effective top-down regulations and the vision of a harmonious and conflict-free process of development in a centrally controlled society. Local, homogeneous, and closed communities were seen as anachronistic and to be replaced by vertical forms of organisation. At the same time, new patterns of local integration and cohesion were expected to flourish in industrial towns and cities.

/// The 1970s: The Social Engineering of a Socialist Society

As interpreted toward the end of the 1970s, the changes entered a new phase in which revolutionary methods were no longer justified. State intervention in the economic process might have been necessary at the point of departure, under the circumstances of a backward country "where different developmental barriers make it impossible to break away from the vicious circle of reforms followed by conservative backlash, stagnation and renewed attempts of reforms" (Morawski 1980: 115). However, the situation in which economic transformation reaches a certain level "both allows and requires a departure from the strategy of enforced industrialisation with its typical centralised decision-making system" (ibid.: 123). At that point of development, the control of the social system could be replaced by increased social participation. Over time, the justification for the top-down implementation of the modernisation project weakened significantly.

In the decade of the 1970s, technological progress became an important objective of Polish economic policy, in line with the expected gradual convergence of capitalism and socialism. The idea of a scientific revolution then gained increasing popularity in sociological studies. The role of knowledge in society and the problem of spreading innovation in a technological era appeared on the sociological agenda. The language of analysis incorporated Western reflections on the coming of a post-industrial society (Markowski 1973). In the context of state socialism it was associated with open opportunities, the professionalisation of social roles, and a functionalist view of society. Sociologists diagnosed high vertical mobility, even in comparison to Western societies (Janicka 1973).

All these changes were understood as the delayed effects of top-down, organised development and the implementation of public policies. They were based on a belief in the rationalisation of social life and the predominance of planned processes, because the assumptions were that, in state socialism, individual action did not create social structures spontaneously,

but filled centrally designed structures. This kind of sociological reflection shared an underlying vision of the peaceful coexistence of different sectors of society, rooted in the paradigm of structural functionalism, which was a popular theoretical framework at the time. It was based also on trust in science as an important factor in managing the economy and society.

During the first three decades of post-war Poland, sociology did not display an interest in the methodology of the changes introduced by the communist project. Flat empiricism seemed to be a safe way out of ideological pressure. In fact, the first attempts at theoretical reflection on socialist society only date back to the 1970s (Wiatr 1971, 1974), when the category of modernisation came to be applied within the framework of the Marxist theory of social development. In looking at social change from the perspective of individual life and interpersonal relations, the concept of a "society of open chances" was used (Narojek 1980). Such a society was also based on the idea of a "planned society," where all trajectories had been previously established, and thus this openness was a bit ambivalent (Narojek 1975). Most analytical studies were conducted from a broad macrostructural perspective and remained focused on top-down social processes organised by the party-run state (Narojek 1973; Sarapata 1965; Staniszkis 1972; Szczepański 1973; Wesołowski 1970). The conviction that it was possible to plan and centrally manage large-scale social units was in line with the emergence of studies on social engineering. Indeed, the potential for the practical application of sociological knowledge seemed to improve with the progress of the new system (Podgórecki 1968). In the period, the project of modernisation through enforced industrialisation led to the popularity of technocratic attitudes, which narrowed the ideological margin and favoured pragmatic solutions. This approach can be confirmed by the fact that in the 1960s and 1970s over four hundred industrial plants employed in-house sociologists who were supposed to contribute to effective management by using their sociological expertise and methodology in practice (Kwaśniewicz 1995: 66).

In that comparatively good period for sociological research, a sociologist was increasingly seen as a professional engaged in diagnostics and in evaluating research, but usually on a rather small scale. A sociologist might also have a role as an "expert on the future," working on a new theory of socialist society (Bielecka-Prus 2009: 90). This kind of theoretical challenge ought to be seen in the context of the general sense of falsehood and fake activities in the 1970s. I generally agree with Marta Bucholc that sociology in those days "was mostly a way of thinking about society and not

a way of asking it any particular questions in order to receive a response"
(Bucholc 2016: 47). The main tasks of sociology – as they were understood
then in a critical evaluation – were not met in that decade. They included
the documentation of new social phenomena and processes in Poland and
the formulation of scientific empirical diagnoses of society, which were dif-
ferent from journalism, and useful for practice. Sociological analyses were
fragmentary and did not result in comprehensive conclusions and generali-
sations for sociological synthesis. There was especially a lack of empirical
works about ongoing changes in attitudes, values, and social awareness,
since in socialism public opinion could not find expression in open politi-
cal life. Sociologists also avoided explorations of the relationship between
society and the authorities (Sułek 2011: 205).

/// The 1980s: Critical Diagnoses of the System in Crisis

Still, there were some sociological points of interest that made connection
with social reality. The earlier focus on social advancement evolved toward
an interest in generational change and new expectations and aspirations
shaped by decades of "real socialism." The younger generation was sup-
posed to demonstrate "innovative attitudes," which had been identified as
a tool of social change. The consequence was research projects into youth
and young adults, including workers (Adamski 1976, 1980). Empirical
studies of social awareness revealed an unexpected picture of society sub-
jected to a holistic and radical remodelling. In the best-known example,
a team led by Stefan Nowak investigated the values and attitudes of young
Poles. The team's work, which began with a survey of Warsaw students in
1957 (see Nowak 1991), led to a theoretical framework for the category of
attitude (Nowak 1973). More importantly, toward the end of the 1970s it
also provided an overall critical assessment of the value system of Poles.
On introducing the image of the amorphous social mass ("grits," *kasza*) of
real socialism into sociological discourse, Nowak wrote:

> For it is a model of the value system of a society in which the old
> social groups have been thoroughly reshuffled, and therefore the
> former axiological structures which were characteristic of the old
> social groups have been more or less accidentally mixed up. This
> is the model of a society in which, after the destruction of the old
> centres where values crystallised, new factors in the crystallisation
> of values have not worked effectively enough to form satisfactorily

cohesive axiological structures. I would suggest that the reason for this lies in the absence of bonds on a wider scale than that of primary groups based on direct contacts, and in the absence of institutional articulation of the interests and aspirations of the different social groups (Nowak 1979: 173).[2]

An in-depth survey of attitudes conducted on the eve of the Solidarity revolution was in fact a concealed diagnosis of political awareness (compare Krzemiński 1998). Indeed, since everyday experience of real socialism resulted in a widening gap between what people thought and what they actually did, a survey of their awareness, attitudes, and aspirations aimed to reveal the hidden but important characteristics of Polish society.

Despite these few attempts to recognise the state of social awareness at the end of the 1970s there was a general feeling that Solidarity came as a surprise to sociologists (Sułek 2011: 243–265). Some were deeply engaged in opposition activities before 1980. During the "Carnival of Solidarity" in 1980–1981 many were participating in the political developments in different roles, as experts advising Solidarity, taking part in strikes, and practicing Alain Touraine's idea of sociological intervention (Touraine et al. 1982).

Further work by Nowak's team was conducted after the rise of the Solidarity movement in 1980, when sociologists focused on the social perception of real socialism and visions of everyday life from the grass roots perspective (Marody 2004 [1981]). One of the most important observations was the progressive delegitimisation of the socialist system (Nowak 2004 [1984]). The crisis was attributed to a persistent deprivation of important social needs and values, such as equality and justice. Sociological surveys came to include questions concerning strategies of adaptation under conditions of a worsening economic and political crisis. In the final years of communist Poland such surveys frequently revealed attitudes focused on survival, which "in a longer time perspective seem[ed] to be leading to the disintegration of the existing social order, a disintegration involving decomposition rather than change" (Marody 1988).

Sociological diagnoses identified a general active rejection of the system at the level of declarations and attitudes, and, on the other hand, the development of individual strategies of adaptation, based on passive acceptance, in the sphere of actions. Relations between the world of official institutions and society were approached in terms of processes of adaptation, which gradually changed the increasingly more troubled system.

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[2] English translation from Nowak 1981: 28.

Sociologists were also interested in its progressive delegitimisation in the eyes of citizens (Rychard & Sułek 1988). All their endeavours focused on explaining people's spontaneous activity and mental states, since this is where they located the causes of the deepening crisis and mass social mobilisation at the time of Solidarity.

A long-term project to diagnose the growing social conflict, by a team under Władysław Adamski, was an interesting example of the kind of surveys begun in the 1980s. The study was pursued throughout the period of martial law and the subsequent "stabilisation," until the climax of the crisis in 1988 and 1989. Working on the assumption that continuity of social phenomena prevailed over revolutionary changes, the project identified an increasing awareness of group interests and their articulation as the reasons for a social conflict of a structural nature. Economic demands gradually transformed into political ones, reaching the core of the system (Adamski 1982: 5–7). The gaping disparity between the ineffectiveness of the socialist economy and the level of needs and aspirations resulted in a general conflict. In an attempt to pursue its origins, sociologists referred to the historical background for explanation of the specificities of structural and mental changes in the era of real socialism (Adamski 1985: 30–31).

From the 1980s on there were more sociological studies, which pointed to the systemic limitations of real socialism, though no one expected its complete fall. Jadwiga Staniszkis provided an in-depth analysis of the ontology of socialism and its structural pathologies (Staniszkis 1981, 1992). She also interpreted the Solidarity social movement, introducing the frame of a self-limiting revolution (Staniszkis 1984) and later describing the final stage of the Polish system of power as "stabilisation without legitimisation" (Staniszkis 1987). In 1988 Witold Morawski explained the necessity for fundamental reforms, using the concept of a vicious circle of mutually negative reinforcement whereby close interdependence between the areas of the economy, politics, and society was the cause of recurrent crises (Morawski 2005 [1988]: 253). Based on their diagnoses, which indicated both the system's dysfunction and the rise of new social attitudes and behaviour, social scientists concluded that fundamental systemic changes would be required in the near future.

These critical scholars were engaged in the opposition, and their books, under the conditions of censorship, were published in a very limited number of copies. However, their influence on Polish public opinion was much wider than might be expected thanks to the practice of "oral sociology" (Sułek 1987). The discipline aimed to "spread social self-awareness"

by making people realise their needs and aspirations (Lutyński 1987). In a society deprived of free access to information and the circulation of ideas, sociologists saw themselves as "a medium giving voice to social moods, attitudes, and aspirations" (Ziółkowski 1987: 20). In 1986 the Warsaw branch of the Polish Sociological Association prepared an expert opinion – including a radical programme of change – on the state of society (Sułek 2011: 159). The next year, a report by Stefan Nowak, calling for urgent, deep social and systemic reforms, was published in a sociological journal (Nowak 1988). The decade of the 1980s was a historical moment in which the need to know and the need to act were intertwined in the biographies of many Polish sociologists. Yet sociological work was mainly about conducting research and gathering data. The need for a theory that could synthesise the results of empirical research was emphasised (Sułek 2011: 241), but a comprehensive model for the social processes of the final years of the People's Republic was not provided. At that moment Polish sociology was enjoying its greatest degree of attention from the international academic community. Polish sociology delivered descriptions of landmark events, but much less often provided comprehensive explanations.

/// The New Project: The Post-Communist Return to Normality

At a time of mounting social conflict, sociologists mainly studied the state of social awareness and factors motivating people to act together. Researchers approached the mechanism of change from the perspective of individual social actors. After the breakthrough in 1989 their perspective radically changed. The fall of the communist order and the necessity to create an entirely new economic and social project produced a new situation, which in a number of ways resembled the revolutionary surge of the early post-war period. This time, however, it involved the completely different intellectual atmosphere of "a revolution in the name of a return to normality" (Rychard 1995), which was not conducive to asking new questions or making assumptions that Poland's transformation might entail new factors.

The departing era was an important point of reference for new sociological analyses. On the other hand, visions of the future did not extend beyond the horizon of transition to a "normal" modern, free-market, democratic society. Social scientists became actively involved in formulating and substantiating the new rules, proposing the directions of transformation, and assessing the implemented measures. This resulted in the frequent use

of the rhetoric of transition. The breakthrough involved a sudden switch from the ideology of socialist to capitalist revolution, one characterised as a kind of "inverted Marxism" (Szacki 1996: 6–7). The victims of this approach included social scientists, who, at least at the beginning, gave up their search for original explanations and the effort to conceptualise local trajectories of change.

The new framework of social reality and the mode of its top-down implementation did not appear to be problematic in popular perception or in academic reflection. Sociologists did not focus on the contents and direction of the reforms, but rather on potential social obstacles to their implementation. The most frequent assumption was that the new rules would stimulate a natural, spontaneous, bottom-up process of shaping a new social order. The process of departure from communism showed marked similarities with the introduction of the system after the Second World War. At first, this "social engineering of democratic transformation" (Narojek 1993) did not become a subject of deeper sociological analysis. The idea that transformation to the free market and democracy would be quite an easy task was based on the conviction that it met the expectations and aspirations of Poles and that it guaranteed success similar to that achieved by the developed Western states. There was very little consideration of other possible options for a "Polish road to capitalism" (e.g., Kowalik 1992). The primary focus of academic interest was the question of overcoming the burden of socialist residues.

Seen from a distance, real socialism was perceived as a particular type of society, characterised by a modernisation referred to as "selective and imperfect" (Ziółkowski 1999), "reversed" (Buchner-Jeziorska 1993), or "false" or "apparent" (Morawski 1998). It was a mixture of imposed modernity in certain areas of social life and the remains of a traditional society in others. The mental outfit of Poles was severely criticised as lacking in civilisational competence: not only did they not have the skills and attitudes essential for the free market and democratic environment, but also displayed a widespread mentality at odds with the concept itself (Sztompka 1991, 1994). In other words, not only were Poles not ready to rise to the challenge of modernisation, but it could even be said that, owing to their socialist mentality, they were obstacles to progress toward a fully modern society.

In the first years of the transformation, sociologists focused on individual and collective social actors only in two roles: those who implemented the project of transformation as accepted by social scientists, and

those who slowed down the pace of the process and came in the way of progress toward a modern society. Society was not regarded as an active subject of the events. Consequently, research topics rarely reflected the real social problems of particular groups or individuals but stemmed from the transformation project.

It was not until a few years later that sociologists slightly modified their approach and identified people making a daily effort to adapt to the new rules as actors in the transformation: "The actors are invisible, which does not mean they do not exist at all" (Rychard 2002: 154). Although this perspective led to interpreting the situation in terms of hybrid solutions, Poland's social reality was still described by comparing it to the Western European model of modernisation. On the other hand, what came into focus were the social costs of the sudden transformation and the emerging pathologies of the new system. The turn of the millennium saw comments on the "drift of the system" (Giza-Poleszczuk et al. 2000: 22) and the consolidating social division. Sociological studies also observed that the process of accelerated modernisation involved increasing differentiation, resulting in the emergence of "a society of two vectors." On the one hand, "Poland has been emerging as a modern, cosmopolitan country of high-earning and widely travelled people. However, it is more and more evident that some regions have not managed to catch up and have remained traditional, rural, and marginalised. A journey from Warsaw to a village in north-east Poland is a journey in time" (Giza-Poleszczuk 2004: 265). The term "real post-communism" reflected the idea that the new order was very different from the original plan, incomplete and deformed, just like in the case of the old "real socialism." Deformations were caused by the imposition of new systemic solutions on certain old rules and institutions, as well as on the enduring older mentality (Staniszkis 1991, 1994).

Piotr Sztompka, in his theory of cultural trauma, gave a more optimistic interpretation of the processes in the 1990s. Usually trauma is the result of abrupt and profound social change that causes the sudden dysfunction of existing adaptation strategies. Such trauma can lead to two alternative scenarios: the "vicious circle of cultural destruction" or the "virtuous cycle of reconstruction." Though the Polish trauma was characterised by an increase in distrust, political apathy, and lack of faith in the future, by the mid-1990s, its symptoms had begun to disappear. Fatalist attitudes were replaced by a growing sense of agency. The trauma was overcome and became a positive force in the process of cultural reconstruction and the consolidation of a new "cultural complex" (Sztompka 2004).

In the course of time, the key paradigm of transformation as imitative modernisation came under increasing scrutiny. The critics questioned the cognitive value of the model and raised the essential specificity of post-communist societies. Unlike before, their argument was based around the history of peripheral and backward Eastern Europe rather than around the experience of real socialism. This approach paved the way for critical reflection on the distinctive traits of Polish society (Kolasa-Nowak 2015). At the same time, other analyses treated the current Polish social phenomena as part of universal European experience. Polish integration with Europe opened the way for considering the place of Poland in the global system, and new challenges stemming from modern global processes. The post-communist transformation came to be perceived as a process gradually dissolving in global social change.

/// Conclusions

As described above, the next phases of development in Polish sociological analysis reflect the changes in Poland's social reality. The common frame for all interpretations was that of a modernisation project for a backward society trying to catch up. During all the post-war years Poland has seemed to be a constant social laboratory. Polish society has undergone two deep social transformations. The initial discourse of a revolutionary project later gave way to the image of gradual normalisation. In the "planned" society, where social life was rationalised and subject to social engineering, social change was perceived as the effect of a conscious design, and society as a passive recipient of organised development. However, in 1980 the economic crisis revealed not only a social conflict but the ineffectiveness of that top-down policy. It became apparent that "the success of state socialism was not based on a utopia of classless society, but on the promise of total modernisation and widespread promotion to 'the state bourgeoisie'" (Kochanowicz 1992).

The unexpected explosion of social activity and mass-scale delegitimisation of the existing order drew sociologists' attention to current events. They explored the motivations of the social actors and the conditions of involvement in the mass social movement. While the situation was dynamic and open-ended, and the system was plunging into crisis, grasping these social phenomena had its important political and practical implications. Social scientists then played a considerable role in shaping the discussion on Poland's prospects and providing arguments for change in the political

system. Binding the scholar's function with that of the citizen has been a tradition from the beginning of Polish sociology.

However, the situation changed fundamentally after 1989. From being in the position of critics exposing the pathologies of the socialist system, sociologists switched to being technocratic advisors, which was a role some of them had practised before (Szacki 1993: 175). Advocating the implementation of reforms, they yet again became occupied with whether Poles were ready to rise to the new challenge. The topics of research were rarely the problems of society, of particular groups or individuals, but rather were derived from the project of transformation. For some time sociologists assumed that "Poland was only a place where something is happening 'with society' – some invisible hand is leading them to democracy and the market: another historical necessity is being fulfilled" (Sułek 1995: 12). After some time the broadly postulated "return to normality," understood as a rejection of the communist period, came to mean Poland's return to its peripheral position in Europe. This made it clear that sociological thinking was still revolving around old notions of "backwardness," "catching up," and "development management."

In a situation where society is subjected to large-scale reforms, the study of the course of induced changes is made according to the adopted assumptions and images of the expected effects. This is why the scale of sociological analyses was so large and the attention of researchers focused on entire social categories. As Zygmunt Bauman wrote about the sociologists of backward societies, "they see their society in motion, in the 'process of development,' as still unfinished, immature, and thus perceive reality as temporary and transitional" (Bauman 1999: 35).

Polish social scientists often acted as agents of change, advocating the project which they perceived as beneficial for society. In doing so they acknowledged the impact of the past to be overcome and focused on a destination point set in the future. As a result, they tended to give less attention to the present, which seemed transitional and hybrid. On the other hand, sociologists who began to look critically at reality rejected the previous interpretations and sought new ones. This happened in the 1980s when social conflict and the economic crisis ended with the fall of communism. New, often surprising events became the source of knowledge. Consequently, social scientists had become more open to discovering new phenomena. They abandoned the previously accepted categories and measures. Those who supported society's opposition wanted to explain and justify rejection of the system by the people. It was thereby easier to move beyond the

model of accelerated and necessary modernisation. Similarly, today, when the idea of completing Poland's modernisation by European integration seems exhausting, sociologists have an opportunity to ask new questions and formulate new explanations. Departure from the narrative of catching up and imitation creates a chance for a more specific view of the social processes in Poland.

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/// **Abstract:**

For all the post-war decades sociology in Poland has been focused on problems that are typical of peripheral modernising societies. The aim of this text is to identify, from today's perspective, successive stages of sociology's development after the Second World War. In the beginning, sociology was focused on perceiving the communist revolution as a social laboratory. In the 1960s and 1970s, Polish society underwent enforced industrialisation and urbanisation. In the next decade, studies were dominated by critical analysis of the communist system in crisis. After 1989, social scientists started to study the post-communist transformation, which was seen as a "return to normality." The entire time, sociological studies oscillated between the monitoring of project implementation and the recording of new grass roots processes. The author considers that sociology's recent departure from the narrative of catching up and imitation creates a chance for a more precise view of social processes in Poland.

Keywords:
induced development, modernisation, post-communist transformation, post-war Polish sociology, public role of sociology

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THE BIRTH OF SOCIOLOGY FROM THE SPIRIT OF (CRITIQUE OF BOURGEOIS) PHILOSOPHY?: THE BELARUSIAN CASE IN THE 1960S THROUGH 1980S

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/// Introduction

This article presents an analysis of the development of sociology in the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic[1] in the period of the 1960s through 1980s. The two main goals of the study are to show the close relations and reciprocal influence of sociological and philosophical issues during this period and to explicate the indirect influence of Western sociological and philosophical conceptions on the development of sociology in Belarus in Soviet times. The project is based on interdisciplinary methodology, and involves the techniques used in intellectual history, discourse analysis, and studies of cultural transfer. The empirical data includes texts (books, scientific articles, textbooks) in philosophy and sociology as well as interviews and memoir literature.

First of all, the problem of terminology arises: whether it is more correct to write about "Belarusian sociology" or "sociology in Belarus" (as a variant of the wider Soviet tradition)? To my mind both terms could be used because the sociological tradition in this period combines elements of the two. As an institutionalised form of research, sociology in Belarus appeared in the Soviet period and therefore it could not appeal to other

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[1] The Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR), or Byelorussia, was one of fifteen constituent Soviet republics in the Soviet Union. It existed for the period of 1920–1991. The republic was ruled by the Communist Party of Byelorussia, a branch within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. On the international stage, Byelorussia (along with Ukraine) was one of only two republics to be separate members of the United Nations. The official languages were Belarusian and Russian.

methodological and conceptual foundations. The institutional and conceptual influence of the Moscow sociologists and party officials was also significant. The sociological tradition in Belarus was dominantly Russian-speaking and there were no linguistic barriers between it and general Soviet sociology. At the same time, sociology was developed as an empirical discipline and was grounded in local Belarusian experience. Therefore we could say that sociology in Belarus in the 1960s through 1980s was developed as a variant of the general Soviet tradition, with significant regional peculiarities. And while the general history of Soviet sociology is presented in a number of publications in English, the Belarusian context is less known.

The history and institutional status of sociology as scientific knowledge in Belarus, as well as in other Soviet republics, changed during various periods of Soviet history. After the October Revolution, Belarusian State University (BSU) opened its doors in 1921 in the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic after a period in which there had been no university education in the region.[2] Courses in Marxist sociology were among the first to be offered in the university at the Faculty of Social Sciences, where the Department of Sociology and Primordial Culture was established. The course reading in Marxist sociology (Katzenbogen 1925) was published, and some research in sociology was done. Later, in the 1930s, sociology was accused of being a "bourgeois pseudo-science" and forbidden in the Soviet Union. The courses in Marxist sociology were renamed courses in historical materialism and became a part of the Marxist-Leninist philosophical canon: "Until Stalin's death in 1953, social sciences in the Soviet Union continued to be normative and speculative […] centred on relating the realities of socialist society to the tenets of Marx's theory and detecting signs of the emerging communist society" (Shalin 1978: 174). Such a close relation between sociology and philosophy existed for the whole Soviet period.

The next period in the development of sociology in the Soviet Union started in the 1950s when various applied sociological research was undertaken. The international factor, with the participation of an official delegation in the Third World Sociological Congress in Amsterdam in 1956, was important for the rebirth of Soviet sociology. "On return from the Congress, the members of the delegation reported to their party patrons that the Soviet ideological machine is lagging behind the Western one and the potential of empirical social research had to be used in competition

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[2] Some discussions about BSU's date of foundation are still ongoing. While the first students started their studies in 1921, the formal documents to create the University were ready in 1919.

between the two systems and in domestic governance" (Titarenko & Zdra-vomyslova 2017: 46).

In the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic the Scientific Laboratory of Sociological Research for Special Issues at BSU was created in 1967. The section of social research at the Institute of Philosophy and Law in the Academy of Sciences (AS) of the BSSR was created in 1968. In the 1970s, courses in applied sociology were offered, and in 1974 the Department of Philosophy began to prepare specialists in sociology (and a few years later, Ph.D. students). It must be said that BSU did not have a special philosophy faculty (as did other large Soviet universities such as those in Moscow or Kiev), but a department of philosophy existed at the Faculty of History. Most of the specialists involved in sociological research were philosophers by education and had doctoral degrees in applied sociology (code "09.00.09" in the official Soviet scientific classification was attributed to the category of philosophical sciences).

The late Soviet period was a period in which sociology was institutionalised as a separate scientific discipline in Belarus. A special department of sociology was created at the new philosophy and economics faculty at BSU in 1989. The Institute of Sociology in the Academy of Sciences was created in 1990. The academic degrees of candidate and doctor of sociological sciences were established.

/// Sociology as a Tool for the Self-Criticism of the Soviet System

Sociology in Belarus had very close relations with philosophy from the very beginning. In the 1920s, while the new Soviet disciplines were being institutionalised, the difference between Marxist sociology and philosophy was not very clear and the content of the courses might be rather similar. For example, there were similarities between the courses in Marxist sociology and dialectical materialism at BSU (Dudchik 2015) and the same persons could do research in sociology as well as in philosophy (e.g., Solomon Zakharovich Katzenbogen[3]). In the 1960s, when sociological research was restored, it was usually done by specialists with a background in philosophy and in a general philosophical framework (specialists in sociology were usually trained in the philosophy departments and dissertations in sociology were attributed to the philosophical sciences).

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[3] Solomon Zakharovich Katzenbogen (1889–1946) was a Soviet sociologist, philosopher, and party activist, who worked in Belarus and Russia. He worked as a professor at BSU in 1921–1925 and gave a course in Marxist sociology.

Fifty-seven dissertations in applied sociology were defended during the 1977–1989 period. This was 9.9% of all dissertations in the philosophical sciences (for the period of 1972–1990, after introduction of the official classification of scientific specialisations) and it was the fourth most popular specialisation (after "09.00.01 dialectical and historical materialism," "09.00.02 theory of scientific socialism and communism," and "09.00.03 history of philosophy," which had almost the same number of dissertations). All the dissertations were defended for candidate degrees and there were no doctoral dissertations in applied sociology.

The general statistical data about dissertations in sociology is important for understanding the development of sociological research in Belarus. At the same time, the professional trajectories of some significant figures are also of special interest. Three main figures for the institutionalisation of Belarusian sociology in the 1960s through 1980s have been selected for further analysis. Professor Georgii Petrovich Davidyuk (1923) is the founder of the post-war Belarusian sociological tradition; he was director of the section of social research at the Academy of Sciences in the 1960s and of the laboratory of sociological research at BSU in the 1970s. Academician Evgenii Michailovich Babosov (1931) is a Belarusian sociologist and philosopher; he worked as director of the Institute of Philosophy and Law in 1977–1989 and as director of the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences in 1990–1998. Professor Albert Nikolaevich Elsukov (1936–2014) was a Belarusian philosopher and sociologist, dean of the philosophical and economic faculty in the 1990s and head of Belarus' first department of sociology, at BSU, in 1989–2003.

As mentioned above, the development of sociology in the Soviet Union in the post-war period was difficult. Negative, or at least suspicious, attitudes to sociology were rooted in the experience of the 1920s and 1930s. As Professor Davidyuk recalled:

> I got to know about sociology during Ph.D. studies in Moscow at the Academy of Social Sciences under the CC of the CPSU [Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – A.D.]. Old professors of our department often said angrily that sociology is a bourgeois science. I knew from the press that it was a directive of the CC of the CPSU. When I worked at the Academy of Sciences I not only got to know, but felt, the hatred, the hos-

tility to sociology from economists, jurists, historians (Davidyuk 2013: 10).[4]

And the title of the article in which he tried to sum up the development of sociology in Belarus in the post-war period is noteworthy: "Belarus: In Tortures and Passions, Sociology Was Born." And while these terms might be considered too expressive, the general tendency of negativity towards sociology among the official Soviet Marxists would surprise Western readers, for whom Marx himself is well known as a classic writer of sociology. But we should remember that the Soviet canon ("Marxism-Leninism") was not identical to classical Marxist texts and a too literal study of Marx's own work was not favoured. Another factor was the critical potential of sociology: Marx criticised capitalist society, but for Soviet sociology, Soviet society was the main subject of critical study. And despite all official criticism and sanctions against sociology, the post-war sociological project was developed under the active influence of party officials: "The party leaders planned to set up a network of sociological centres of the USSR and saw sociology as an effective, science-based instrument of ideological struggle and propaganda" (Titarenko & Zdravomyslova 2017: 46). Therefore sociology could be interpreted (possibly not without reason) by other experts as a tool of party policy.

The variety and importance of procedures of criticism in Soviet society must be remembered. Not only elements of foreign ideologies and theories (such as criticism of bourgeois philosophy and sociology) but also some phenomena of Soviet life could be subjects of active criticism. For example, Oleg Kharkhordin showed the constructing role of processes of self-criticism within a group (a "collective") for the formation of Soviet individuality (Kharkhordin 1999: 142–163). Soviet sociology presented a more scientific-like variant of external criticism. And sociology's critical function was proclaimed in textbooks to be among its most important ones (Davidyuk 1977: 26). In his later interview Davidyuk remembered that

> The critique existed in the Soviet period. But it had a measure, a certain, marked subject. The gigantic corps of Soviet journalists criticised, and even wrote *feuilletons*. But the journalists knew well whom to criticise and to what extent. The editorial boards of newspapers and journals accepted sociologists' texts willingly. It was allowed to criticise the heads of enterprises, collective farms for

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[4] All the translations from Russian and Belarusian are my own.

social disorders or for inability to reveal causes of personnel turn-overs, or for non-compliance with labour safety laws (especially for women). But the texts should not contain criticism of the secretaries of the district and regional committees of the CPB [Communist Party of Belarus – A.D.]. Only party officials had the right to criticise. It was allowable to present the findings of research on the efficiency of the party's propaganda, the work of universities of Marxism-Leninism, or the houses of political education (such issues were researched by the Sociological Laboratory of BSU) only in written form and only to the propaganda department of the Central Committee of the CPB (Davidyuk 2013: 12).

As Liah Greenfeld wrote in 1988, "Soviet sociology is, essentially, purposeful science. It exists in order to achieve certain practical goals. […] Usually, such an endeavour would be considered a technology. […] Sociology is seen as a tool for the implementation of party goals, whatever these goals are" (Greenfeld 1988: 111–112). At the same time, criticism was a double-edged weapon and often sociologists were accused of "defamation of the socialist reality" for their findings: "Not everyone liked the results of the research, publications. Complaints to the party organs against the 'subjectivism' of sociologists existed; some agreements with the university were terminated; 'dressing downs' of sociologists at plenary sessions became almost a norm" (Davidyuk 2008: 97).

Certain conflicts existed not only with the party officials but with other specialists, especially philosophers. As Professor Elsukov remembered about his work at BSU at the Department of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy for the Faculty of the Humanities headed by Georgii Petrovich Davidyuk in 1970s,

a specialty for students in applied sociology was established; there was a special collective of applied sociologists who worked according to special agreements. […] The department turned abruptly towards sociology. But another task to prepare professional philosophers still remained. […] Its supporters strengthened their positions. […] Two centres of influence and various scientific interests were formed and the conflict was inevitable. […] As a result G.P. Davidyuk left the department (Elsukov 2011b: 40).

It might be supposed that in some aspects the history of sociology in the Soviet Union is rather similar to the Western situation, with the nineteenth-century appearance of sociology as a part of philosophy and the rather long period of its separation and institutionalisation. Davidyuk himself explains this parallel in his memoir article: "The new is always born in struggle. Auguste Comte was blamed for misunderstanding the development of society, for the invention of social laws: the laws of society were supposedly the subjects of history and economical science. Economists in England struggled against sociologists till the second half of the twentieth century" (Davidyuk 2008: 93). It is interesting that the author starts with examples of struggle between sociology and various types of knowledge and disciplines but continues with the description of a conflict between sociological knowledge and the Soviet system as such: "The Soviet political system resisted sociology furiously. The CPSU was afraid of sociological research, knowing that misery, exploitation, and absolute violation of rights[5] would be explicated and shown" (Davidyuk 2008: 93).

It could be said that such a historical comparison (sociology versus other forms of knowledge, and sociology versus the political system) looks rather asymmetrical and some form of the Soviet ideology or discourse could be specified instead of the Soviet system as such. But perception of the possible contradiction of sociological and philosophical discourses, and attempts to establish a distance from philosophy (at least in its Marxist-Leninist form), are not typical for the older generation and Davidyuk did not make any such in his text. Returning to his historical comparison (sociology versus other forms of knowledge, and sociology versus the political system), we could interpret it in various ways: for example, as equality between the Soviet system and Soviet philosophy (as its ideological correlate). But I would like to refer to the philosophical background of Davidyuk (as well as of the majority of Soviet sociologists of the 1950s through 1970s). For example, in his interview, Davidyuk, in describing one of many conflicts with the authorities, recalled the support of "progressive philosophers," who in some way were opposed to the officials. This could be described as a double identity of the sociologist and the philosopher at the same time. It might be supposed that such an identity has a split character (and to some extent it could be presented as such) but to my mind the situation is more correctly described as reciprocal influence and

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[5] It is interesting to note that in 2013 the rhetoric presented by professor Davidyuk in reference to criticism of the Soviet system seems rather similar to Soviet rhetorical clichés. It is possible to imagine the same words in a Soviet text criticising capitalist society.

experience of the Soviet philosophical tradition is a very important factor in the formation of sociology in Belarus. Some of the key figures for the development of sociology in Belarus are usually identified in the literature as both "sociologists" and "philosophers"; their works often deal with both disciplines and even their works in sociology sometimes have a significant "philosophical" component.

/// From the "Collection of 'Little Facts'" to the Study of the "Methodological Problems of Scientific Fact-Formation": Sociology as an Applied Science

Perhaps the formation of sociology as an applied science seems rather paradoxical when the philosophical background of the key figures in Belarusian sociology is recalled. At the same time this was the general tendency throughout the Soviet Union, and the movement toward the so-called "factory sociologist" played an important role in the development and institutionalisation of sociology (Abramov 2014). Epistemological questions (the relation between theory and practice, the hierarchy of forms of scientific knowledge, the problem of objectivity, etc.) were of primary importance for Belarusian sociology at this period. Because of its applied status, sociology was interpreted as a sub-discipline and its scientific status was questioned. The problem of the status of sociology appears in the texts of the period as well as in memoirs. For example, in *Applied Sociology* Davidyuk wrote that "Applied sociology is supposed not to be a science but is measured only by the limits of historical materialism. Therefore the task of social research is to get the necessary empirical material for scientific works in historical materialism" (Davidyuk 1977: 14). He argued that applied sociology is a separate and sufficient science but a science of a special kind – an applied science. Such an interpretation has some earlier history, involving an understanding of the nature of science. As Davidyuk remembered:

> In the spring of 1969 I went to the assistant director of the institute of philosophy of the AS BSSR […] with a big sheaf of documents to sign about the academic mission – our group was preparing to go do research at the Brest lamp factory. He looked at the documents and asked me: "Are you are going again to collect 'little facts'? [diminutive form of "facts" – A.D.] Is it really science?"
> I asked him, "But how science is done?"

He answered, "Real science emerges in the library, by reading books."

That's how it was fifty-sixty years ago [the text was published in 2013 – A.D.]. A Soviet specialist in humanities read a tenth of the books in a library and then wrote another one, or a candidate or doctoral dissertation. The academic councils of institutes or departments made decisions about the research themes for the scientific collective or single researcher. The direction of research was assigned by a resolution of the CC of CPSU (Davidyuk 2013: 10–11).

The problem of the status of sociology and its relation with historical materialism was actively discussed in the 1920s in the Soviet Union (and after the polemics, sociology was blamed and forbidden) and Davidyuk made some reference to these discussions. For example, in the chapter on the history of sociology in the Soviet Union he referred to the position of the Soviet sociologist Sergei Alexandrovich Oransky,[6] whose vision of sociology was "the most acceptable." The main points of Oransky's conception were: "1. Marxist sociology as an independent science; 2. The dialectical unity of theory and method in Marxist sociology; and 3. Acceptance of the independence of specific sociological research on social processes" (Davidyuk 1975: 56). Davidyuk described relations between applied sociology and historical materialism as follows: "historical materialism is a general social theory which discovers the main laws of the development of society as a social organism and develops the most general theories of social development" (1977: 16); "the decisive role belongs to historical materialism, because the latter is the methodological and theoretical foundation for applied sociology" (1977: 18). He wrote about the very close and dialectical interaction between them, which led to the mutual enrichment of both, as well as other social disciplines: scientific communism, mathematics, political economy, psychology (especially social psychology), and so forth.

It is not an easy task to separate clearly sociological research from works on historical materialism for the contemporary reader and, in the 1960s and 1970s, even for some specialists themselves the difference looked mainly formal. As professor Elsukov remembered his work at BSU in the 1970s with Georgii Petrovich Davidyuk, "Davidyuk gathered a group that

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[6] Sergei Alexandrovich Oransky (1895–1939(42)) was a Soviet sociologist; he worked as a professor in Leningrad in the 1930s. He was the author of the book *Main Questions of Marxist Sociology* (1929), and was imprisoned in 1930–1931 and 1938–1939.

formally worked exceptionally in the area of "histmat" [shortened form of 'historical materialism' – A.D.] but essentially elaborated sociological research [...]. We did applied sociology, research, participated in conferences, etc." (Elsukov 2011a: 101). Sociologists in this period provided the results of concrete research. Liah Greenfeld wrote that the concept "concrete" was used actively as the result of "a liberal substitution of the term 'empirical' for the euphemism" (Greenfeld 1988: 110) and it must be remembered that the concept "concrete" is rather widespread in Hegelian and Marxist intellectual traditions. At the same time, sociology still did not have its own professional language, and the meta-language for interpreting received data was the vocabulary of historical materialism. Such an understanding of sociology as an applied, concrete science made it dependent on the general discourse of Soviet social philosophy, and Belarusian sociologists tried to change the situation. The main attempts were done in the area of methodology and epistemology. For example, in his textbooks, professor Davidyuk tried to argue for the really scientific character of applied sociology and opposed the generalised vision of the structure of sociological knowledge, which is usually presented as having three main levels: the lowest is the empirical one; the middle is the level of theoretical interpretation; and the highest is the level associated with methodology and the structure of historical materialism, with its laws and categories. For such an understanding, historical materialism is something like "a springboard for sociological research" (Davidyuk 1977: 17). In opposition to this position, Davidyuk proposed another understanding of the structure of scientific sociological knowledge. In his opinion, sociological knowledge should have its foundations not only in general theory (i.e., historical materialism) but in special sociological theory as well. The analogy with Robert Merton's "middle range theory" is rather obvious for the contemporary reader, but the author did not refer to it in the Soviet textbook for objective reasons). Sociology as applied science should develop theories that could help to discover special areas of social reality. It is interesting to mention that such a form of argumentation, with reference to "special theories" or Merton's "middle range theory," was rather popular in the post-Soviet period, when new disciplines (not only sociology but cultural studies – culturology – as well) tried to separate themselves from the general philosophical tradition. In trying to argue the scientific status of applied sociology Davidyuk explicated its functions and categories (as important attributes of an independent scientific discipline). The functions were the following: theoretical, descriptive, informational, prognostic, ideological (i.e., applied sociology is "filled with

ideas, subordinated to political and ideological questions" (Davidyuk 1977: 26)), and critical.

Another strategy for legitimising sociology as a science was to strengthen the role of empirical knowledge. Albert Nikolaevich Elsukov started his career as a professional philosopher with the candidate dissertation "The Problem of Explanation in Social and Historical Cognition." Later, in 1985, he defended a doctoral dissertation in philosophy: "Methodological Problems of Scientific Fact-Formation," where he argues the importance of scientific facts and the sophisticated, constructive, and self-sufficient character of the procedures for working with facts. The dissertation combined material from the natural sciences and its findings could be applied to the social sciences and especially sociology.

At the same time, it was an urgent task for sociologists to separate the concepts of "social research" as such from "sociological research." The first name of their institution within the Academy of Sciences was the "Institute of Concrete Social Research," which led to misunderstandings and attempts to do research in all areas of the social sciences: the juridical sciences, political economy, ethnography, demography, and so forth.

One of the practical implications of the postulations of a separate scientific status for applied sociology is the further institutionalisation of sociology within the system of education, including entering the specialisation in sociology: "the main point is that it is necessary to prepare sociologists as well as philosophers or, for example, economists, that is, to give them 2,500–3,000 academic hours in sociology. And, finally, the time has come to enter 'applied sociology' in the university nomenclature of specialisation and to open sociological departments in the leading universities" (Davidyuk 1977: 5). But the reality was more difficult. As Davidyuk wrote in his article in the 2000s:

> We started the course of study for sociologists at BSU. A specialisation in applied sociology was offered; I published the textbooks *Introduction to Applied Sociology* (1975) and *Applied Sociology* (1977) – the first textbooks of their type in the USSR – to help students. In 1977 the first group graduated. They had a specialisation as "applied sociologist" on their diplomas. We started to form the Ph.D. programme. But the good beginnings to training sociologists at the university were stopped by a command "from above." […] An inspection [commission] came unexpectedly, recognised the notation on the diplomas to be incorrect, and ordered the notation to

be "lecturer in social sciences." And we did this till 1988, when sociology was recognised as a science (Davidyuk 2008: 96).

/// The Transfer of Western Knowledge and Its Role in the Development of Soviet Sociology

As was shown in the previous part, there were at least two important elements in the development of sociology in Belarus as well as in the Soviet Union: the findings of empirical research, and Marxist-Leninist discourse as the theoretical form for their interpretation (Soviet philosophy and historical materialism especially). The correlation of the two components differed in various periods and it can be supposed that these uneasy relations between the two elements greatly influenced the development and status of Soviet sociology. At the same time, Soviet sociology, as an applied discipline on its theoretical foundations, was less influenced by official Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Another important source for the development of sociology in the Soviet Union was the indirect influence of Western sociological and philosophical conceptions. The official Soviet philosophical and social science was developed in opposition to Western knowledge (which was usually accused of being "bourgeois"): "in general, the Soviet conception of sociology was inversely related to its views on bourgeois sociology" (Weinberg 2004: 47). At the same time, some Western ideas were rather well known and were presented in academic publications in the form of "criticism of bourgeois science." Despite such publications' critical form, they could often provide some real information. Presumably such a situation, where Western knowledge was transferred in different forms, was present in various Soviet sciences, but for sociology, since the period of the 1940s–1950s, it was especially important.

> The only permitted genre of academic writing related to sociology was the critique of bourgeois sociology. It was established by the end of the 1940s for ideological aims in the course of the Cold War. This genre presumed a thorough analysis of the foreign literature and intensive reception of Western social theory. A ritual part of this genre was a section with a critique of the hidden bourgeois ideological bias of Western theories from the orthodox Marxist point of view. […] many writers of this genre belonged to the intellectual elite. They mastered foreign languages and got access to

Western professional books and periodicals (Titarenko & Zdravo-myslova 2017: 37–38).

And even later the foreign "bourgeois" sociology was presented as a shadow background for the Soviet one. The "criticism of bourgeois sociology" was the fourth most popular topic in scientific articles in the 1970s–1980s (Greenfeld 1988: 104).

For example, professor Davidyuk described his development as a sociologist in this way:

> I got to know the essence of sociology by often visiting the Institute of Philosophy in Moscow, which in the 1960s already had a sector of social research, led by professor Gennady Osipov.[7] I listened carefully to the discussions about American and German sociologies while working in Moscow in the Lenin Library. I knew a great deal about it from Gennady Osipov and Galina Andreeva.[8] My desk books were books by Vladimir Yadov,[9] *Sociological Research: Methodology, Programme, Methods*, and Andrey Zdravomyslov,[10] *Methodology and Procedure of Sociological Research* (Davidyuk 2013: 10).

At the same time he emphasised the importance of foreign authors:

> I grasped the essence of sociology most deeply in writing my doctoral dissertation "Critique of the Theory of 'the Single Industrial Society.'" Books on this topic were written by American, German, and Polish sociologists. They were not translated into Russian in the 1960s. I had to read them all in the original. I was amazed by the depth of the authors' understanding of social reality and by the connection between their theoretical judgments and objective processes. I was especially impressed by the depth of John Gal-

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[7] Gennady Vasilievich Osipov (1929) is a Soviet and Russian sociologist and philosopher: Ph.D., professor, and academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences; director of the Institute of Socio-Political Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences, honorary president of the Russian Sociological Association. He is one of the founders, and in 1959–1972 the president, of the Soviet Sociological Association.

8 Galina Mikhailovna Andreeva (1924–2014) was a Soviet and Russian sociologist and social psychologist, Ph.D., professor, and one of the pioneers of Soviet post-war social psychology and sociology.

[9] Vladimir Aleksandrovich Yadov (1929–2015) was a Soviet and Russian sociologist and philosopher: Ph.D., professor, specialist in the sociology of labour and economic sociology.

[10] Andrey Grigoryevich Zdravomyslov (1928–2009) was a Soviet and Russian sociologist, Ph.D., professor, and specialist in the theory of interest and the sociology of conflict.

braith's and Daniel Bell's knowledge of American as well as Soviet realities in their books *The New Industrial State* and *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society* (Davidyuk 2013: 10).

As we can see, except for the intensive contacts with his Soviet colleagues (especially the Moscow ones) Davidyuk spoke of the importance of reading foreign authors for his professional development.

To my mind, this situation of the indirect influence of foreign conceptions on the development of Soviet sociology could be described in terms of a "cultural transfer." This approach is represented in the works of the French researchers Michael Werner and Michel Espagne (Espagne 2003). The approach itself is based on a broad interpretation of culture and therefore the processes of cultural transfer could include various forms of interaction, but the reading and interpretation of the texts is of primary importance for our case. Espagne writes that a special role in the process of cultural transfer belongs to the figure of the mediator, who has connecting functions for various cultures (Espagne 1997). Presumably, the Soviet scientists who read and interpreted foreign texts could be described as such mediators in some way.

It is well known that for political and ideological reasons the Soviet intellectual tradition withdrew into oneself and contacts with foreign ("bourgeois") scientists and their texts were limited and attitudes toward their ideas were critical. At the same time the Soviet social sciences and humanities were not totally hermetic and some contacts and receipt of information from beyond the Iron Curtain occurred. These processes of transferring Western knowledge into the Soviet context were usually presented in the form of criticism of bourgeois knowledge. The Soviet researchers did not simply read foreign authors and use those authors' ideas but presented their texts as critiques from a Marxist-Leninist perspective. Academician Babosov reminisced about this period in relation to philosophy:

> Our philosophical thought was not worse than the West's in any connection. The only sad thing was that we were cut off by the Iron Curtain. Towards almost all that was interesting in Western philosophy we had to advance the idea of a critique of bourgeois philosophy. And all the branches of philosophy that we teach today – neo-positivism, hermeneutics, etc. – were discussed in the sense of their contradiction to Marxist-Leninist philosophy and incompatibility with the position of dialectical materialism as the

only true philosophical doctrine. It was dogma we were guided by (Babosov 2011: 318–319).

Russian philosopher Vitaly Kurennoy describes the late Soviet situation as follows: "criticism (polemical evaluation of doctrines from a Marxist-Leninist perspective) in the late Soviet period was often limited to a ritual gesture; the practice of its writing was presented in the immanent reconstruction of certain conceptions" (2004: 9). As Elizabeth A. Weinberg wrote, "in the best instances, the theory of research was presented in detail before it was criticised. […] Extensive bibliographies may have accompanied the discussions" (2004: 54). Therefore, it could be supposed that knowledge about Western ideas was present among Soviet sociologists and readers of their books.

A good example of the procedure of criticism is presented in Davidyuk's book *Criticism of the Theory of the "Single Industrial Society,"* published in 1968. While the text itself contained a thorough analysis of Western authors, the criticism as such is represented mainly in the first part and the conclusion. The author analysed social, gnosiological, and methodological foundations of the "single industrial society" theory. He wrote about the necessity for critical analysis, that is, the "exposure of the class essence […] of the theory" (Davidyuk 1968: 10). The class character of Western sociology prevented it from doing objective research: "Bourgeois sociologists have no other choice than to protect the interests of capitalists. Because of their social state […] they have to research life not as it is but through the prism of their class interest. They have to choose pragmatically what is 'profitable,' 'useful' for monopolists and declare it as a 'truth'" (Davidyuk 1968: 24). The methodology used by Western sociology is characterised as "metaphysical" (as opposed to the dialectical method) and "positivistic"; they "absolutise some changes, ignore objective laws of social development […] absolutise the role of technique and underestimate the role of the human" (Davidyuk 1968: 35). Their "economic approach is not scientific […] but vulgar" (Davidyuk 1968: 41). It "ignores productive relations and the operation of external phenomena" (Davidyuk 1968: 43). And while the theory may reflect some social tendencies in general it "does not give a dialectical and materialistic understanding and scientific explanation of social life" (Davidyuk 1968: 226).

It is important to say that the issue of the ideologisation of Soviet texts, especially in philosophy and the social sciences, is well known. They contain a large number of rhetorical figures, with rather intensive critique of

some theses as "bourgeois," "reactionary," and so forth. References to certain dogmatic formulas of Marxism-Leninism (e.g., describing the nature of some processes as "dialectical") are widespread, and quotations from the texts of classic writers (Marx, Engels, Lenin), as well as references to the decisions of Soviet officials, were almost inevitable. Therefore, we should presumably overlook these parts of the texts as merely rhetorical and stereotypical, and should concentrate our attention on the factual information within this ideological frame: names, titles, concepts, and so forth. Such a strategy could be productive and could present at least some information about the content of the texts, despite their rhetorical form. At the same time, it can be assumed that some ideological constructions not only had rhetorical functions but some additional sense added. Anthropologist Alexei Yurchak showed the "normalisation" of official Soviet discourse through interpretation in everyday practices in the late Soviet period. At the same time he tried to escape binary oppositions in understanding Soviet culture and did not tend to present official Soviet rhetoric as something totally false and insincere (Yurchak 2005: 1–125). Therefore, it can be supposed that traditional Soviet rhetorical forms could contain some additional information and at least in some aspects should be taken into account, but this should be a subject of additional analysis.

/// The Formation of a Canon: Books and Textbooks in Sociology

The Soviet books dealing with sociological issues usually had some genre specifics. They often used material from candidate and doctorate dissertations but were written, as a rule, in popular form for a wide audience and combined various approaches and strategies of working with information. They contained Soviet Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, factual material and statistics, summaries of foreign conceptions (the subject of our special interest) and their critique from the Marxist-Leninist position, and sometimes even summaries of Western works of fiction, movies, and so forth.

A number of works that were significant for Belarusian sociology bore the important imprint of foreign ideas. I would like to start with Davidyuk's work, *Main Features of Contemporary Revisionism* (1961) in which he observed the major trends in Marxism that differed from those accepted in the Soviet Union (and were labelled "revisionist"). He wrote (using the typical discursive elements of the period) about the philosophical foundations of the revisionist movement, the social conditions of its development, its vision of changes in social structure (the role of the proletariat, the

bureaucracy, intellectuals), the evolution of socialist states, the functions of the communist party, the national question, and so forth. Special attention was given to Polish authors (Z. Bauman, L. Kołakowski) and Yugoslav ones (I. Nady). Among the most famous Western authors referred to are H. Lefebvre and H. Bloch. Therefore, it could be supposed that some knowledge of the ideas (not necessary in the explicit form of agreement or rejection) of the "revisionist" authors about the development of modern society (and the socialist ones as a variant of it) would in some way influence further sociological research and visions of sociology in general. The book was published in 1961 and it was based on the material of the candidate dissertation defended in 1959. Thus formally we could state that some basics for the Belarusian sociological project had been developed at least by the end of 1950s. It is important to say that the book influenced Davidyuk's career significantly and turned him toward sociological research in some way. As he remembered it:

> In 1961 my book *Main Features of Contemporary Revisionism* was published. The Yugoslav press, with its entire journalist corps, attacked my book. In the pro-government newspaper *Struggle* I was accused of libel against the Yugoslav leaders, including Josip Broz Tito. In this period I was a lecturer of the CC of the CPB. Around the beginning of 1962 I was called by the head of the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the AS of BSSR Kazimir Buslov[11] and invited for a business conversation. […] He said that I was invited by the secretary of the CC of the CPB, who had said that it would be inconvenient to leave [me] in the apparatus because of Yugoslav's indignation against [me]. At the end of the conversation he recommended Buslov invite [me] to work at the Institute of Philosophy, especially now it had a good vacancy. After these words of K. Buslov I understood everything (Davidyuk 2013: 9).

The next book is the *Critique of the Theory of "The Single Industrial Society"* (1968). As we mentioned previously, Davidyuk himself called the period of its writing crucial for his own development as a sociologist. In 1970, Davidyuk published a special book about foreign conceptions of ideology

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[11] Kazimir Pavlovich Buslov (1914–1983) was a Soviet Belarusian philosopher, Ph.D., professor, and academician of the Academy of Sciences of BSSR. He was director of the Institute of Philosophy and Law (AS BSSR) in 1956–1972, and chairman of the Belarusian branch of the Philosophical Society since 1972.

and especially the theory of de-ideologisation: *Marxist Ideology and Bourgeois De-ideologisation*. It is an interesting fact that the book was written in the Belarusian language, while almost all other books were written in Russian. One of the possible explanations for such a linguistic peculiarity is the work's rather popular character: a number of popular books were published in Belarusian while scientific literature was mostly published in Russian. The next book was written by Davidyuk together with Vladimir Sergeevich Bobrovsky[12] and was called *Problems of "Mass Culture" and "Mass Communication"* (1972). An interesting trait of the title and the text itself is that both the terms "mass culture" and "mass communication" are written with quotation marks (as well as the term "the single industrial society" in the previously analysed work) to show that they were taken from foreign, "bourgeois" theories and the Soviet researchers used them with some critical distance. The book contained two chapters: on mass culture and mass communication respectively. The books contained a number of references to foreign authors, mainly English-speaking ones (W. Rostow, M. McLuhan, D. Bell and others) as well as some others, such as the French sociologist R. Aron. The book also covered the texts of authors who wrote about socialist societies: A. Inkeles, R. Bauer, J. Douglas.

According to Davidyuk, Evgenii Mikhailovich Babosov's book *Social Aspects of Scientific-Technical Revolution* was a "guideline" for the work of their sector (Davidyuk 2008: 95). The book was published in 1976 and covered issues of social, moral, educational, and cultural changes caused by the scientific-technical revolution. The author referred repeatedly to foreign authors. He analysed the activity of the Club of Rome thoroughly, especially the works of J. Forrester and D. Meadows. The texts of A. Berle, Z. Brzezinski, A. Toffler, S. Lipset, R. Aron, and especially D. Bell, are also referenced in the book.

Professor Davidyuk published the first Belarusian textbooks in applied sociology in 1975 and 1977. These also contained certain references to foreign authors. Naturally, they did not contain quotations from foreign authors, as that would have been almost impossible in the Soviet Union. At the same time, the textbook *Introduction to Applied Sociology* covered various foreign conceptions rather thoroughly, in the part on the history of sociology. The chapter called "Bourgeois Sociology" is rather long – 89 of the book's 199 pages, more extensive than the part on the history of Marxist sociology. It is important to emphasise the amount of space the

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[12] Vladimir Sergeevich Bobrovsky (1936) is a Belarusian philosopher, Ph.D., professor, and specialist in mass society theory and anthropology.

textbook devotes to the history of sociology. It could be supposed that this high number of references to the history of sociology was in some aspects caused by the novelty of the discipline itself and its unclear, and in some aspects, problematic status. To present such a doctrine in the short form of a textbook was, if not a challenge, than at least not a trivial task. And a reference to the history of the discipline as its basis seems to us one of the best and at the same time one of the more logical and obvious decisions in this situation. It was intuitively acceptable to a general reader and allowed the material to be structured according to the logic of its inner development. Such a classification of material (according to the vision of the history of sociology) has some objective (or pretending to be objective) and rather obvious justifications. The appeal to the history of sociology (especially including the Marxist tradition) shows the discipline's old and historically rooted foundations. At the same time, the author did not have to show his own position explicitly (which could be criticised) but could at least hide it under references to other names and traditions.

In general, the rhetorical attitude to foreign conceptions changed significantly. While the first texts (such as *Main Features of Contemporary Revisionism*) were very critical of foreign authors, later we see more moderate attitudes and even some elements of acceptance. For example, in *Marxist Ideology and Bourgeois De-ideologisation* we find the following passage: "a number of books, which contain interesting facts, descriptions of new methods and techniques of concrete sociological research. Especially interesting are generalisations on mechanical data handling, which has been done in the USA for a long time. Such material, in critically remade form, is used by the Soviet sociologist. Bourgeois sociology is older and still has many followers. But Marxist sociology has class and methodological advantage" (Davidyuk 1970: 74). The following process of the transfer and legitimisation of Western sociology involved not only methods but concepts as well. For example, in the textbook *Applied Sociology* the following classification of sociological categories was presented: "social fact, social environment, direct social environment, personality, collective, social actions, connections, relations, systems, classes, institutions, organisations, control, social structures, classes, strata, groups, relations between and within classes, differentiation within classes, differences, family, social progress, social change, mobility" (Davidyuk 1977: 11). It looks rather similar to the Western variants and is less related to the Marxist-Leninist canon than might have been expected. The collective edition of the *Dictionary of Applied Sociology* (Shulga 1984) continued and developed this tendency. The dictionary had a spe-

cial article on "Contemporary Bourgeois Sociology"; the article contained a number of concepts similar to the Western ones, and the texts of articles themselves referred to foreign authors and conceptions. For example, the article "Social Mobility" had the only reference to the collected texts of American sociologists, translated into Russian; the article "Social Status" referred to the conceptions of M. Weber and T. Parsons; the article "Sociology of Mass Communication" referred to the conceptions of R. Merton and P. Lazarsfeld, and so forth. Therefore, it can be concluded that in the 1960s–1980s a slow but permanent and constant process of transferring Western knowledge to Belarusian Soviet sociology took place, in the form of conceptions, ideas, and terms. The explicit use of Western conceptions became ever more normal and legitimated. This transfer influenced sociology's development significantly, and once various conceptions had been transferred and become known, the American authors acquired some dominance. It can be supposed that this transfer of Western knowledge influenced not only academicians but also – through this academic mediation – Soviet officials. We should not forget the close relation between philosophy and communist institutions and that some researchers (such as the academician Babosov) worked as members of the party apparatus for a certain period. But that is a question for further research.

/// Conclusion

In the beginning I used the term the "sociology of Belarus" instead of "Belarusian sociology" and wrote that in the 1960s–1980s it was developed as a variant of the general Soviet tradition, with significant regional specificities. At the same time, research has shown that a view of Soviet sociology as something very homogeneous could be questioned as being oversimplified in some aspects. Naturally, a very high degree of homogeneity existed (especially in the early periods of sociology's development) but sociology was significantly formed by external elements, involving the Soviet administrative and institutional divisions, and relations with party officials. But such subordination of sociological research to local party institutions within certain republics made it more variable. In the Belarusian case, the local specificity of sociology was significantly influenced by the dynamics of local administrative and scholarly institutions (mainly the Institute of Philosophy at the AS and the Department of Philosophy at BSU).

One of the specificities of sociology in Belarus was the discipline's very deep incorporation in the system of philosophical knowledge and,

for a long time, its methodological and disciplinary separation from philosophy has not been explicated. The reciprocal influence of the two disciplines was important for a number of leading figures involved in the institutionalisation of sociology in Belarus. And while sociology was closely integrated into philosophical knowledge, the tension between it and some branches of philosophy was thereby significant. But while the philosophy of science was among the leading disciplines in the BSSR, the question of epistemology, and especially the status of empirical knowledge, was of primary importance for sociology as an applied discipline with a philosophical background. Therefore, arguments about the scientific and theoretical status of sociological knowledge are often used to legitimise sociology as a discipline.

Another important source of sociology's development was the indirect influence of Western sociological and philosophical conceptions. Official Soviet philosophical and social science was developed in opposition to the Western – usually called "bourgeois" – knowledge. At the same time, some Western ideas were rather well known and were presented in academic publications in the form of "criticism of bourgeois science." Criticism was often presented in rather ritual forms. Nevertheless, the criticism itself could often provide real information about foreign conceptions and ideas. The criticism was supported by the Soviet officials and its subjects were chosen according to currents needs and plans. Simultaneously, the planned nature of Soviet criticism made the work of certain researchers more autonomous (according to their specialisation). Analysis of main texts (monographs, textbooks, and dictionaries, as well as memoir literature) shows the main problems, approaches, works, and concepts (with some dominance of the American ones) that were transferred and referred to in Belarusian sociology in the 1960s–1980s. The process of transfer had a slow but constant character and the open use of Western concepts became more and more normal and legitimated: from specialised scientific articles and monographs to textbooks and dictionaries. This study has thus explained the real importance of "Western" knowledge as a "shadow" factor of sociology's development (often in close connection with philosophy) in Soviet Belarus in the 1960s–1980s, as well as some of the forms and mechanisms of intellectual transfers in the post-war period of Soviet history.

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/// Abstract

This article covers the development of sociology as a scientific discipline in Belarus in the period of the 1960s through 1980s. It analyses the close interrelation between sociological and philosophical knowledge. It also looks at the phenomenon of the double identity of the sociologist and the philosopher, leading to their reciprocal influence. The indirect influences of Western sociological and philosophical conceptions are explained as an important source of sociology's development. Analysis shows that some Western ideas were known rather well and were presented in academic publications and textbooks in the form of "criticism of bourgeois science," which, despite its critical form, could often provide real information. Analysis of the main texts (monographs, textbooks, and dictionaries, as well as memoirs) helps to cover the main problems, approaches, works, and con-

cepts that were transferred to, and referred to, in Belarusian sociology in the period of the 1960s through 1980s. The process of transfer had a slow but permanent and constant character and the usage of Western conceptions became ever more normal and legitimated. The findings reveal the real importance of "Western" knowledge as a "shadow" factor in the development of sociology (often in close connection with philosophy) in Soviet Belarus in the 1960s through 1980s.

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THE AUTONOMISATION OF THE CULTURAL FIELD IN LATE SOCIALIST ALBANIA AND THE EMERGENCE OF EARLY SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

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/// Introduction

Most East-Central European countries had a pre-war tradition of sociology either centred on a particular school of social research, as in Poland or Romania (Bosomitu 2017; Szacki 1998), or instrumental to public discourses of modernisation enunciated by intellectuals. Notwithstanding acquaintance with outstanding figures in sociology such as Durkheim, Simmel, or Spencer, the pre-war intellectuals in Albania – most prominently Branko Merxhani – were grappling with processes of nation building and societal transformation; they treated sociology loosely and normatively, as if it provided an ideological blueprint (Sulstarova 2007: 82; Ypi 2007: 673). Consequently, Albania did not share a similar tradition of pre-war sociology with other state socialist countries of East-Central Europe. The aim of this paper is to situate Albania's unique experience of the emergence of sociology under the state socialist regime within the broader regional experience of the emergence (or re-emergence) and institutionalisation of sociology (Voříšek 2008) and to explain the particularity of the Albanian case.

In explaining the trajectory of social science, and specifically of sociology under socialism, there is a shared recognition in the literature of the pivotal role played by the de-Stalinisation process, which resulted in a more liberalised cultural policy and provided relative autonomy for the social

sciences (Beliaev & Burtorin 1982: 421; Shalin 1978: 173; Voříšek 2008: 91). However, ample and sometimes contradictory explanations are given for the other causes of the emergence and institutionalisation of sociology. Some authors consider that sociology emerged as a result of the state socialist regime's inefficacy in addressing the pressing problems of industrialisation; the solutions were then supposed to be found in "concrete social research" or in the sociological discipline (Beliaev & Burtorin 1982: 431; Lane 1970: 48). Other authors consider the establishment of sociology to have been the result of a bottom-up process triggered by a local sociological movement, or international influence (Shalin 1978: 174). The literature seems rather inconclusive on the role of other explanatory factors for the establishment and institutionalisation of sociology across state socialist Europe and in the Soviet Union.

This paper addresses the following research question: what shaped the emergence of sociological research during the period of late socialism in Albania? The second aim of the paper is to reveal the causal mechanism by which a liberalised cultural policy brought about a shift. The traditional role of the socialist intelligentsia lessened in importance while the role of social scientists emerged; in the very final years of the state socialist regime, in 1989 to 1990, these latter were pitted against Party cadres and representatives in defending a limited yet free academic practice. In order to explain the intricate process of the emergence of sociology under state socialism in Albania, this paper utilises a layered theoretical framework that tries to capture the interaction between stages of regime development (Jowitt 1992), the co-existence of various competing modes of legitimation (Verdery 1991), and the transformation of the heteronomous sector of cultural production into an emergent field of cultural production (Bourdieu 1992). As Voříšek (2008) mentions when explaining the various patterns of sociology's institutionalisation as a discipline across Soviet Europe, the emergence of sociology under state socialist regimes mostly involved the scientific field's being configured in spite of frequent regime controls and restrictions. In Albania, this particular process took place after regime change. However, the trajectory of sociology's emergence during the late period of the state socialist regime affected the discipline's post-1989 institutionalisation. In most of the countries of socialist East-Central Europe a different theoretical perspective than the one proposed here for Albania is prompted by the presence of institutionalised international contacts or membership in an international network of sociologists, the establishment of national sociological associations, and the institutionalisation of sociol-

ogy as a discipline, with the establishment of sociology departments under various labels.

/// The Theoretical Framework

The sociologists in state socialist Albania were not involved in a struggle with the regime for defence of the discipline because of their interstitial position as the ideological intelligentsia (Szelényi 1982: S311) within the field of power and as cultural producers in the quasi-autonomous emerging cultural field. A distinction should be made here between the Bourdieusian notion of the "field" and the notion of a "heteronomous sector." During a large part of the existence of the state socialist regime in Albania there were cultural producers – writers, artists, professors of philosophy, historians, and art critics – but not a field of cultural production. The degree of a field's autonomy is the main component of the concept (Bourdieu 1992: 220). Such a degree of autonomy is defined as "negative sanctions inflicted on heteronomous practices such as direct subjugation to political directives [...] and especially by the strength of the positive incitements to resistance and even to open struggle against those in power" (Bourdieu 1992: 221). During the Stalinist period of Albania's state socialist regime, the cultural production was, as Verdery claims, "a minor category of ideological activism" (1991: 88). Henceforth, it is better to use the term "heteronomous sector" (Bourdieu 1992: 259) than the notion of a "politicized cultural field" (Verdery 1991: 116). The notion of sector exemplifies the cultural sector or the scientific sector during the Stalinist period.

Juxtaposing the period from the late 1950s to the late 1970s with the period of the mid-1980s to 1990 clarifies the transformation of the state socialist regime in Albania and the transformed position of the socialist intelligentsia involved in the cultural sector vis-à-vis the regime. This paper uses Jowitt's theory of the stages of Leninist regimes (1992) in order to assess the conditions that trigger the variegated relation between society and the Party-state. An alternative theory, which in this case has less applicability, is the theory of the ascendancy of the intelligentsia to class power (Konrád & Szelényi 1979). An important initial condition – which is not fulfilled in the Albanian case – for the rise of the intelligentsia as agents of the "rationalisation of the system of legitimation" (Szelényi & Martin 1988: 664), is the "relative separation of the economy from the political" (Szelényi 1982: 311). The Albanian state socialist regime did not permit the emergence of a technocratic intelligentsia that would have been crucial in

the engineering of market socialism reforms. However, a process of "opening up [the party bureaucracy] ranks to the intelligentsia" (Szelényi & Martin 1988: 665) did happen in the late 1980s. Indeed, such an event entailed a simultaneous process whereby the transformation of the cultural sector into an emerging cultural field encouraged the early formation of sociology and the reconfiguration of the field of power, in which cultural capital started to dominate over political capital. Actually, the ascendancy of the cultural intelligentsia in Albania is a result of the congruence between the crisis of Marxist-Leninist ideological legitimation and the regime's reformist cycle, whose inclusive dimension had unintended consequences. The after-effects of this process were that a portion of the cultural intelligentsia ascended to power in the post-socialist regime and that sociology was consolidated as a discipline.

The transformative stage of the state socialist regime in Albania, which aimed to "alter or destroy values, structures […] contributing to the actual or potential existence of alternative centers of power" (Jowitt 1992: 56), lasted from the immediate post-Second World War period up to the late 1950s. The main transformative goals of the regime were to weaken the merchant class, representatives of the national bourgeoisie, public intellectuals, and patriarchal relations in rural areas. The coercive mode of legitimation was rather dominant during this period. Henceforth, the confrontation was between "unreconstructed society" and the communist party apparatus (Jowitt 1992: 57). At this stage, the state socialist regime had not yet managed to make the education of the socialist intelligentsia local. The consolidation phase of the regime, which included the period between 1960 and 1979, had intermittent cycles of aborted liberalising reforms; it created interaction between the socialist intelligentsia and the regime based on "ideological-political orientation" (Jowitt 1992: 74) and adherence to the party line. The role of cultural producers in the cultural and educational sector was to enhance Party propaganda and the ideological education of society. At this stage the dominant capital in the field of power was political capital. No clear distinction was made between experts with a "formal role prescription" (Jowitt 1992: 74) and the "politically relevant behaviour" (ibid.) of the party cadres. The socialist intelligentsia at this period can be considered "task-achieving cultural producers" dependent on Party directives.

The weakening of Marxist-Leninist ideology in the 1980s, and the discontinuity of dependency on a socialist hegemonic power such as the Soviet Union or China, made the state socialist regime open its ranks in

the administrative apparatus and economic sector to non-party members of the socialist intelligentsia. The "more professional, skilled and articulate strata" (Jowitt 1992: 95) started to replace the party bureaucracy. This professional strata articulated policy formulations on the social problems of the post-consolidation – if not modernisation – phase, by providing novel "ideological definitions" (Jowitt 1992: 92). It is at this juncture that the regime aimed to "enhance its legitimacy without sacrificing the charismatic exclusiveness of its apparatchik component" (Jowitt 1992: 93). A more relaxed cultural policy on the socialist intelligentsia involved in the cultural-educational sector emerged. The notion of the co-existence of various principles of legitimation (Rigby 1982: 15) is utilised to indicate the symbolic-ideological legitimation (Verdery 1991) of the Albanian socialist regime, based on national ideology as well as Marxist-Leninist ideology. As the article shows, legitimation based on national ideology was less efficient in the mid-1980s, or at least it was a smokescreen. It was not the historians and ethnologists but the ideological intelligentsia – the sociologists and professors of political economy – who proposed policy reforms to solve the social problems facing the regime.

Apart from the regime-level analysis, the present paper explains the causal process of the emergence of the cultural field and the interstitial position of the emerging cultural intelligentsia based on the Bourdieusian framework. This conceptual toolkit is utilised in conjunction with the theorisation of the expert community, which was characterised by collegiality, occupational closure, and non-political value commitments (Waters 1989: 946). The post-consolidation phase of the state socialist regime engendered the reconfiguration of the field of power. This concept is defined as "the space of relations of force between agents or between institutions having in common the possession of the capital necessary to occupy the dominant positions in the different fields" (Bourdieu 1992: 215). The main institutions involved in the cultural sector included the Institute for Marxist-Leninist Studies, the Academy of Sciences, the V.I. Lenin Party School, and the State University of Tirana. Other state agencies involved included the State Planning Office and the Science Committee of the Prime Minister's Office. In the late 1980s, the influence of the Institute for Marxist-Leninist Studies and the V.I. Lenin Party School waned and the State University of Tirana became the locus for the articulation of the cultural field. Some representatives of defunct institutions were transferred to the State University. The Academy of Sciences played an important role in establishing the institutional infrastructure for the professionalisation of expertise, re-

gardless of the decline of the national ideology it had helped to establish. Agents possessing cultural capital replaced party bureaucracy in the leading positions of the cultural sector, and economists proposed certain policy reforms for the restructuring of enterprises and economic decentralisation. The process of the autonomisation of the cultural field (Bourdieu 1992: 248) from ideological control implied different value commitments, demands, and strivings for further professionalisation, and the occupation closure of a "pure producer" (ibid.: 257), with its specific position-takings.

/// The Social Sciences and the State Socialist Regime before the Post-Consolidation Phase

1. The Dissolution of Expertise: Anyone Can Be a Scientific Worker during the Cultural Revolution

During the first stage of its rule, the state socialist regime exhibited its transformative goal, which pitted the Party against unreformable society. Official party documents written by the leading party ideologues specify the tasks that the Party organisations and the socialist intelligentsia were supposed to accomplish to reach the transformative goal. Educating the educators – mainly party officials in charge of revolutionising society – was conceived as parallel to the processes of eradicating the remnants of the past regime and social structure: "the revolutionary actions of the communists and workers, and their participation in the battle for progress and destruction of everything archaic, and the building of the new, is a powerful educational tool" (Alia 1969: 18).[1]

In the consolidation phase the regime aimed at the eradication of the cultural practices and "vestiges" of bourgeois society. "We are witnessing a new phase that is characterised by a frontal assault against all the 'blemishes' of the old feudal-bourgeois society in politics, economy, ideology, and culture"(Hoxha 1969: 25). The Party ideology considered party officials and the socialist intelligentsia to be as capable of producing studies as any secluded group of social scientists.

In 1951, the state socialist regime had already initiated a process to produce its own socialist intelligentsia; it established three institutes of higher learning, on the Soviet model, with the intention to "form the intelligentsia of our land" (Rouček 1958: 56). In 1957, the State University was estab-

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[1] All translations of cited fragments are our own.

lished. An early attempt to resuscitate the internal party discussions (on the order of Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist position) that had taken place at the Tirana Party Conference in 1956 was nipped in the bud (Lalaj 2015). One might imagine that the liberalisation of cultural policy followed the initial stage of Marxist revisionism within the Party. By scrutinising official party documents delineating regime policies on the role of cultural producers and the objectives of particular sectors of the social sciences (as presented by their leading representatives), the socialist intelligentsia's subordinate position in regard to the party bureaucracy and its rule becomes clearer.

The source of legitimacy remained Marxist-Leninist doctrine and the knowledge claims of the Party. Nexhmije Hoxha, head of the Institute for Marxist-Leninist Studies, explained at a convention on the role of the social sciences that "the study of social problems cannot be an issue solely for a group of specialists – but an issue of all the party cadres, primarily of the communists and local party secretaries" (1969: 23). The prescribed function of social research on social issues was to enhance the ideological and educative effect rather than to provide applicative social research on various sectors of society or the economy, let alone to trigger theory-based research. "The studies on social issues will contribute to the enhancement of propaganda work and agitation, as well as to educational, cultural, and organisational work"(Hoxha 1969: 24). At the height of the Maoist revolutionary zeal of the state socialist regime, doing social research became massive and popularised, recognising no hierarchy or previously established authority. Albanian scholars, who were mostly trained historians before the war, were labelled esoteric. Their claim to scholarly authority was challenged and not considered useful. "Before, we wrongly considered that only 'specialists' or 'historians,' who were trained as such, could study social issues. We had little faith in the large masses of workers, farmers, intelligentsia, social activists, and officers to accomplish this task" (Hoxha 1969: 24).

To wit, during the first decades of the state socialist regime, the cultural producers did not conduct their studies within an autonomous cultural field. Conformity to the directives of the Party was manifested even in self-criticism employed by the members of this heteronomous cultural sector when presenting their role. Science was within the grasp of any member of the socialist intelligentsia or party bureaucracy, or of a worker, and henceforth was not the mark of a particular profession, or symbolic capital. Most members of the academia with positions in higher learning institutes

or at the Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies were linguists, ethnologists, political economists, or historians.

There was a certain hierarchy within the ideological intelligentsia that was based on proximity to the Party and shown by being in charge of various ideological tasks within the cultural sector, such as taking part in state committees, or proposing the long-term goals of a particular field of work. Kostallari was one of the leading members of the ideological intelligentsia in the sector of linguistics, head of the Institute of History and Linguistics, and dean of the Faculty of History and Philology for quite some time. Studies were conceived to help "party committees and mass organisations to enhance the ideological work of the party organisations" (Kostallari 1969: 128). On the other hand, party members and workers were considered to be as capable of conducting studies as members of scholarly institutes. "The solution […] requires the massification of studies directed by party committees in every region and every county" (Kostallari 1969: 129). In the economic sphere, the state socialist regime intended to introduce the direct participation of workers in managing production (Mara 1969: 105). Those that possessed expertise or were responsible for economic planning, such as directors of state enterprises, engineers, or head of units, were labelled bureaucrats. The leading representatives of the scientific sector showed a propensity to propagate "scientifically" the so-called "line of the masses."

At the margins of the scientific sector there were limited attempts to introduce certain innovations in the study of state socialist society. In the late 1960s certain scholars at the Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies suggested that the "methods" of "bourgeois" sociologists of the West and of "revisionist" sociologists in the socialist camp should be used instrumentally to study public opinion (officially called "social opinion") (Avdia 1969: 177). The use of these methods borrowed from "bourgeois" sociologists was linked to the actual practice of the political mobilisation of the masses and the expansion of workers' control in factories and state enterprises. Although the recognition of certain sociological methods by some members of the Institute for Marxist-Leninist Studies is rather impressive, it was insufficient to bring about the establishment of a sociological research unit within this particular Institute, or for the conduct of applicative social research. There is no marked continuity between the initial, instrumental attempt to introduce sociological methods surreptitiously within a Marxist ideological framework in the late 1960s and the process, in the late 1980s, of substituting sociological research for Marxist-Leninist dogma. More-

over, the status of the social researchers in the 1960s and 1970s differed from the role and status of the socialist intelligentsia during the inclusive phase of the state socialist regime in the late 1980s.

2. The Onslaught on State Bureaucracy

The Leninist type of party considered bureaucracy a hindrance to the participation of the masses in the socialist administration of society (Wright 1974: 85). The main characteristics of bureaucracy, according to Weber, involve "expert and technical knowledge" (1974: 72). Allowing the emergence and consolidation of professional groups within the state bureaucracy constituted a challenge to the monopoly of knowledge and power exercised by the Party apparatus. As Waters explains, the central components of collegial structures among professional groups include structural specialisation, value commitment, and occupation closure (1989: 946). The state socialist regime in Albania devised particular measures to weaken and restrict, if not quell, the occupation closure of the state bureaucracy and technocracy (Çami 1972: 18), claiming that this amounted to undue privilege and distancing from the masses. On the other hand, continuous reshuffling of the state bureaucracy and use of workers' control over the state administration were among the measures that atomised and alienated the bureaucracy, affecting its stability.

During the Cultural Revolution, any professional group that might have emerged among the cultural intelligentsia and technocracy and claiming allegiance to different value commitments than Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Party's "theoretical thinking" would be confronted with the downgrading of their expertise and the inclusion of party representatives, the masses, and workers in the production of knowledge. For quite some time, the state bureaucracy was subordinate to the Party. The prevailing official discourse of the regime delineates bureaucratisation, intellectualism, and technocracy as threats to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Members of the state socialist intelligentsia in leading positions of the educational and cultural sector, such as university deans or department directors, and the heads of party institutes such as the V.I. Lenin Party School and Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, were engaged in an ideological battle against the bureaucracy. Luan Omari, dean of the Faculty of Law and Political Sciences at the State University of Tirana praised the Party for subduing the bureaucracy: "Experience of the construction of socialism has proved that the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat [...] cannot be

ensured without a resolute struggle against the bureaucracy" (1972: 18). This position of the cultural intelligentsia has been constant through time. In the late 1970s Zija Xholi, dean of the Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, reiterated that bureaucratisation posed a hindrance: "It undermines the links between the state power and the people […] cultivates conceit in the cadres, such as 'respect' for oneself and scorn for the masses" (1984: 8). The state socialist cultural intelligentsia itself did not yet constitute a professional group that was "self-controlling and self-policing" (Waters 1989: 958) nor did it express different value commitments. However, during the late 1970s to mid-1980s, with the change of leadership of the Party of Labour of Albania (PLA), the state socialist regime started to "mobilise expert knowledge" (Waters 1989: 952) by incorporating members of the cultural intelligentsia, who were engaged in ideological battles and in raising the educational attainments of the socialist intelligentsia, into committees on intellectual-work policies at the behest of the Party-state. The state socialist regime could have chosen a different path of recognising and incorporating its defeated technocratic intelligentsia.

The early 1970s had constituted a brief interlude in which the technocratic intelligentsia, occupying ministerial, state enterprise, and management positions in the state bureaucracy, became ascendant. The weakening of economic cooperation with China conditioned the country's failure "to achieve many of its planned targets in the 1971–1975 plan" (Larrabee 1978: 65). In this context, attempts were made to introduce some degree of economic liberalisation in the centralised socialist economy (Larrabee 1978: 67). Abdyl Këllezi, an economist educated before the war, occupied various positions in the administration of the socialist economy, including chairman of the State Planning Commission (1968–1975), and cooperated with the minister of industry and the minister of trade on a "slight liberalisation of Albania's course" (ibid.). The party apparatus undertook purges in the state bureaucracy, in particular within the "top echelons of the state administration […] particularly in the economic field" (Larrabee 1978: 68). Short, intermittent cycles of attempted reforms in 1956 and 1972 were followed by long periods of the primacy of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, *partinost*, and the ascendancy of the party bureaucracy. As in the case of Romania (Verdery 1991: 106), a reform and technocratic constituency was lacking. The emerging constituency of the last short cycle of reforms emerged not within the technocratic intelligentsia but within the ideological intelligentsia engaged in the cultural-educational sector of the state socialist regime. As the next section demonstrates, the regime was invested at the same time

in a different discourse than the Marxist-Leninist ideology – a discourse characterised, according to Verdery, by "symbolic and ideological appeals to the Nation" (1991: 86). This process had implications for the status and understanding of the social sciences.

3. The Legitimation Effects of National Ideology and the Reproduction of Expertise

The Academy of Sciences, which was based on the Soviet model, was established in 1972 and incorporated the various existing scientific institutes.[2] Historians, linguists, and ethnologists constituted the bulk of its scholars. The social sciences were primarily conceived to pertain to national identity, folklore, national history, and the language of the Albanian people. In one of the official documents presented to the Council of Ministers by representatives of the Academy of Sciences in the late 1970s, the social sciences are defined as "already well-established Albanian national sciences."[3] This particular understanding of the social sciences, with a focus on contemporary history and the so-called socialist construction, did not include sociology. The only reference to sociology in official documents regarding scientific planning was a thematic reference. The official document on "The Broadening and Uplifting of the Quality of Contemporary Historical Studies" mentions important research themes, whose character is "historical, economic, and sociological."[4] Overall, the social research accomplished at the Academy of Sciences became subordinate to national ideology.

By the late 1970s, social research was mainly centred at the Academy of Sciences as a coordinating institution between the State University of Tirana, the Institute of Marxist Leninist Studies, and the V.I. Lenin Party School. The party's official discourse on scientific policy, compared to the

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[2] It should be noted that after the Second World War, the state socialist regime inherited a research institute named the Institute for Albanian Studies, which was established during the fascist occupation. This structure was later transformed into the Institute of Sciences, maintaining some of the historians and linguists, who had been educated in Western Europe, as members of the refashioned Institute of Sciences. What unites the two academic institutions under these two different regimes is the dominance of Albanology as a defining feature of social science studies.

[3] National State Archives of Albania, Council of Ministers fonds, file 47/1979, p. 3: "Relacion për forcimin e partishmërisë proletare dhe të karakterit kombëtar të studimeve në institucionet e shkencave shoqërore dhe në shkollat e larta" [Report on Strengthening the Proletarian Partinost and the National Character of Studies in Institutions of Social Sciences and of Higher Education].

[4] National State Archives of Albania, Council of Ministers fonds, file 47/1979, p. 11: "Projektvendim për forcimin e mëtejshëm të partishmërisë proletare dhe të karakterit kombëtar të studimeve në shkencat tona shoqërore" [Draft Law to Further Strengthening the Partinost and the National Character of Our Social Studies].

discourse of the 1960s which treated specialists, Party bureaucrats, and other communists as equal in matters of science, started to provide more official recognition to the expertise and symbolic capital of researchers and academics working in the scientific sector. Nonetheless, ideologically task-oriented social research persisted until it started to wane or be replaced in the mid-1980s.

Contrary to the cases of other state socialist societies, in which "cultural producers," as Verdery calls them, were engaged "in struggles over the nation" (1991: 11) in cooperation or in contradiction to the Party and among themselves, the Albanian case does not display competing discourses on the nation articulated autonomously from the prevailing narrative constructed by the regime. As a consequence, this faction of the cultural intelligentsia took part in legitimating the state socialist regime through national ideology, rather than in challenging the prevailing official narrative on the Albanian nation. To wit, no real "politics of culture" (Verdery 1991: 12) took place that would have pitted various sub-groups of historians and social scientists against each other over discourse on the nation. In a way, to a larger extent, cultural production was subdued to the "category of ideological activism" (Verdery 1991: 88). The discourse on the nation was rather homogenous. This is not to say that members of this faction of the cultural intelligentsia did not attempt to assert the primacy of their expertise over ideological and political demands and thus to manifest their cultural capital. In the late 1970s, when the regime was in its post-consolidation phase, academic historians made their claims on the recognition of expertise and their understanding of "scientific work." A good illustration was the dispute between the president of the Academy of Sciences, Aleks Buda, and Prime Minister Shehu on the primacy of expertise in regard to archaeological expeditions. The regime demanded hasty conclusions and results, whereas the academics showed more restraint, and claimed that "this is first of all an archaeological problem."[5] More than a process of making new, competing knowledge claims it was a process in which cultural producers had their expertise mobilised by the regime to induce ideological effects. This condition did produce a certain friction between social scientists' understanding of expertise and the Party's understanding of the role of science, putting the brakes on ideological zeal. Nonetheless, it did not question the primacy of the Marxist-Leninist dogma.

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[5] National State Archives of Albania, Council of Ministers fonds, file 47/1979, p. 17: "Procesverbal i mbledhjes së kryesisë së këshillit të ministrave mbi shqyrtimin e relacioneve" [Council of Ministers Meeting Record on Examining Reports].

The usual practice of task-achieving cultural producers required the use of specific genres of cultural production, which can be termed "position-takings." The socialist intelligentsia involved in the cultural sector had to provide generalisations: synthetic conclusions in official reports to the Party, the government, or at scientific events. A certain part of these generalisations and non-empirical theoretical syntheses were dedicated not only to normative "exhortations" (Verdery 1991) in favour of the ideology but to critique of bourgeois and revisionist scholars. Keeping "bourgeois-revisionist ideological aggression"[6] at bay was one of the tasks. At the same time, in the late 1970s the state socialist regime intensified diplomatic relations with Western countries such as Italy, Austria, Greece, and France, thus providing exchange and research opportunities for Albanian cultural producers.

In contradiction to the rhetorical demands for the compliance of cultural producers with "ideological-political orientations" (Jowitt 1992), which were manifested in the "political and ideological content"[7] of cultural production, and for cultural producers themselves to have a "sound political, ideological, and scientific Marxist-Leninist education,"[8] the regime initiated the professionalisation of social scientists. The Academy of Sciences played a coordinating role in the process of enhancing the expertise of cultural producers. A 1979 internal document of an official meeting of the Academy of Sciences' social section on postgraduate research indicates the disciplinary-based criteria for prospective research: "Dissertation themes should encourage research and bring something new."[9] Propaganda-based research and compilation-type research was not supported.[10] The regime's recognition of the socialist intelligentsia's expertise stemmed from the Party's attempt to shift from ideological-political compliance to novel ideological definitions, which implied policy proposals to feed "the policy-

[6] National State Archives of Albania, Council of Ministers fonds, file 47/1979, p. 40: "Procesverbal i mbledhjes së kryesisë së këshillit të ministrave mbi shqyrtimin e relacioneve" [Council of Ministers Meeting Record on Examining Reports] .

[7] National State Archives of Albania, Council of Ministers fonds, file 47/1979, p. 46: "Procesverbal i mbledhjes së kryesisë së këshillit të ministrave mbi shqyrtimin e relacioneve" [Council of Ministers Meeting Record on Examining Reports].

[8] National State Archives of Albania, Council of Ministers fonds, file 47/1979, p. 45: "Procesverbal i mbledhjes së kryesisë së këshillit të ministrave mbi shqyrtimin e relacioneve" [Council of Ministers Meeting Record on Examining Reports].

[9] National State Archives of Albania, Academy of Sciences fonds, file 19/1979, p. 7: "Tematika për fushat e shkallës së pare të kualifikimit shkencor pasuniversitar në shkencat shoqërore" [Topics for the First Level of Postgraduate Scientific Qualifications in Social Sciences].

[10] National State Archives of Albania, Academy of Sciences fonds, file 19/1979, p. 7: "Tematika për fushat e shkallës së pare të kualifikimit shkencor pasuniversitar në shkencat shoqërore" [Topics for the First Level of Postgraduate Scientific Qualifications in Social Sciences].

making of the Party."[11] This does not mean that the previous practices of the massification of social research were not present as well. The institutional basis for further professionalisation was set by establishing external qualifications through various programmes abroad and the use of "scientific debates, conferences on particular scientific problems and lectures."[12]

/// The Emergence of Sociology, the Autonomisation of the Cultural Field, and the Crisis of Marxist Ideology

1. Uncertainties of the Post-Consolidation Phase: Opening the Ranks to the Cultural Intelligentsia

The Ninth Party Congress of the Party of Labour of Albania, held in November 1986, constituted a turning point in the ideological discourse of the leading heights of the Party-state and in the process of reconfiguring the field of power. Ramiz Alia became the first secretary of the PLA after the death of Enver Hoxha in 1985. The regime's new leadership loosened the ideological restrictions and limited the use of coercion. Although the regime publicly manifested its ideological objection to "revisionist" policies in the Soviet Union and to "the restoration of the bourgeoisie" in East-Central Europe, in facing the uncertain prospective trajectory of the state socialist regime and the existing immobility of the centralised economy, with the waning of its legitimacy among the working classes and young generation (Biberaj 1998: 30), it initiated a new reform cycle. The ideological discourse delineated in the political speeches of Ramiz Alia and other leading members of the Party emphasised a recognition of Albania's changing external and internal conditions. Behind the veneer of ideological correctness and rhetorical exhortations to base "scientific work on revolutionary theory and on the correct line of the Party" (Alia 1986: 21), the regime recognised and promoted specialisation and the expertise of cultural producers. Economists, physicists, mathematicians, and social scientists were asked to provide recommendations and solutions to the pressing problems facing the regime. In consequence, the sharp distinction between

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[11] National State Archives of Albania, Academy of Sciences fonds, file 14/1982, p. 13: "Programmei i punës për zbërthimin e vendimeve të kongresit të VIII të PPSH" [Working Programme on the Analysis of the PLA's 8th Congress Resolutions].

[12] National State Archives of Albania, Academy of Sciences fonds, file 14/1982, p. 24: "Programi i punës për zbërthimin e vendimeve të kongresit të VIII të PPSH" [Working Programme on the Analysis of the PLA's 8th Congress Resolutions].

the Party bureaucracy and "unreformed" society was overcome and social research was no longer the prerogative of any socialist citizen.

During this stage, more and more members of the cultural intelligentsia were recruited to the state bureaucracy and non-party positions. In 1990, in a speech on the democratisation of social life, Ramiz Alia informed the members of the Central Committee that "in the apparatus of the central departments and institutions, the communists make up only 33% of the total number of employees and functionaries, while 67% of them are not party members" (1990: 4). This process, which had evolved over time, happened prior to the regime change in 1991. The official discourse during the late 1980s specified the increasing role of cultural capital and the authority of the cultural producers. The existing practice of ideological work was considered by Party ideologues such as Foto Çami to be inefficient and burdened with empty slogans and clichés (1986: 36). What was required was "more knowledge, more facts, and arguments" (ibid.). The lofty ideological and political battles were replaced by concrete social issues (Alia 1986: 12). The state socialist regime accepted the necessity of recognising the changing role and importance of cultural producers, as part of the socialist intelligentsia. "Currently, society needs people who are quite able professionally and passionate about their expertise, as well as competent in their field" (Alia 1986: 27). As Starova and Fuga (2001: 14) explain, the regime allowed a small number of ties with the Western social sciences, through the ordering of books and publications from the West or "revisionist" East, as an investment in the improvement of the ideological elite. Facing complex problems, the state socialist regime made clear that it was not succumbing to bureaucratisation and that it was not relinquishing the Party's monopoly on power. Nonetheless, the state socialist regime was no longer as monolithic after the reconfiguration of the field of power. Professors of political economy and leading planners at the State Planning Office presented new economic measures or policies to increase the efficiency of economic production and to provide more relative autonomy to state enterprises by decentralising decision-making. The First Secretary of the PLA made a strong statement: "The Party cannot interfere in the economy" (Alia 1990: 17). In the cultural and educational sector, Party directives and *partinost*, and the primacy of Marxist-Leninist ideology, were sidelined by the new ideological intelligentsia leading the process of making the cultural field autonomous from the political power.

2. The Autonomisation of the Cultural Field

The Academy of Sciences, as the leading institution in the cultural and scientific sector, had established the institutional structure for the recruitment and education of new members of the group of cultural producers in the late 1970s. Despite initial instances of friction over their different understandings of expertise between members of the cultural intelligentsia and members of the Party-state in official meetings, Marxist-Leninist ideology was not questioned, replaced, or challenged. In the mid-1980s, the national ideology appeared less effective in legitimating the state socialist regime. The social problems to be solved increased. A few members of the cultural intelligentsia became involved in providing novel ideological propositions to overcome the waning effect of the militant and dogmatic use of propaganda. In this paper, this group of cultural producers is called the ideological intelligentsia. Not dependent on the strict Party line and correct repetition of the official Marxist ideology, and not being either Marxist sociologists or proponents of market socialism, the ideological intelligentsia articulated the crisis of legitimation through Marxist ideology. A process of differentiation between the strata of the cultural intelligentsia started to take shape. Hamit Beqja, a professor at the State University of Tirana, was one of the main proponents of policy changes in the education sector and also of more openness to progressive science. Most of his contributions were presented in official newspaper articles during the years 1987 to 1988. Aiming to curtail the effects of self-reliance or isolation in the educational system he proposed "[…] not isolating ourselves from the achievements of contemporary culture, science, and technology" (Beqja 1982: 39) as well as the "modernisation of the whole teaching and educational process at school" (ibid.).

The criticism levied at the cultural intelligentsia for relying on unreflective and uncritical use of Marxist ideology is an indication of differences among the cultural intelligentsia. Some groups or members of this stratum possessed more symbolic capital, through having articulated novel strategies of problem-solving that were recognised by the state socialist regime. Beqja presents the inefficacy of most of the cultural intelligentsia in the ideological sector in this way: "Aware of their own mediocrity, they intend to hide their lack of competence with political capital, with their family biography and their long contribution [to the socialist regime…] becoming as such a hindrance to the progress of the country" (Beqja 1989: 310). What was demanded was a more critical stance, more intellectual in-

novation, and less and less dogmatism. On the other hand, it should be noted that this group of cultural producers supported the "progressive and democratic processes that were triggered by the Party" (Beqja 1989: 547) and not political pluralism. Interestingly enough, in his public statements in *Zëri i Popullit* [The Voice of the People], the official press of the PLA, Beqja enumerates the social problems facing Albanian youth, such as social deviance and extravagant personality affirmation (1989: 308), and the indolence of the workers (1989: 310). Together with Tefik Çaushi, Kristaq Angjeli, and Alfred Uçi, Beqja became a supporter of the emergence of sociology as separate from *histomat*.

3. From the Sociology of Social Problems to Early Institutionalisation

As mentioned above, in Albania in the period from 1986 to 1989 sociology was not institutionalised as a separate autonomous discipline in the universities. The first Albanian sociological association was established in April 1990 and in 1991 the Faculty of Sociology and Philosophy was established at the University of Tirana. Nonetheless, the establishment of the Sociological Association and the Faculty of Sociology and Philosophy can be traced to the cultural producers' relative autonomy from the political powers and dislocation from the interstitial position between the field of power and the cultural field. The discipline of sociology was institutionalised after 1990. Means was found, between the education sector of the Central Committee Apparatus of the PLA and the Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, to allow the establishment of a special course in the discipline of sociology in 1986 (Weinstein et al. 2011: 34). Those who were involved in this endeavour were professors of philosophy at the University of Tirana, or those who had moved from the V.I. Lenin Party School to the University of Tirana, such as Servet Pëllumbi, who co-taught a special course with Fatos Tarifa, a young scholar at that time.[13]

The group of cultural producers involved could be categorised in two separate, yet complementary, sub-groups. One sub-group included members of the ideological intelligentsia, such as Hamit Beqja, who started to discuss the constraints of historical materialism, and the second sub-group included those cultural producers who conceived sociological research pri-

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[13] Other prominent members of the emerging sociological community were faculty members and the first generation of students: Artan Fuga, Lekë Sokoli, Fatmir Zani, Kosta Bajraba, Elira Çela, Zyhdi Dervishi, Klarita Gërxhani, and Teuta Starova.

marily as the sociology of social problems, in order to provide solutions to concrete problems facing the state socialist regime. These later contributed to doing "sociology for sociology's sake." Both groups were supportive of the process of "democratisation" initiated by the regime. When the 1992 elections were won by the opposition, led by the Democratic Party, the ascendancy of the Socialist Party of Albania (ex-PLA) was ended, and the centre-right considered that a break with the past had occurred. The initial institutionalisation of sociology as a discipline, which had happened through the establishment of the Faculty of Sociology and Philosophy in 1991, was henceforth challenged by the new powers in the name of reforms. The functioning of the Faculty was suspended (Tarifa 1996).

None of those who had contributed to the emergence of sociological research and later to sociology's institutionalisation were sociologists. Most of them – when engaged in criticising bourgeois and revisionist sociology – had come into contact with foreign authors. The process of obtaining and cultivating the dispositions of the sociological habitus involved cultivating personal contacts between Albanian cultural producers and foreign sociologists who visited socialist Albania (Weinstein et al. 2011: 34). Through exchanges of letters, autodidactic learning, and the ordering of books from their foreign colleagues, the Albanian cultural producers created a community of sociologists. Yet one cannot speak of professionalised sociologists at that juncture. The affinity between the public sociology of C.W. Mills (Tarifa 2014) and the kind of sociological research done from 1986 to 1990 was determined by the structural position of Albanian social researchers as part of the field of power, due to the appreciation of cultural capital, and as proponents of applicative social research aiding the solution of concrete social problems. Being a public intellectual and a sociologist appeared not to be a contradiction to this generation of cultural producers (Tarifa 2014). The cultural products of sociologists-in-the-making included scholarly articles introducing particular sociological methods (Tarifa 1986), mostly applicative social research on youth culture, and life-style sociology (Tarifa & Bajraba 1988; Tarifa & Çela 1989). The position-takings of these particular members of the cultural intelligentsia did not resemble speculative theorising based on the sophisticated regurgitation of Marxist ideology or the Party's theoretical thinking. However, the cultural products that appeared between 1986 and 1990 are ambiguous, due to their structural position at the intersection of fields, and in the sense of ascribing the correct behaviour of the socialist intelligentsia vis-à-vis the regime and of contradicting the dogmatic representation of socialist reality through their con-

crete empirical research. "In the cities, especially among the intelligentsia […] we observe sometimes the propensity to remain within the boundaries of family life, to construct a comfortable life, and avoid social activism on the work front" (Tarifa & Çela 1989: 63). One of the contradictions that appeared due to empirical research was related to the assumed emancipation of women. In fact, the active participation of women in political and social life was in contradiction with their low emancipation in family life (Tarifa & Bajraba 1988: 121).

In 1989, and especially in the spring of 1990 with the creation of a sociological association, members of the sociological community had taken steps that completed the autonomisation of the scientific field, as a subfield of the cultural field. However, it should be noted that the association comprised sociologists in the making as well as members of the creative intelligentsia, who henceforth became a community of public intellectuals. This happened prior to regime change in December 1990, and before the establishment of the first opposition party, the Democratic Party, which was based on the convergence of a faction of the cultural intelligentsia opposing the regime and the students of the University of Tirana. The social activism of the sociologist or social scientist in providing pragmatic answers to complex problems was considered insufficient to complete the scientific training of new social researchers, who should be involved in proper academic practice: "[postgraduate studies] should include a number of scientific works, scientific papers, conference papers, etc. […]" (Dervishi 1988: 52). The first scientific conferences – and the only ones in the late 1980s – on sociological topics were organised by the Scientific Sector of Philosophy on the "Sociological Overview of Our Spiritual Life" and the "Philosophical and Sociological Overview of Empirical Reality" in October 1989 and November 1990 respectively (Weinstein et al. 2011: 36–37). At this time, some sociologists started to distance themselves from the party bureaucracy and even to face issues of censorship with regard to their empirical research. The removal of secrecy from official state statistics, and the constraining effect of "ideological vigilance," were pertinent concerns of social scientists (Tarifa 1990: 98).

/// Conclusion

This paper has argued that the emergence of sociology in state socialist Albania can be explained by constructing a theoretical model that takes into consideration the stage theory of the evolution of the state socialist

regime, its different modes of legitimation, and the increasing role of the cultural intelligentsia at certain critical junctures. The institutionalisation of sociology as a discipline under a state socialist regime did not occur in Albania as in most of the East-Central European countries. In most of these countries, sociologists were aiming to consolidate and institutionalise the sociological discipline, and their trajectory is rather different from the trajectory and structured position of the cultural producers in the Albanian case, who became involved in the endeavour to conduct piecemeal social research and simultaneously to enhance the legitimation of the state socialist regime.

This paper has aimed to contribute to specifying a causal mechanism linking the relaxed cultural policy of the state socialist regime with the early institutionalisation of sociology. Apart from the theoretical and conceptual tools that delineate transformations at the regime level, the Bourdieusian framework has been utilised to make sense of the autonomisation of the cultural field as a first step to emancipation from political power. On the other hand, the theoretical model has revealed the interstitial position or the ambiguity of cultural producers as part of the cultural intelligentsia in the late 1980s in socialist Albania.

Viewing the emergence of sociology in Albania in terms of the strategies of specific historical agents in establishing sociological research under the cultural policy of late socialism overturns the normative and to some extent, non-empirically validated idea about sociologists bifurcating into either accomplices of the regime or scholars censored by the regime's totalitarian nature.

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/// **Abstract**

This paper addresses the following research question: what shaped the emergence of sociological research during the period of late socialism in Albania? The second aim of the paper is to reveal the causal mechanism by which a liberalised cultural policy brought about a shift. The traditional role of the socialist intelligentsia lessened in importance while the role of social scientists emerged. In the very final years of the state socialist regime, in 1989 to 1990, these latter were pitted against Party cadres and representatives in defending a limited yet free academic practice. In order to explain the intricate, early process of the emergence of sociology under state socialism in Albania, this paper utilises a layered theoretical framework that tries to capture the interaction between stages of regime development, the coexistence of various competing modes of legitimation, and the transformation of the heteronomous sector of cultural production into an emergent field of cultural production.

Key words:
autonomisation of the cultural field, cultural producers, field of power, sociology, state socialism

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RESEARCH, CONCEPTS, AND PERSPECTIVES

CULTURE OVER STRUCTURE:
THE HERITAGE OF LIFESTYLE RESEARCH
IN THE 1970S IN HUNGARY AND POLAND

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"In the effort to construct a socialist society the problems of lifestyle present themselves more and more urgently, both on the ideological and the empirical level. Is there an authentic form of socialist lifestyle, and can we consciously form or influence this model during the construction of the economy and society?" – with these words the sociologist János Szántó summarised the results of a giant sociological research project on "socialist lifestyle" in Hungary (1978: 5).[1] In 1975, an international sociological conference was held in Budapest. Sociologists from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union presented their research findings on the same topic. "Lifestyle" is the word that was used in the original documents and publications for the core topic of the research. At this conference, the Eastern European social scientists, including Szántó, tried for the first time to elaborate "the characteristics of the socialist lifestyle" in a theoretical (and ideological) context. Szántó (1978: 145) writes that "socialist lifestyle – if we understand the term correctly – means the mode of life of people living in a society of developed socialism." Primarily, the participants of the conference discussed the conceptual framework of life-

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[1] All translations of cited fragments are our own.

style research, but they also thematised methodological questions such as the quantification of social phenomena, modelling possibilities, and using statistical data for sociological analyses. The researchers did not use a single, canonised definition of lifestyle, instead we find different and parallel concepts in the most important publications on the topic at the time. For example, one of the main figures of lifestyle research in Hungary, Ágnes Losonczi, states that they were interested in how "people plan, organise, live, and think their lives. We consider basic facts like the material-social conditions, what role everyday survival plays in these conditions, how these people relate to the work that sustains society and fills a major part of their lives, what they think are the most important goals and experiences of life, and what they regard as important" (Losonczi 1978: 44–45). István Kemény, one of the most influential sociologists of that era, wrote in 1973 that "a lifestyle connects those living it and disconnects them from those living other lifestyles" (1992: 135). He argues that lifestyle forms every part of life and personality, and is also continuously changing and linked to the social context (Kemény 1992: 136). Roughly at the same time, Andrzej Siciński,[2] a prominent Polish sociologist, started organising a multidisciplinary research team to conceptualise different Polish lifestyles and later to observe them empirically. One of the key differentiation criteria was (or was supposed to be) belonging to either the group of the intelligentsia or of the workers, while differences between rural and urban lifestyles played a significant role as well (Siciński 1978a: 135).

Three years after the above-mentioned conference, seven Hungarian[3] and one or two further authors from each guest country[4] published their articles in a monograph entitled *Lifestyle Research in the Socialist Countries* (Szántó 1978). On reading these articles, a permanent desire for dialogue with mainstream Western sociology can be identified. The writers quoted

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[2] Andrzej Siciński (1924–2006) was one of the most versatile and active post-war academic Polish sociologists. He graduated from Warsaw University in 1952; in 1961 he defended his Ph.D. there. Afterwards, he was one of the animators of Polish intellectual life, gathering around himself people with different academic backgrounds, worldviews, and political preferences. He was the leader of several interdisciplinary working teams at the Polish Academy of Sciences, conducting theoretical and empirical research projects on, among other subjects, contemporary culture; visions of the future (a famous international research project with the Norwegian sociologist John Galtung); Polish lifestyles in the 1970s (described in this paper); emerging civic society (the latter research tradition is still being continued by his followers). He was also the co-founder of OBOP in 1958 – Poland's first public opinion research institute – and later a path-breaking qualitative methodologist; he was also an adviser to Solidarity in 1980 and Minister of Culture in the early 1990s.

[3] K. Kulcsár, Á. Losonczi, M. Szántó, E. Hankiss, R. Manchin, R. Andorka, and L. Cseh-Szombathy.

[4] A. Siciński, N.S. Mansurov, V.Z. Rogovin, M. Illner, and B. Filipcová.

– aside from Marx and Engels – from Parsons, Malinowski, and Weber, to Hall, Heller, and Campbell. Nevertheless, there are a limited number of similarities with Western sociology to be observed among the concepts and methods of the national studies. The comparative analyses with Western societies remained unfinished and artificial. It seems that this first attempt to canonise Eastern European (socialist) knowledge on a transnational level failed. Probably the failure did not originate from socialist-type sociological thought but from the research question itself; as has been stated more than once, the question of everyday life in the social sciences is vast (Highmore 2002: 1) and can include practically any theme, such as language, rules, positions, or performances (Kalekin-Fishman 2013: 715).

Research on everyday life seems to have played a double role in the socialist society of the 1970s. On the one hand, it is seen now by researchers, *a posteriori*, as a critical tool for unmasking the poverty and deprivation that was officially denied at the time but was still very much present in socialist society. On the other, it was seen in that period as a tool for helping ameliorate the system and, in parallel, to legitimise the "socialist way of life." This dualism is also observable in the status of the Hungarian and Polish research groups. Both were funded or ideologically influenced by the State and the Party, but at the same time, they were sheltered areas, where intellectuals and researchers belonging to the opposition could work rather freely. Both the influence of ideological questions and the relative independence of the scientific field (compared to the previous period) are observable in each of the cases.

Two research collections from the 1970s on the everyday life of Hungarian and Polish industrial employees have recently been found in the unorganised archives of the Hungarian and the Polish Academies of Sciences. These documents provide considerable empirical material to support our argument.

/// 1. The Concept of Lifestyle in the Hungarian and Polish Sociological Traditions

1.1. Hungary – from the Hungarian Peasant to the Time-Budget Analysis

Lifestyle research has a long and unique tradition in Hungary. At the *fin de siècle*, the sociologist Róber Braun, inspired by William I. Thomas, con-

ducted a survey on the everyday life of the Hungarian peasants (Braun 1913). In the interwar period, some of the "populist writers" (Erdei 1933; Illyés 1936; Kovács 1937; Szabó 1936, 1938; Veres 1936) produced descriptive works ("sociographies") and political pamphlets based on the daily life of the peasants. These authors focused on the impoverished living conditions in an impressionistic and politically motivated way. Their political scope reached from the far left to the far right, but their highly critical accounts were made from a strong moral position. The writers' influence was due, on the one hand, to their double status on the boundary of politics, sciences and literature, on the other hand, to the lack of an autonomous, scientific, sociology (Bourdieu 1999).

Sociology in Eastern Europe came to a halt after the Second World War and with the communist parties' takeover of the region. Classical sociological research topics reappeared at the beginning of the 1960s, when sociology re-emerged as a scientific and institutionalised discipline in Hungary. Following the Soviet model, a sociological research group was created at the Institute of Philosophy, at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS), in 1960. The consolidation of János Kádár's[5] regime played an important role in the reorganisation of sociological research, even if the period of détente after the defeat of the 1956 revolution was not without troubles. According to the dogmatic Marxist viewpoint, there was no need for independent sociology alongside historical materialism. Sociologists who wished to restart the discipline had to depart from the principles of historical materialism and Marxist sociology to legitimise a field of sociology independent of Marxist social science, to produce a methodology, and to familiarise themselves with and become accepted by non-Marxist schools of sociology. In 1963, András Hegedüs became head of the independent Research Group. Hegedüs had been prime minister in 1956 after the defeat of the revolution, but had abandoned politics and turned to social science in the early 1960s, after a forced emigration in Moscow. Some members of the Group were influenced by the ideas of Lukács's Budapest School (Heller 1970) and they in part defined sociology as a kind of socialist criticism. Thus, in the 1960s sociology was politicised; it did not have a solid institu-

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[5] János Kádár (1912–1989) was a Hungarian communist politician; he was the prime minister of the Revolutionary Workers'-Peasants' Government established by the Soviets in 1956, which was tasked with halting the national uprising of the Hungarians. From 1957 to 1988 he headed the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. He directed repressions against the participants in the Hungarian revolution. Subsequently, he conducted a series of economic and political reforms, which ensured a fairly high standard of living for Hungarians. The system he created is called "Goulash Communism."

tional framework and professional representatives. Members of Hegedüs's group arrived from different disciplines without proper scientific questions and methodology. Their common aim was to show the distance between ideology and society; the lifestyle topic seemed ideal for them. In addition, it was a perfect research programme for critically minded scholars who were interested in the so-called Western sociological empirical methods rather than in Marxist theories of society. However, the programme was not completely independent of Hungarian research. Sándor Szalai, who worked at the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) in New York from 1966, developed a new method of lifestyle research. The method he used most prominently, the time-measurement coding scheme for analysing the structure of everyday life (Szalai 1972), became one of the Hungarian methods to have most influence in international sociology of the twentieth century.

Aside from Szalai's formalised, mathematically elaborated method, most sociological works were more political and ideological manifestations than significant scientific studies, although they triggered discussions in the socialist public sphere (Heller et al. 1992). This kind of criticism, which developed under the influence of the political system, both criticised and, unintentionally, also advanced the legitimacy of the political system in the 1960s. The obvious questions regarding the role of state socialism in shaping people's daily lives remained taboo.

In the 1970s, as a consequence of stronger political pressure, Hungarian sociology escaped into professionalisation. Hungarian sociologists (Andorka 1970; Hankiss 1977; Losonczi 1977; Szalai 1972; Szelényi 1973) developed more complex disciplinary and methodological approaches, which led to sociology becoming more autonomous on the one hand, while receding from the public conversation on the other. In the 1970s, departments of sociology were established at universities, promoting the professionalisation of the discipline.

1.2. Poland – from the Polish Peasant to a Humanist Sociology

In the 1970s, the two countries' almost parallel research interests in everyday life seemed to be completely disconnected; in the rich Polish literature on these research endeavours, no reference can be found to the work being done in Hungary. In fact, all that we have learnt stems from our analyses of the literature and the empirical data that were produced in both countries – and put aside for many years.

The intellectual roots of the largest Polish sociological study of lifestyles, which was conducted by scholars working at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences are twofold. One is the strong and influential tradition of humanistic sociology in Poland. We write "humanistic" and not (solely) "qualitative" or "interpretive" to stress the sizable impact of the theoretical concepts and methodological recommendations of Florian Znaniecki, the founding father of Polish sociology.

Znaniecki has a well-established position in the history of sociology, mostly thanks to his cooperation with William I. Thomas and their joint, monumental work *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (1918–1920). But the most often quoted passages from Znaniecki's work do not come from his substantive analysis of the rich autobiographical material (letters, diaries, autobiographies) he collected from Polish peasants or, later, from workers, but from the theoretical and methodological considerations that led him to develop (Znaniecki 1922, 1927) what he called the "humanistic coefficient" (*współczynnik humanistyczny*). What is sometimes called "the Polish method" in sociology (Bertaux 1981), that is, collecting vast autobiographical material by organising open competitions for written memoirs (*pamiętniki*) in order to develop, inductively, sociological generalisations which might be interpreted as direct adaptations of the above-mentioned "humanistic coefficient" (Konecki et al. 2005). Znaniecki had organised such a competition among workers for the first time in 1921. This research method continued on a large scale until the 1970s.

The extensive research on lifestyles started by the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the PAS is not simply a continuation of this qualitatively, biographically, and individualistically oriented sociological tradition. The methods were different, although the stated research goal was similar: to grasp the individual in his or her social and/or cultural "entirety."

It was an attempt to implement these new, qualitatively oriented perspectives into sociological theorising and empirical research practice – to make them visible to a sociological mainstream dominated by positivist theoretical approaches and focused on researching social structures.[6]

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[6] In this context the name of Stefan Nowak (1924–1989), another prominent Polish sociologist of the same post-war generation, should be mentioned. At the time when Siciński was conceptualising and realising a methodologically novel, qualitative research programme on Polish "lifestyles," Nowak was nuancing and sophisticating a quantitative, questionnaire-based analysis of Polish society, and particularly its "system of values." See his famous paper "System wartości społeczeństwa polskiego," (Nowak 1979), which is still widely discussed and used as a reference (in English, "Value Systems of Polish Society," (1980)).

Looking at social reality from a lifestyle perspective meant, therefore, giving priority to culture over structure (or seeing both as equally important).

What might seem paradoxical today, especially from an outsiders' perspective, is that this was being done by one of the key Polish sociological institutions, financed with public money and approved by the ruling communist party, as in Hungary. Still, the PAS's Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, which was established on the wave of the political thaw of 1956 and gave shelter to many ideologically and politically "insubordinate" scholars, was probably the most liberal of the institutions where such a project could have been initiated. Siciński himself managed to balance perfectly between the party's acceptance if not outright support (some of his Institute colleagues were active party members and had political functions in the party apparatus), and at the same time surrounding himself with young, critical scholars, artists, and activists, who openly opposed the cultural and political mainstreams. All members of his team, no matter how different and opposing their worldviews, recalled Siciński very positively.

/// 2. Lifestyle Research in the 1970s in Hungary and Poland

2.1. The Hungarian Sample

Lifestyle was the topic of the first large-scale, complex empirical studies among different social groups after the Second World War in Hungary. How can the outstanding popularity of this research concept be explained? One way is to point to the importance of everyday life in international sociological research trends as a consequence of Parsons' theoretical hegemony (Parsons 1937). Another plausible answer resides in the idea of a "peaceful coexistence or competition" between the socialist and capitalist worlds, as announced by Richard Nixon. According to this idea, socialist governments also wanted to justify the success of their systems through the application of scientific data. One of the benchmarks was the well-being of people in the socialist system. In addition, due to the lack of real political elections, this particular scientific method was almost the only possibility for the political authorities to examine the habits and attitudes of the citizens and gather information on how they spent their time. In parallel to this development, the Kádár-regime used increased living standards to legitimise the socialist system (so-called "Goulash Socialism").

A couple of years ago, a dozen boxes of transcribed interviews and other research materials were found in the Institute of Sociology. The boxes turned out to contain the results of a research project on workers' lifestyle conducted in the mid-1970s in Budapest. The Voices of the 20th Century Archive and Research Group organised and catalogued the documents.[7] The collection now contains approximately 600 documents on 195 interviewees.[8] The data was collected in ten factories in Budapest. Due to the fragmentary nature of the collection, we cannot analyse it as if it were complete. But for a socio-historical, theoretical, or methodological analysis, this collection is very valuable.

In the collection, we find mainly primary data (we call it a file) on each interviewee, plus some draft analyses. A complete file of an interviewee includes four different texts:

a) An often very long, structured biographical interview with the focus on everyday life and cultural consumption. The research project collected detailed information on the biographical background, parents, family life, relationships, contacts, and social milieus of the interviewees. In the interviews, they talk about their childhood activities, school experiences, teachers, and cultural consumption (books, press, television). The interviewers asked numerous very general questions, for instance, about "things you dislike," "bad experiences in your life," and "things that make sense to you." Another focus of the interview was active participation in "higher culture" – obviously the only form of culture that was considered valuable by the researchers. It is clear by reading the texts based on this material that listening to beat music, spending time with friends, or recreations or hobbies such as gardening or handcrafts were not seen as important cultural activities. On the contrary, the aim of improving one's education in one's spare time was considered to be positive, and we see that high culture was favoured and thought to be *the* means of socialist culturalisation. In socialist theory, higher culture (*Kultur* in German) meant art films, classical music, and serious works of literature and was understand to be an

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[7] Project website in English: http://20szazadhangja.tk.mta.hu/en
[8] The collection originally must have been much larger, since – as we know from the sources – approximately 1,200 people were interviewed and answered a questionnaire. The collection is fragmented; there are complete files missing, and in approximately 50% of the available files, one or more documents are missing. It is almost certain that all four types of documents were not made for every single file, since not all 1,200 people in the questionnaire-sample were interviewed.

important factor for the emancipation of members of the working class.

b) A summary of the interview in regard to the interviewee's living conditions, parents, childhood, school, choice of profession, degree of culturalisation (the consumption and production of high culture), aims, and desires. We also find annotations of the interviewers about what is missing in the interview and evaluations of the life trajectory of the interviewees (for example, "a bad childhood," "lack of cultural background," "the personality of this person and his cultural needs have not been fully shaped yet," etc.).

c) An individual questionnaire with detailed questions about the interviewee's school, family, income, father's occupation, legal status of the interviewee's dwelling, questions about the furnishing of the dwelling, land ownership, group activities, and family life. We find detailed information for a time-budget analysis of cultural consumption at home on an average weekday and on weekends. Interestingly enough, no information was gathered on the shadow economy or alternative forms of production (e.g., DIY projects, or *kaláka*, a self-help means of build living space by organising friends and family). There are many questions on participation in culture and on the topic of the cultural goods consumed (press, radio, TV programmes, cinema, theatre, books, museums, and exhibitions). Changes of lifestyle and the social mobility of the interviewees were other recurrent topics.

d) A narrative comparison of the interview and the questionnaire by the interviewer, mentioning discrepancies in the answers between the interview and the questionnaire about how much and what cultural goods were consumed.

The research was conducted at the Institute of Culture, which existed from the 1970s until the 1990s in connection with the Centre for Sociology of the HAS. The Institute became a home for established social scientists, and members of the democratic opposition also participated as interviewers in the projects. Therefore, the group was politically mixed, and, as in Poland, was considered to be a sheltered environment by some researchers. The large amount of research focusing on lifestyle and everyday life was heavily funded by the Party, but the participants were not necessarily loyal in regard to Party directives. The research topic had to be interesting for the Party; nevertheless, one sees hardly any political topics, questions, or comments in the concrete raw material of the research project. In the theo-

retical writings of the researchers, the aim of achieving a socialist society was in the foreground. However, for them, socialist society meant the inclusion of higher cultural activities that were common among the sociologists themselves (listening to Mozart and Bartók, or reading Shakespeare, for example). The cultural "nivelation" of the working class unintentionally thus meant inclusion in bourgeois cultural activities. A very important theme was enabling workers to have free time to spend as they wanted (but preferably "in a culturalised way").

Therefore, everyday life in this study was understood as a holistic term covering everything that was relevant for how the members of the sample spent their time (Szántó 1978). A very important normative goal of the researchers was to show whether people's workload enabled them to participate in other activities. These activities were seen in a very normative sense, with the aim being participation in high culture and activities contributing to a socialist society. Still, this focus took into account activities other than those of the workplace and the household. In the mid-1970s, it could have been used to make gender- or class-based claims about whether having a personal life outside of work and the fulfilment of personal desires was possible or not.

In a sense, lifestyle research was pioneering in Eastern European gender studies and the sociology of material culture and of the family. We would like to mention just a few examples: Aliz Mátyus's book (1980) about young women from the countryside living and working in Budapest, Judit H. Sas's (1981) book on "female women and male men," Ágnes Losonczi's publication (1977) on "lifestyle in time, in objects, and values," or Mária Sági's study (n.d.) on "culture and *individuum*" around the same year. Losonczi also invented a triangular model to show the dynamics between social conditions (the conditional sphere), social actions (the kinetic sphere), and needs and motifs (Losonczi 1977). She also stressed that history is always embodied in the lifestyles of social classes and groups; thus, lifestyle is a dynamic category in the social sciences. Why are certain elements of a lifestyle resistant to social conditions and structural changes? How can historical changes explain the transformations in human needs and desires?

The above examples show that although in most cases there was a strong normative and critical perspective on lifestyle research, this research focused on very diverse issues and problems. The concept of lifestyle was suitable to link these fields.

2.2. The Polish Sample

It has already been mentioned that Polish "lifestyle" research of the 1970s can be seen as an example, or even a manifestation, of an anti-positivistic turn in sociology. Let us look a bit closer at how it was conceptualised and realised in research practice. Such a closer look is possible today thanks to raw empirical data collected during the project and miraculously surviving all institutional and political changes. In the last few years the documents have been archived and made accessible for "re-visiting." This unique collection of research data became a cornerstone of a newly established Qualitative Data Archive at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at PAS – the same that conducted "lifestyle" research almost four decades ago.[9]

But before coming to the collected data it is worth stressing the exceptionally rich body of literature that was written and published under its roof. As we have mentioned before, the vast majority of these publications do not confront collected empirical material at all; nevertheless, in many texts you can find assurances that fieldwork data is the core of the entire endeavour. This lack of analysis of the actual data collected is similar to the Hungarian lifestyle studies, where analysis of the collected material is also scarce.

Among the key publications that appeared in book form, two volumes were devoted to theoretical considerations on the category of lifestyle, with extensive references to contemporary, mostly Western, sociological theories on that very concept and its relatives: "way-of-life," "life-world," or the only seemingly simpler concept of the "everyday" (Siciński 1976, 1978b).

Another collection of publications connected to the lifestyle project focuses on methodology, or rather methods, as it presents research tools in a very detailed way (Siciński 1980; Siciński & Wyka 1988). It is not easy to find any other (qualitative) research project in Polish sociology where this kind of documentation was so extensive and so transparent to the wider public.[10] Still, what was thought to be the greatest value of the project – namely, its empirical richness and density – is somehow missing at the end and hard to find in the texts presenting the project "findings." Why?

Some blame history (or History) for the delayed and insufficient analysis of the empirical data collected within the "lifestyle" project (Siciński

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[9] Project website: http://adj.ifispan.pl/o_archiwum.

[10] The exception might be the research project on the Solidarity movement and moment, which had a large impact on the discipline and which legitimised qualitative approaches in Polish sociology to a far greater degree than the long-absent "lifestyle" research of Andrzej Siciński and his team. See Krzemiński et al. 2005 [1983]; Marody et al. 2004 [1981].

1988). The fieldwork was conducted mainly in 1979 and finished at the beginning of 1980 – that is, at the very final, crisis stage of the Gierek decade,[11] the year when the Solidarity strikes were ended by the introduction of martial law. These historical events had a direct impact on the research team. Siciński himself was a Solidarity advisor, and many of his project colleagues were involved in this social movement: some were even interned when martial law was instituted. Undoubtedly Siciński himself and other members of the research team had much more urgent things to do at the beginning of the 1980s than to interpret the data on lifestyles they had collected earlier, especially since the empirical material documented an "earlier" time – even if only a couple of months earlier – which no longer seemed relevant during the Solidarity breakthrough. The stress that had been placed on the stability and inertia of the lifestyles that had been researched and the lack of discovery of any signals of the approaching changes was retrospectively interpreted as a weakness of the whole research endeavour (Gawin 1999; Siciński 1985).

The core of the book summarising the empirical data (Siciński 1988) is a typology of these lifestyles illustrated by excerpts from empirical data. It seems as if the researchers constructed an intellectual framework that enabled them to present their empirical findings in a very clear, elegant, controlled way, at the cost of a radical reductionism and huge selectivity in coping with the collected data. This brings us to another explanation as to why it was so difficult to analyse the material for so many years: not only were there external historical reasons, but internal ones as well – the collected data was so extensive and rich that producing any non-superficial narrative to summarise and generalise it all was hardly possible. The typology of lifestyles can be seen today – when we have access to the raw data – as an attempt to get out of the trap.

This typology is constructed on one basic philosophical principle. Namely, that each person in society has some – larger or smaller – spectrum of free choice, which is used, or fulfilled, in very different ways. At one end of the spectrum is the avoidance of choice, at the other is orient-

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[11] Edward Gierek (1913–2001) was First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) in the years 1970–1980. This decade of his rule, which started with euphoric promises and widely shared optimism about modernisation, economic improvement, and – maybe most importantly in this context – the rise of individual consumption, finished with huge crises in 1980. These were the direct cause of the social protest that led to Solidarity. Thus the abandonment of the lifestyle research data for several years might have had something to do with a feeling – which today is hard to prove empirically, of course – that research findings from before "the revolution," that did not foresee it, were somehow irrelevant or inadequate. After a longer time had passed, they seemed much more valuable, though.

ing one's life toward constant change. In between, we have persons whose choices are repeated and form visible, stable patterns – or are changing but are still driven by clearly defined long-term biographical goals. Such a theoretical frame made it possible – quite astonishingly from today's perspective – to picture Polish workers and intellectuals as agents, as value-driven choosers who actively shaped their own and their families' lives (and lifestyles). The collected empirical data easily fulfilled this deductive model. It was used to exemplify a concrete life orientation driven by one value or another (for example, family life, a career, independence, material goods, self-development, etc.). Was Polish society of the late 1970s really so "optional" and non-determining? Or were Siciński and his colleagues so politically naive that they adapted the successful propaganda language to interpret their research findings? Or were they rather deeply inspired and influenced by a subjective, humanistic thinking rooted in Znaniecki on the one hand, and the "schismatic" sociologies of the time on the other, leading them to look for strong human subjects and agents opposing the determining social (and socialist) reality? A positive answer to the last of these questions seems the most accurate. The translated title of the jubilee book for Siciński, written by his collaborators two decades after the lifestyle fieldwork, seems to confirm this: *Homo eligens. Społeczeństwo świadomego wyboru* [Homo Eligens: The Choice-Aware Society] (Gawin 1999).

Upon a closer inspection of the research design and practice visible in the collected material we can make the following observations. The Polish lifestyle research was conceptualised and conducted as research on families. Roughly eighty families – mainly workers, and some members of the intelligentsia – who were working in the same factories, were visited in their homes in four provincial cities: Gdańsk, Bydgoszcz, Lubin, and Dobre Miasto. The choice was dictated by historical reasons and the cities' different socio-economic development after the war. The first three were (heavy) industrial cities; the latter was a very small satellite town. The research in the Hungarian case was quite similar: most of the people interviewed were workers, or specialists with university degrees working in industry.

We are presenting the Polish "lifestyle" research as sociological, but Siciński and his team put considerable effort into collecting solid, dense, ethnographical material, which was intended from the beginning for sociological generalisations.

The general idea of observing a family's lifestyle – understood holistically – was written into a set of research steps, each having its special genre and narrative style. Therefore, each fully completed family folder consists

of the following documents: a basic data sheet with personal information, a family questionnaire, biographical interviews (a transcript and/or audio file) with family members (usually with the family "head"), family pictures taken by the researcher or copied (photographed) from family albums, pictures of the household interiors, and the "appendix" and "researcher's diary," which were most often richest in content. This enigmatic appendix contained a detailed, precisely structured description of the "everyday" and "everything" of the families. The diary contained descriptions of family "behaviour" during the research process. Both these latter files were also full of researchers' opinions and self-expressions. Altogether we have, on average, around one hundred pages, and sometimes two hundred or more, of dense manuscript for each family.

On looking into these files we immediately see the richness, denseness, and heaviness of the collected material. The typology of "lifestyles" based on the free-choice principle (from almost fully determined people to almost free choosers of a life strategy) seems now a clever rhetorical tool to help depart from the complexity and weight of the data and return to the more secure ground of theoretical speculation. Life "as a whole," "as such," in its entire "style" happens not to be transferable to a set of sociological categories.

/// 3. Similarities and Differences

As we have seen, the Polish research was less politicised than the Hungarian. Polish sociologists and anthropologists – with an ethnographic focus – used the research as a good occasion to raise fundamental questions about "the nature" of sociological endeavour, turning the project into an internal, hermetic, theoretical and methodological dispute. Hungarian scholars, on the contrary, acted as objective observers providing a neutral description of society – one which would be understandable to the wider public.

However, there are more similarities than differences between the two approaches. Both research programmes were based on a holistic approach to understanding lifestyles. The Hungarian and Polish scholars wanted to describe the totality of social life, to understand and explain the complexity of socialist society. As old-fashioned scholars, they insisted on the category of "culture." They acted as missionaries of higher *Kultur* (either consciously and purposely in fulfilment of a political agenda, or unconsciously – showing their social and cultural distance to people they met "in the field"). But what does the consumption of high culture indicate? Our hypothesis is that

in the light of the normativity observable in the scholarly discourse, high culture stands for the advanced (modern) society that was the aim of the socialist system at the time, where socialism's superiority over capitalism had to be measured and proved.

The areas of lifestyle research were hardly separable in the 1960s and 1970s, thus it was a suitable field for sociology, which had not yet been professionalised. The aim of the Hungarian and the Polish researchers was to map the whole life of a person and/or family; the researchers had a fundamentally holistic interest in the people they were studying. Both as regards quantity and quality the collected material is vast in comparison to sociological studies conducted in recent years. This presumably had to do with the fact that the research had a strong ideological background and thus heavy funding from the Party itself.

Compared to the particular research interests and very focused research questions of today, the aim of these researchers of forty years ago was to map the totality of the social life of the people and families under study. At least in Eastern Europe, this broad interest, in our view, is due to the critical outlook that scholarship adopted – and had to adopt – at that time.

We can risk the hypothesis that the most difficult methodological problem for the sociologists was the inclusion of the biographical interviews in their research analysis. Based on the later Hungarian publications, one can see that the researchers either returned to sociographical/anthropological descriptions, or they used the interview only to shape the questionnaire, or they later left out the interviews altogether and returned to a solely statistical analysis. But even the Polish lifestyle researchers, who were deeply rooted in a biographical tradition with its "humanistic coefficient," could not really take advantage of the interviews they had conducted to integrate "subjectivity" into their strict typologies. Ethnographic description and questionnaires go well with each other – the biographical narrative, however, fits neither one.

The great amount of theoretical and methodological literature produced within Polish lifestyle research, together with the extensive ethnographic data collected in the field (which is now archived and accessible) invite different kinds of re-visits of this material. The first confrontations show how difficult it was (and maybe still is, despite all the interdisciplinary thinking) to combine theoretical speculations on "culture," politically driven thinking on "society" from a macro-perspective, and ethnographic concentration on the singularity of individual (family) life, with what is

perhaps the most difficult to integrate: an attempt to grasp individuals' sense of life through biographical interviewing. The final combination of these diverse and, on many points, opposite paths of thinking and of doing a kind of social research that was intended to provide a near-complete picture of the "lifestyles," "everyday," or "culture" of a particular social group at a particular time does not present a coherent picture. Instead, it offers a set of loosely connected puzzles. While examining them, we can learn much about how sociological knowledge was produced, and still more about the lives of people (but not necessarily their lifestyles) at that particular moment in time (Straczuk 2015).

/// 4. Conclusion: The Socio-Historical Relevance of the Research from Today's Perspective

The study of the socialist lifestyle was popular due to its Janus-faced character. It may have contributed to bringing criticism against the socialist system into the public sphere, and, along with the idea of "fridge" or "goulash socialism" (Dombos & Pellandini-Simányi 2012: 325–350; Kornai 1996; Kovács 2009) may have helped to "freeze" the imaginary socialist ideology itself. In the context of contemporary mainstream social sciences, in this era of professionalism, the aim of trying to understand and grasp a human life in its totality might seem naive. Specific, limited scientific questions tend to dominate current sociology, especially in Eastern Europe. Limited funding possibilities do not allow for such large and diverse research projects.

In the writing of social history, everyday life (or *Alltagsgeschichte*) – which is sometimes considered to be a synonym of mentality (*Mentalitätsgeschichte*) or lifestyle – has become a tool for describing the social and cultural life of ordinary people. The concept of everyday life focused attention on the history of social classes and groups, and encouraged a departure from the long historiographical tradition of ignoring the society behind great events and famous personalities.

In the last decades, there has been a renaissance of the study of everyday life in socialism. In this research, the concept of everyday life is similar to that in the sociological research projects of the 1970s and 1980s. On the one hand, both have a focus on the macro-level, on the other, they are both searching for the "average" people of a certain class or social stratum. Thus, both have to confront the phenomenon of *Eigen-Sinn* (Lüdtke 1995) – or as Highmore put it, the question of whether everyday life is the

realm of conformity or of resistance (Highmore 2002). In both our cases, there was, from the researchers' side, a demand for conformity regarding cultural consumption and the use of high culture in everyday life, but real consumption did not fulfil this demand. It was ideologically not supported to have other cultural patterns of consumption, so our knowledge of the complexity of real cultural habits remains fragmented. These "old" sociological sources provide an unusually large amount of material for writing social history. But the complexity that remains in the shadow has to be uncovered with other research material *not* included in this collection. Last but not least, it might be hazardous that current socio-historical studies of socialism often use the results of former sociological approaches as scientific facts without any critical reconstruction of the nature of the information produced, the researchers' presuppositions and foundations, and the set of overarching socialist doctrines or beliefs in these approaches (Majtényi 2014).

Among the core questions of the research in the 1970s in Hungary were how well a person could satisfy their higher (cultural) needs, and whether their workload enabled them to have fulfilled private and community lives. The focus at the time was thus on evaluating the existing communist society in Hungary. In Polish lifestyle research, even though it was partly driven by different motivations, a very similar, normative (even pastoral) thinking was present in the background: a person's life should be "fulfilled" – it should make sense. The similar research question of whether modern, now capitalist, society in Hungary (or elsewhere as a matter of fact) is contributing to the fulfilment of personal goals and a richer life is rarely asked. A contemporary social science that asked the question would be a fundamentally critical one. Should we take this old collection as an example?

In the Hungarian research of the 1970s, a clear normative trace was obvious. Participation in high culture and active, creative personal cultural activities were regarded as the *non plus ultra* of human activity. This clearly cannot be the starting point of a state-of-the art social science inquiry. However, the narrative interviews in this collection give us a rare insight into the everyday life of these people. Similar contemporary research projects on personal happiness appear in the social sciences as often descriptive, survey-based, small-scale research questions. We cannot really grasp the personalities, the life stories, behind the people in such samples. And such projects rarely tell us anything about the system and the life-world of people in a (post)modern society (Habermas 1981).

However critically we think and write today about the lifestyle research of our older (institute) colleagues, we do not claim that we – as social scientists – are doing better research on the "everyday" of our present time. Maybe we have gained in precision by answering more detailed and more focused questions, or we might focus on better defined "pieces" of social life or culture, but this (questionable) precision does not come free. The cost is reduction and the eschewing of fundamental questions. The latter tend to be, unfortunately, holistic. Even if the answer given three or four decades ago looks naive or ideological (or both) today, it is worth looking back at research that was ambitious enough to ask such "heavy" questions.

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/// Abstract

In our article we will present two Eastern European examples of how so-
ciological research on everyday life in the 1970s has been influenced by po-
litical and cultural circumstances and particular scientific traditions. From
the early 1970s, sociology flourished in some countries of the Eastern Bloc,
institutes were refounded, and research projects were heavily subsidised.
Research into daily life – the so-called "socialist lifestyle" – was one of the
main foci of sociological inquiry.

Recently, similar data collections from two such projects were discov-
ered in the archives of academies of sciences in Hungary (HAS) and Po-
land (PAS). In both cases, we can see that the researchers stand decisively
on the side of "high" culture, while taking a normative view of "low"
cultural consumption. Even though there was no direct cooperation or
interdependence between Hungarian and Polish "lifestyle" researchers, we
can observe similar structures of thinking about socialist society. Western
influence, mostly implicitly, is also visible.

Keywords:
culture versus structure, everyday life, history of Hungarian sociology,
history of Polish sociology, holistic approach, interpretive analysis, lifestyle
research, multi-method research, socialism

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FROM SCIENTIFIC SOCIAL MANAGEMENT TO NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITY? CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH ON THE WAY FROM AUTHORITARIANISM TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, 1969–1989

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The aim of the present study is to look at official Marxist sociology in Czechoslovakia during the last two decades of communist rule. As one of the central disciplines of governance, sociology had been providing the Party with necessary empirical knowledge about "socialist society" from the 1960s on. The promising boom of the 1960s (Voříšek 2012), however, was halted by the Warsaw Pact invasion, and the situation of Czechoslovak sociology after 1969 was bleak. A number of scholars – obviously mostly Marxist – who were active in the remarkable renaissance of sociology in the 1960s were purged during the early stages of the consolidation regime. Many important figures such as Pavel Machonin, Miloš Kaláb, or Jaroslav Klofáč were forced to work either in different disciplines (e.g., Kaláb in pedagogy) or in an entirely different field, and often manually (Machonin, Klofáč); many others decided for emigration. What followed, especially in the Czech part of the country, was the rise of "second crew" members, such as František Charvát, Antonín Vaněk, František Zich, and Karel Rychtařík, who had not previously had a chance to hold leading posts. There were a few exceptions, though; some outstanding or at least average sociologists, such as Radovan Richta, Jaroslav Kohout, and Blanka and Jindřich Filipec, made a political compromise with Gustáv Husák's regime.

In terms of the development of sociology as an autonomous discipline, the 1970s and 1980s in Czechoslovakia must inevitably appear as a decline. Most historical accounts suggest that this is the case, although such a perspective is usually penned by practitioners of the discipline themselves (e.g., Machonin 2005). However, there is another picture as well. Michael Voříšek is far from repeating the "traditional" (dissident, former-reform-communist) narrative about twenty years of complete ideological brainwashing and sterility in sociology (Voříšek 2014). He identifies several strata in the field. First, he discerns the official hegemonic layer that preached a return to Marxism-Leninism as a prerequisite for rekindling the genuine Marxist sociological thought that envisaged politically and ideologically engaged partisan sociology (Rychtařík 1971; Sirácky 1979; Sirácky & Rychtařík 1976). Second, there was a layer of more or less respected expert "niches" and semi-official sociology that produced, at times, interesting, largely empirical, sociological research. Third, there was sociology – or rather sociological thinking – in dissent and émigré circles. It was especially the former, semi-official, or "grey zone" sociology (Nešpor et al. 2014) that played a crucial role in the fundamental reconfiguration of the field after 1989. Coming from this group, Miloslav Petrusek, one of the founding figures of the sociological renascence in Czechoslovakia in the late 1980s, also offered a more differentiated approach. He noted that sociology always oscillates between two poles: sociology of the status quo, that is, an apologetic sociology that legitimises a given social order, and critical sociology, which fosters critical distance and aims at the fractional or systemic change of a given social order. Although official sociology in totalitarian systems leaned one-sidedly to the apologetic pole, Petrusek argued, it did not cease to exist as a self-standing discipline (Petrusek 2014).

Drawing on these analyses the present paper pays, however, less attention to the intrinsic value of sociological production in the given period and focuses rather on the *modus operandi* of "apologetic sociology": the ways in which sociological knowledge was used to help manage late socialist society, and how that knowledge was adapted to the changes brought about by *perestroika* whilst anticipating its own transformation during the early liberal democratic period after 1989. While methodologically based in the history of political and social thought, this approach is also inspired by governmentality studies, the enquiry into genealogies of governance and its social technologies, and by the social scientific knowledge and expertise forming these technologies (Bevir 2010). Since governmentality studies have emerged historically and theoretically to address largely liberal demo-

cratic societies, and the thrust of the present article is not theoretical but empirical-historical, the inspiration does not translate here into a consequent theoretical application of the conceptual framework of governmentality onto late-communist Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, sociology and social research after 1989 offered and practised a distinctive "therapeutisation" of Czech and Slovak societies and thus contributed to what some Foucault-inspired theoreticians call "neoliberal governmentality" (Lemke 2000; Rose & Miller 1992) or "neoliberalism as a historical institutional form" (Flew 2014).[1] This paper here does not endeavour to make such analyses even though it describes and discusses some of the preconditions of this development.

The current view of the state socialist regimes in their late stage has been influenced by the language of dissidents and their conceptualisations, which characterised the regimes by the predicate "neo-Stalinist" until it was replaced in the 1980s by the notion "totalitarian." From the perspective of our research theme these predicates obscure rather than clarify our understanding of the evolution of the regime. It is particularly notable in the Czechoslovak case, as the post-dissident narrative constructs a marked discontinuity between the "reformist" era of the 1960s and the "normalisation" of the 1970s–1980s. From a longer term perspective focusing on governance practices, however, there are two fundamental phases of post-Stalinist consolidation regimes in Eastern Europe: the Khrushchevist and the Brezhnevist, respectively. The latter actually connects to the former in many aspects, particularly in light of its governance techniques, and its ideological and intellectual substantiation.[2]

To put it schematically, apart from the complex – albeit half-hearted – process of de-Stalinisation, Khrushchevism, mainly in its second phase in the first half of the 1960s, provided a new legitimation formula based on a few main elements that expressed the optimistic expectations of a vigorous and decisive jump into the realm of the communist future. First, there was the notion of the "all-people's state" that had purportedly replaced the dictatorship of the proletariat in the advanced phase of socialism leading to the early passage to communism. This concept was later taken over by Brezhnevism. The second aspect concerned the development of various new models of a state-socialist economy, which toyed with ideas of intro-

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[1] All translations of cited fragments are my own.
[2] Previous scholarship has perceived Khrushchevism – in contrast to Brezhnev's era – as a self-standing phase in the history of the Soviet regime, both in terms of its ideological goals and its ambitions (McCauley 1987; Miller & Féhér 1984; Smith & Ilic 2011).

ducing market mechanisms as an auxiliary instrument into planned econo-
mies (as suggested by reformist economic teams such as those of Evsei
Lieberman in the USSR or Ota Šik in Czechoslovakia). Overall economic
reforms – let alone public discussion of them – were abandoned during the
Brezhnev rule. Yet the ways to economic improvement within the system
were always being explored, not merely in the more reformist Hungary or
Poland, but also in the outspokenly "orthodox" communist consolidation
regimes after 1968, such as that in Czechoslovakia – for example, through
the then leading economic paradigm of optimal planning. Finally, the third
novel aspect that best represented the technological and futuristic opti-
mism of Khrushchevism was the theory of a "scientific and technological
revolution" as a way towards communist modernity under the guidance of
the Party. This too had been adopted and adapted in Brezhnev's era.

The Brezhnevist consolidation regimes of the late 1960s and the 1970s
differed from Khrushchevism – and even more from its most successful
application in East-Central Europe that is Kádárism – in one major aspect:
the comeback of stringent ideological orthodoxy in the public sphere and
official discourse in response to and repudiation of the reform communist
movement of the 1960s. Furthermore, the utopian vision of an early arrival
in the communist future had been irrevocably replaced by the down-to-
earth project of building "advanced socialism." The latter was supposed to
be characterised not by the revolutionary charisma of the Party, but by "sci-
entific management of the society" (*nauchnoje upravlyenie obschestvom*). This
concept played an important legitimisation role in the ruling apparatus.
It assured the apparatchiks that the changes and possible reforms would
only be gradual, without questioning their power and privilege. Yet it also
portrayed state socialism as an alternative modernity based on a differ-
ent, though efficient, use of technological innovation, for which the highly
elastic concept of "scientific and technological revolution" was of great
value. Hence the "scientific management" of various spheres such as the
economy, individual enterprises, and cities – but also Party life, state ad-
ministration, and social life – came to be of vital concern for the Party and
state leadership, including the managerial elites and expert milieus.[3]

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[3] Scientific management had always been a concern of Soviet leadership and a part of the Soviet
ideological package. Sidelined during high Stalinism, it regained power throughout the whole post-
Stalin era, up until the end of the Soviet Union (Beissinger 1988).

/// The Theory of Scientific and Technological Revolution as the Leading Ideological Paradigm

The reformist era of the 1960s was the golden age of sociology in Sovietised East-Central Europe, as the discipline aspired to offer a critical mirror to societies, and solutions to the emerging crises (Puttkamer 2012; Voříšek 2012). Yet even in late-communist dictatorships the official social theory preaching a comeback of "genuine Marxism-Leninism" tried to investigate, under the surface of weighty ideological language, some of the most pressing social-political problems, such as the dilemmas of social integration, social cohesion, and governance. In the less "orthodox" countries, i.e., Poland and Hungary, part of this process even took the form of a *sui generis* political sociology of the socialist state; it was fostered by some of the leading experts and Party activists such as Jerzy Wiatr or Kálmán Kulcsár, but also by some of the sociologists who became dissidents, such as Jadwiga Staniszkis (Garlicki 1998). In most other countries in the Eastern bloc the theory of scientific and technological revolution (STR) became the leading academic-ideological paradigm of the time.[4] Rooted in the reformist 1960s, the theory contained a lot of Khrushchevist emancipatory elements that had to be brushed away. In Czechoslovakia the STR was famously represented by an interdisciplinary team around philosopher and sociologist Radovan Richta. Their collective monograph, *Civilization at the Crossroads*, had a dizzying career in Czechoslovakia and internationally at the end of the 1960s (Richta 1966, 1969). Yet even *Civilization* contained tangible technocratic elements making it into a potential legitimisation resource after 1968. Already during the Prague Spring the publication had been interpreted in different ways: as a substantiation of reform by reform-minded communist elites, but quite moderately, if not conservatively, by many other members of the Party apparatus. The propositions for improved planning and management systems – with the help of modern communication, cybernetics, etc. – and advocacy of "system engineering" matched the prevailing view among both conservative and reformist party circles that the Party should not lose its central political and economic control. As such it provided a reputable scholarly analysis offering a rather

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[4] Quite a lot of research has emerged in recent years addressing studies of the polittical future in the East and West, and their interconnection and transnational ties. (See e.g., Andersson 2012; Andersson & Rindzevičiūtė 2015; Guth 2015; Rindzevičiūtė 2016). The present study, however, focuses on one aspect, namely the promotion of the theory of STR to the main ideological-academic paradigm in late-communist dictatorships.

moderate and widely technocratic solution to the current crisis, along with less moderate futurological hope for communism as a whole.[5]

Given his own undeniable reformist past, Richta found himself in a difficult position at the beginning of the 1970s. He was only saved because of non-negligible Soviet patronage and, in general terms, because of the compatibility of his STR theory with the main Soviet legitimisation formula. In response to the Prague Spring of 1968, Soviet future studies were also heavily curtailed and purged. The Communist Party made clear that it would not allow social scientists and experts to establish any sort of "second party" of social critics (Guth 2015: 364). In Czechoslovakia the adaptation of the STR to the new circumstances involved, on Richta's part, ever deeper reduction of the critical potential of the original STR theory. He had to avoid some of the most crucial aspects previously emphasised by his theory and to abandon its "reformist" interpretation straight away (Richta & Filipec 1971). None of his later works, therefore, contained any harsh criticism of planned, centrally administered economies. On the contrary, from then on he kept highlighting the unique opportunity that the centralised system offered for the full-fledged blossom of the STR. Furthermore, there was no more criticism of uniformity and conformism in education or public political discussions. The pressing calls for the development of radically new forms of labour also disappeared from his arguments. The theory was changed into a "developmental theory of technocratic governance and a legitimizing narrative for late socialist dictatorship" (Sommer 2016: 160). Its straight apologetic narrative assured the state socialist regime about the historically necessary superiority of the socialist organisation of social, political, and scientific life, and thus about the inevitability of their early takeover of the global competition in science and technology (Kedrov et al. 1974).

In the late 1960s and early 1970s the theory of STR was accompanied by a related academic discipline, the forecasting (or prognostics) that played a major role in the ideological critique of Western futurology and that expanded on its capacity for making predictions that the STR theory already envisioned (Sommer 2015). The increasing emphasis on the assimilation of socialism and science in STR and prognostics also entailed the growing role of science in the socio-scientific steering of society (*vědecké sociální řízení, nauchnoje upravlyenie obschestvom*). This was a hot topic in Soviet political-philosophical literature from the 1970s (Afanasiev 1968, 1977;

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[5] This interpretation draws on the "classical" account of Prague Spring history (Skilling 1976: 125–131); for the most recent study on Richta's STR theory see Sommer 2016.

Leninizm 1973). Authors admitted that in capitalism certain forms of social steering or social engineering had already been developed either in practice (Taylorism, Fordism) or in theory (T. Veblen, M. Weber). Nonetheless, they argued, in the case of socialism it should assume a much more systematic and society-wide scope. Whereas in capitalism the omnipresent monopolistic capital was the concealed subject of the steering, in socialism – under Party leadership – the historical subject of social steering was apparently the ever-growing strata of the working people. The practical consequence of this argument was the even more emphatic assertion of social scientific research as an indispensable component of communist governance.

The late socialist STR envisaged two fundamental levels of participation of science in social management. First, there was the development of long-term models and plans, including the development of five-year plans based on the prognoses of multidisciplinary teams. The second level concerned the design of specific solutions for "various levels of management work," which implied a wide range of applied social research and the development of "new complexes of sciences" such as demography, sociology, social psychology, various mathematical disciplines, cybernetics, etc. (Mikulinsky & Richta 1982).

Much of the applied research and, above all, the forecasting, concerned economic planning and prognosis and centred in Czechoslovakia around the National Planning Commission (Sommer 2015). Let's leave this rather familiar part aside for now and focus on the other aspect of the forecasting business: namely, social planning and forecasting where different social sciences – with sociology on top – played a primary role. In historical memory today, the disciplines related to social planning have fallen into oblivion, partly due to the overall rise of economic rationality since the 1970s and, more specifically in the Czech and Slovak context, because it was the economic forecasters – such as Valtr Komárek, Miloš Zeman, and many others – and not the social forecasters who played an important role in the post-1989 transition.

Nevertheless, throughout the late socialist period the research complex of prognostics and social forecasting – considered to be the most complex and challenging element of forecasting – was not only rhetorically highlighted but also generously supported and funded. The main person to reformulate the STR scheme to reflect the needs of late socialist social management purposes in Czechoslovakia was, somewhat surprisingly, František Kutta, an economist and legendary mountaineer. In the 1960s Kutta joined Richta's team because he disagreed with the market-oriented

approach of the team led by Ota Šik, which was drafting the economic reform. At the time Kutta was mainly concerned with material, technical, and technological aspects of economic growth in the "period of socialism expanding into communism" (Kutta 1962, 1968). Throughout the reformist 1960s he kept defending the superiority of central planning over any of the attempts to devise a mixed economy in Šik's fashion. In the 1970s Kutta found his place as the main ideologist of the "theory of management of social processes" developed as a part of the conservative late-communist theory of STR (Kutta 1971, 1974; Kutta et al. 1973). It was established on the wishful presumption that socialism, with its centrally organised economy and science, were paving the way towards sweeping technological innovation. Yet this first had to be made possible in the form of a "new, higher phase of development of socialist production based on higher principles of intensive growth" that involved all possible socio-economic factors. This complexity, Kutta maintained, highlighted the need for overall planning and a "management of social innovation process." This in itself was a complex process of multi-layered relations between science, equipment and technology, production, education, information flow, and, last but not least, effective management. To enable such development, the role of socialist state was to launch a transition towards "complex, systemic, long-term, optimal planning of social processes." A lot of hope was placed in the growing "automatisation and computerisation of information systems," which were supposed to solve, somewhat magically, the immense complexity of social processes (Kutta 1974: 611ff.).

Nevertheless, alongside such Marxist-Leninist scholastic theories, a whole range of practical disciplines and socio-techniques were developed in an effort to contribute to the umbrella project of social planning and social management, the aim of which was to direct and optimise major social processes in the desired direction of "advanced socialist society" and its future transformation into a communist one. This included economic sociology and the sociology or social-psychology of management, as well as the sociology of socialist way of life, and sociology of youth or of family. Although even in consolidated Czechoslovakia almost each of these sociological branches did develop its "grey-zone" alternative that tried to keep a low profile and stay away from direct ideological engagement (Nešpor 2014), their official representatives were very close to the hegemonic Marxist-Leninist social science discourse, in terms of its conceptual framework and language, as well as institutionally. The following part will focus on this kind of applied sociology for the purposes of authoritarian

governance, which, as we shall see, might eventually have had quite differ-ent results and consequences in individual cases.

/// Managing Society: The Sociology of Socialist Enterprise

The theory of management was among the most "practical" disciplines in the field. Its main role was to help socialist managers and senior personnel to run enterprises and organisations. It had its own research institution, the Institute of Management, established in 1965 and operating throughout the state socialist era and into the liberal capitalist period. The Institute pub-lished two journals: *Moderní řízení* [Modern Management] and *Organizace a řízení* [Organisation and Management]. Even the theory of management was not immune to the different ideological commitments. Particularly during the first years of the post-1968 consolidation many leading articles that appeared there focused on proving the Leninist roots of "modern socialist management." Most of the output of the Institute, however, was practice-oriented. The Institute also had a relatively free discussion on all possible modern management techniques and incentives arriving from the West or Asia. Nonetheless, this study is more concerned with theoretically informed applied sociological research reflecting the socialist management, operating fully within the Marxist-Leninist language code, and yet striving to work with some of the up-to-date sociological instruments.

The work of Jaroslav Kohout, a well-known sociologist working at the Prague-based University of Economics (*Vysoká škola ekonomická*, VŠE) is illustrative. Kohout, like many others, developed his theory of sociological and psychological aspects of economic micro-management in the 1960s (Kohout 1966, 1967). Already in his early works he was calling for a more academic approach to management through the incorporation of empiri-cal and theoretical sociology and, simultaneously, for the development of a specific "socialist management theory independent from alien (read West-ern) models" (Kohout 1966). At the time, Kohout was the founder and first director of the Department of Sociology and Psychology at VŠE, which was actually the first department of the kind in Czechoslovakia. After 1968 he became the leading authority on enterprise sociology and the socio-psychology of management. Some of his works were considered of practi-cal value despite his consequent application of the official Marxist-Leninist discourse and his loyalty to the Party (Kohout 1976, 1982). He became one of the leading practitioners of applied socialist social-management research in the service of the authoritarian rule.

Here we are dealing with merely one aspect of Kohout's sociological thought – his theory of labour collectives and their key socialisation role in advanced socialist society (Kohout 1975, 1981). The theory leaned heavily on the classics of Marxism-Leninism, but also on contemporary Soviet authors such as the philosopher Victor G. Afanasiev or psychologists Nikolay S. Mansurov and Aleksander G. Kovalev.[6] It drew on Marx's observation about the vital role of labour in the process of forming a human being. Historically, this has been a spontaneous process, which moulded human nature into a specific historical form shaped by the predominant production relations. Yet if the Marxist premise is that the social environment is the prime determinant of a human being, then human nature is always historically contingent. Thus in socialism the process of the "humanisation of man through labour" was to be transformed into a "managed" instead of a "spontaneous" process, since socialism aimed at the transformation and re-education of human beings, which was to remove all the negative legacies of the bourgeois past, including individualism and egotism. In the original teachings of Marx and Lenin before the Bolshevik revolution the re-appropriation of the rule of enterprise, together with mass social creativity and political organisation, was supposed to form the basis of a new communist constituent power, "the creative unity of the social, the economic, the political" (Negri 1999: 293). In late state socialism, in contrast, the industrial enterprise, still a crucial site of political interest, was seen as a potential major source of social stability. From the perspective of late socialist social management theory, the labour collective was to serve as the decisive plain for the "formation and development of the harmonious personality of socialist citizen." The Marxist-Leninist theoreticians hoped thus to fill the void in the ideological education of adults who were unaffected by either the state-educational or the Party-organisational institutions and mechanisms.

Socialist enterprise was thus to secure the production of utility values. Yet at the same time, it should also have been the primary site for the development of the "harmonious personality of a socialist citizen." Socialist enterprise, Kohout maintained, "does not fulfil one of its fundamental roles, unless it is an organisation form that puts in practice socialist collectivism." In practical terms, the author maintained, different forms of socialisation mechanisms should have been developed, along with various checks

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[6] Not only did Kohout become the main proponent of the theory of labour collectives in the Czechoslovak context, but he was also an active force in the development of the field within the Soviet bloc; see Cherkasov & Kohout 1979.

and practices that would make it possible "to mould, in everyday factory practice, the working people according to the principles of socialist and communist society, and to educate them to such conduct, behaviour and reactions that are in compliance with these principles" (Kohout 1975: 33).

As some recent historical studies convincingly show, the reality in socialist enterprises was very far from the wished-for projections of the official Marxist-Leninist theoreticians and political representatives. Neither in the founding period nor at any later time, did the Party manage to really impose its presence on the industrial workers and, instead, remained alienated from its supposed power basis, which saw the Party simply as yet another "ruling class" (Heumos 2006; Kott 2014). The ensuing frustration was probably an additional incentive for the official social theoreticians to think over ways and means of reaching the labouring masses.

There was an effort – which eventually did not prove successful – to design special socio-techniques for factories and enterprises: for instance, by providing social analyses and steering instruments of the social climate, of interpersonal and inter-group relations. Furthermore, opinion polls in factories were conducted as a means to control the efficacy of decision-making at the management level. The polls were a kind of socio-technique that the Czechoslovak late-communist regime tried hard to use extensively. The government spared no funds or effort in this respect. At the same time, the polling research was one of the most closely monitored territories. Most of the empirical data concerning public opinions and attitudes was inaccessible not only to the general public, but often even to specialists from outside the institutions carrying out the empirical research, that is, mainly the two institutes for public polls, the federal and the Slovak one (Šiklová 2004). Their work was subordinated to the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Communist Party's Central Committee, for these institutes were defined and conceptualised primarily as service organisations for the highest Party leadership. Its aim was to provide, first, actual empirical data about the society and its changing attitudes for the purposes of governance and, second, to select data that would be – and indeed was – widely used as propaganda material in specialist publications and the daily press.[7] Kohout's arguments about the appeal of opinion polls in enterprises and organisations followed the same top-down prophylactic

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[7] See, e.g., NA ČR (National Archives of the Czech Republic), KSČ-ÚV-02/4, file 54, a.u. 79/12, "Plán výzkumné činnosti ÚVVM na období 1978–1979" [ÚVVM research plan for 1978–1979]; ibid., file 6, a. u. 12/b3, "Informace o práci ÚVVM od roku 1977 a zaměření jeho činnosti v dalším období" [Information on the Work of ÚVVM from 1977 and its operational focus in the subsequent period].

and propagandist logic. Opinion polls in labour collectives and research in interpersonal relations should have enabled managers and local Party leaders to develop differentiated, effective, and propaganda-oriented approaches to each workshop or department, and to focus on the most pressing issues. Simultaneously they should also have served as a control mechanism measuring the efficacy of managerial decision-making on the shop floor (Kohout 1975: 35).

/// From a Sociology of the Socialist Way of Life Towards the "Civil Society" Paradigm?

In the 1970s and 1980s various semi-official research endeavours or expert "niches" did not subscribe to the official, heavily ideologised sociological mainstream but still kept within the range of supportable topics. They stayed away from direct ideological engagement and instead tried to pursue empirically-oriented social research, leaning conceptually on non-Marxist-Leninist concepts and narratives. These included such fields as urban sociology, some areas of the sociology of enterprises, the sociology of youth and education, the sociology of family, or environmental sociology. In the self-reflexive history of sociology the "niches" could usually be read as attempts to retain some meaningful sociological research alongside – and often in spite of – the official, unproductive Marxist-Leninist sociological mainstream (Voříšek 2014). Such sociologists very often drew on impulses toward critical sociological thinking from the reformist 1960s, when Czech and Slovak sociology opened itself to international and transnational dialogue and was influenced by sociological thought and recent research from the West, and also from Poland, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union (Machonin 2005). This narrative certainly made sense to the many practitioners purged from academic sociology after 1968, who were forced to find jobs in strictly applied social-scientific research – if not outside the field altogether. They published under the names of their colleagues who "covered up" their works and, ultimately, produced sociological *samizdat* such as the journal *Sociologický obzor* [Sociological Horizon], edited and written by Josef Alan and Miloslav Petrusek. It was from these sociologists and their milieus that the sociological mainstream emerged in the early liberal democratic period after 1989, when sociology was reconstituted as a critical academic reflection of modern society. Even then, sociology and sociological knowledge continued to serve largely as a "governance instrument" –

both political and commercial – and gave birth, for instance, to a genuine opinion-poll industry in the post-communist period.

What remains questionable, though, is the image of the strict dividing line between, on the one hand, the "official" sociology that remained faithful to Marxist-Leninist teaching for whatever opportunistic reasons, and, on the other hand, those who refused to play along. It was precisely the "prognostic paradigm" and the different subsequent research and modelling schemes that played the role of an intermediary between the two worlds and was one of the main plains of convergence – if not conversion – of expert milieus in regard to the future (neo)liberal paradigm. Many of the aforementioned "niches" drew legitimacy, as well as state funding, from the argument that they, too, were contributing to the "social-scientific steering of society" by developing concrete modelling for the desired social-cultural development. This part of the niches' research arose from general prognostics and the conviction that empirical sociological research could provide data and techniques to regulate developmental trends in economic and social life. Such a picture somewhat questions the post-1989 quasi-dissident legend about "islands of positive deviation" in the "niches," which has been so much fostered by the founding generation of renascent sociology after the fall of communism. Most of the niche practitioners have so far paid limited attention to the argument of one from their midst, sociologist Jiří Kabele, that after all, "we were not a negligible part of the project of society-building and its scientific governance" (Kabele 2011). Such participation did not necessarily emerge from the practitioners' political attachment to the late-communist political order but rather from the generally accepted modernist presumption that societies can be thoroughly analysed and thus also governed scientifically.

An illustration is offered by the sociology of lifestyles or of "socialist way of life," a relatively recent discipline that emerged in the 1960s and was inspired by the Western sociology of lifestyles and leisure. In late communist Czechoslovakia, Blanka Filipcová was its chief proponent. Her redefinition of the field in the early 1970s started from a moderately interventionist position that sought the possibility of intervening in cultural education through partial control over leisure activities (Filipcová 1970; Filipcová & Filipec 1976). Later her research assumed a more voluntarist and instrumental direction, looking for more direct possibilities for the ideological and political education (called consistently "socio-cultural formation") of socialist citizens through the management of their leisure activities. Notably even here, in the core of the official Marxist-Leninist

sociology of socialist way of life, a discrepancy was identified between the socialist extensive model of development, which was based on systemic economic and quantitative indicators, and was seen as historically necessary (but overcome in the current situation), and the desired "intensive development model" based primarily on "social development preferring the development of resources and innovation" and thus on the "comprehensive development of socialist personality" (Filipcová 1984).

The official sociology of the socialist way of life was a relatively vast and well-funded research field with two major branches. The first, represented by Filipcová, focused on designing ideological models and offering grand interpretations, which were usually quite unrealistic. It sought ways to guide society not just to achieve its political acquiescence but to steer and stimulate labour, to motivate social engagement, and to increase the potential for innovation. The second branch, whose practitioners worked under the supervision of the former, involved strictly empirical research focusing usually on specific small areas: for instance, leisure activities within the military, teachers, or a particular issue of the lifestyle of working women.

As an intermediary effort between the two, a kind of middle-range prognostic modelling was developed by younger sociologists such as Fedor Gál and Zora Bútorová from the Bratislava-based Research Institute of Quality of Life, and Josef Alan from the Research Institute of Labour and Social Affairs in Prague. In the early 1980s these sociologists occupied themselves with developing the methodology of "dynamic modelling" and "dynamic prognosis" in social research and social management studies (Alan & Gál 1981). They presented their approach as a significant element in the concretisation and more empirically based elaboration of the sociological category of "way of life," which was a prerequisite for any sensible "planning-like regulation of the development of socialist way of life" (Gál & Bútorová 1981). The modelling, in their conceptualisation, had both explorative and normative aspects, where the "model-setter" (*modelár*) was more responsible for the former and the decision-maker (read Party or management leadership) for the latter. The planned design of the "dynamic way-of-life model" was sold to decision-makers as a potentially convenient instrument for eliminating the "aberrations (in social development) incongruous with the goal criteria" (ibid.: 435).

Thus "dynamic modelling" was supposed to be a more reality-based instrument for the very kind of social steering of socialist society that was preached by the official Marxist-Leninist forecasting theory, à la Kutta, and the official theory of socialist way of life, à la Filipcová. Yet the young

sociologists were already at this point warning that dynamic modelling of social phenomena – similar to most other modelling approaches – still suffered from an overwhelmingly abstract approach. Thus they concluded their first analyses with an emphasis on the need for permanent feedback in the triad of prognosis–conception–planning, where the planners would continuously supply the forecasters with the changing input and also changing goals, and thus make prognosis considerably more flexible. Even more importantly, they accentuated the need for empirical analysis, which was much more likely to record the subjective and qualitative side of social reality and should function as a constant corrective to abstract mathematic and prognostic modelling (ibid.: 435–436).

Gál worked at the time with the Prague-based Sportpropag, an applied research institution founded by the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Union of Physical Education (ČSTV), where a special Department for Complex Prognostic Modelling was established in 1981–1983, led by the economist Miloš Zeman. A typical "niche" organisation, the Department gathered under one roof a number of non-conformist scholars from a variety of disciplines such as economics, sociology, or ecology, and made relatively free discussion possible in its internal seminars until the whole Sportpropag was closed in 1984. Although a majority of its leading figures subscribed to some kind of systemic modelling and holistic forecasting, there was a small critical group of "apostates" from these methods, such as Josef Alan or Jiří Kabele. On their move from quantitative to qualitative sociological methods they questioned not just some aspects of the systemic paradigm but its entirety (Kabele 2011). These debates certainly influenced Gál, who – while continuing his critical work on dynamic modelling – came to the conclusion that the "systemic dynamic modelling of social processes" must be altogether restructured if it was to survive as a viable sociological instrument (Gál 1984). At that point he was already on the way towards a more heterodox model of forecasting, the so-called "problem-oriented participative forecasting" (POPF) which he developed together with associates such as Pavol Frič and Peter Benkovič (Gál 1989; Gál et al. 1988; Gál & Frič 1987b).

The model originated from practical efforts to establish a different kind of forecasting in connection with the reorientation of Slovak scientific research. The task was to develop a general forecast for the scientific development of the Slovak Socialist Republic to 2010. The forecasters' team produced a large-scale interactive experiment involving general political directives, the directors of scientific institutes and heads of departments

at the Academy of Science, and a relatively large group of rank-and-file researchers from a variety of fields – from the pure and natural sciences to human and social sciences (Gál et al. 1990; Gál & Frič 1987a).

The general aim of POPF was to show "early signals of threats to development or to identify opportunities for development, but also to articulate interests and mobilise different social groups to act in a manner conducive to the elimination of such threats and the exploitation of such opportunities." As such, this type of forecasting – in contrast to the older kind of prognosis that focused on systemic factors and on imposing the forecast, based on collected data, "from above" – was constructed as a complex interactive process. It involved those who commissioned the forecast – usually managers and policy makers – the forecasting team, experts and professionals from the field concerned, and the public concerned – rank-and-file researchers, citizens of a town, factory workers, etc. (Gál & Frič 1987b: 679).

A new element was the primary focus on forecasting as a way of active social learning and anticipatory behaviour. The participation of the broader public in the formulation of a forecast was to surpass the standardised "opinion polls for management purposes" elaborated by sociologists of enterprise such as Kohout. The POPF required an active collaboration of all the segments involved, plus continuous and interactive dialogue. "Thus it is a process of the gradual cultivation and articulation of opinions and adoptions of attitudes, rather than a once-only expression of one's standpoint" (ibid).

It was suggested that the method retained the traditional promise of social prognostics, i.e., the commitment to eliminate potential threats to harmonious social development. Moreover, there was also the promise of a possible moderate moulding of human minds in the process of a "gradual cultivation and articulation of opinions." Yet this process was double-sided, as it did not presuppose merely the imposition of directions from above, but also an articulation of interests and desires from below. Social dialogue was envisioned – which the authors did not explicitly call democratic. Not because that would be impossible but because it would be seen as a brazen critique of the "'socialist democracy," which supposedly existed. The authors occasionally made their inherent criticism of late state socialist society somewhat more explicit when they argued, for instance, that in the "conditions of autocratic centralism" the POPF was not a viable concept, even though they were quick to assure the readers that their model was "not developed in the context of autocratic centralism." Yet if

the model of POPF was to work, possible inhibitions in the social context had to be dealt with, such as the "distrust and unwillingness on the part of participants to express their interests and values," public indifference, or "the lack of readiness of the social system (*sic*!) to accept an open, critical and tension-ridden dialogue" (ibid.: 684).

The model was heterodox, while conditions in Czechoslovakia were relatively orthodox. From the broader perspective – though most probably independently – it was in congruence with the emerging democratisation discourse in Soviet prognostics of the *perestroika* period (Guth 2015). On the whole, however, despite a growing rhetorical adherence to the reformist *perestroika* language, the Czechoslovak sociology of social planning and programming, in its fundamental reasoning and ideological framework, remained faithful to a holistic, systemic, top-to-bottom approach, shielded by Marxist-Leninist references, as evidenced by a collective work of 1988, *The Prognosis of the Social Development of Czechoslovak Society*, which was part of a general long-term forecasting project (Illner et al. 1988).

The POPF was, in contrast, understood by its authors as a turn away from all-encompassing theoretical forecasting concepts presenting social systems as "entities governed by fully comprehensible laws of development" towards much more flexible, reality-checked, and local circumstances-adapted, participative models that presupposed ongoing communication between politicians, managers, specialists, and the population. They also assumed a fundamental plurality of interests and social positions that could hardly be made consonant with the Marxist-Leninist vision of a unified, homogenous socialist society. Albeit never explicitly used, the concept of "civil society" was lurking behind the POPF. Unsurprisingly, its authors were participants of different semi-official public initiatives such as the famed *Bratislava nahlas* (Bratislava Out Loud) in 1987, which eventually gave rise to the Slovak democratisation movement culminating, in 1989, in the Public Against Violence with Fedor Gál as its first Chairman (Gál 1991).

The changing mood was tangible also in the POPF language of social analysis. On the one hand, the authors still retained many aspects of the official political – as well as scientific – language code, particularly in the conceptual repertoire of the prognostics. Yet they no longer used as many modelling or steering notions. Instead, somewhat surprisingly though significantly enough, they stated that one of their major motives, along with the "diagnosis of the causes" of certain critical situations, was also "the search for appropriate therapies" (Gál 1990: 74–82; Gál & Frič 1987b: 685).

The gradual transformation of the "social forecaster" into the "social therapist" was on the way.

/// Conclusion

What happened when the "social therapy" of social scientists encountered the economic "shock therapy" of the emerging political economic elite – symbolised in Czech and Czechoslovak circumstances by Václav Klaus – is beyond the scope of this study. The nascent political elite of the liberal transition era in Czechoslovakia came from a relatively small number of dissident circles and expert groups such as the forecasters. The milieu of the non-conformist Sportprogag of the first half of the 1980s, where Fedor Gál met not only Miloš Zeman but also other future leading economists and politicians, including Václav Klaus, is a case in point. Many of the experts drifting towards democratisation movements at the end of the decade eventually became its leading figures or even leaders, such as Gál in the Public Against Violence from the very beginning, and Klaus in October 1990, after defeating his post-dissident opponents in the Civic Forum. In terms of political inclination, one can hardly speak of a single camp. Whereas Klaus started to push for neoliberal economic reforms, soon forming his own powerful liberal conservative Civic Democratic Party, the social forecasters and sociologists who emphasised the importance of the "social question" and the need for a well-structured and comprehensive social policy as an essential supplement to the economic transformation, leaned mostly towards some kind of social liberalism or social democracy. This is well proven, for instance, by a 1990 manifesto signed by the sociologists Alan, Gál, Kabele, Petrusek, Šiklová and a few others and sent to President Václav Havel (*Prohlášení* 2004). Gál, on top of all, was a conscious promoter of participatory social mechanisms and participatory democracy; his understanding of civil society was close to that of Havel. In contrast, Klaus' political credo, from very early on in the democratic era, contained a conscious defence of representative democracy and what he called a "standard system" of political parties as a counterweight to what he saw as suspect movement-like political formations and participatory democracy mechanisms. Nevertheless, what was shared throughout the broad "liberal democratic camp," at least at the beginning, was the belief in the need for radical, rapid, and all-encompassing change in the economy and society, which in the sociologists' vision should have helped to transform not only

the centrally planned economy but also the fundamental models of social development (see, e.g., Gál 1991, 2000).

Most of the sociologists coming from semi-dissident or specialist circles were not economic neoliberals in their *Weltanschauung*. Some of them, such as Jan Keller or Martin Potůček, became early critics of the liberal transition and its social cost. Yet in general sociology, like other human and social scientific disciplines in this period, transformed and accommodated itself to the new liberal democracy and capitalism. Its practitioners found their place in politics, remained in the academic sphere, or founded successful polling enterprises. In some ways, sociology adapted to the new circumstances even better than other social sciences, since empirical sociological research – which could build on the existing structures and expertise from the previous era – responded remarkably well to the requirements of the state administration or to commercial needs, either through publicly funded academic research or as private polling agencies (Nešpor 2014: 517–580).

If one understands governmentality as a genealogical concept soliciting historicising inquiry, one might agree that "even as the central elites may well conceive of the world using diverse narratives, so they often turn to forms of expertise to define specific discourses" (Bevir 2010: 438). In this article I have tried to explain the expertisation of governance during the late state socialist authoritarian rule in Czechoslovakia. In terms of the theory and practice of governance, the late-communist regimes developed peculiar theoretical disciplines rooted in modern social scientific research. Such policy had an awkward double edge ensuing from the nature of research creating critical knowledge for a client, i.e., the Party-state, but at the same time requiring autonomous space for the expert field and its internal discussion, which potentially went beyond the confined borders of the respective field. This study has explored a few examples of how society and social integration were studied and conceptualised – generally for the purposes of communist authoritarian governance – in the case of social planning studies, economic sociology and the sociology of labour, as well as the sociology of socialist style-of-life and the related middle-range prognostic methodology. After 1989, there was no notable follow-up to the academic work of some of the main protagonists such as Kutta, Filipcová, or Kohout, partly because of their age, but mostly, however, due to their alienation from the new emerging academic milieu in the liberal democratic system. Yet the same expert fields also produced a branch of social-scientific research that very soon came to be understood as an "alternative"

sociological language and social thought, which was easily transformed into a new, non-Marxist sociological and social research paradigm. Fedor Gál predominantly used the paradigm for political and later commercial endeavours; others, such as Josef Alan or Pavol Frič, used it for notable academic projects in the new democratic regime.

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/// **Abstract:**

This paper focuses on official Marxist sociology and social science research in Czechoslovakia as one of the central "disciplines of governance" in the 1970s and 1980s. With most of the first-class practitioners being purged after 1968, the study pays little attention to the intrinsic value of sociological production in the given period, but focuses instead on the *modus operandi* of "apologetic sociology": the ways in which sociological knowledge was used to help manage "socialist society" under the late-communist regime, and how that knowledge was adapted to the changes brought about by *perestroika* (while anticipating the discipline's own transformation during the early liberal democratic period after 1989). First, the paper deals with the reformulation, during the early 1970s, of Radovan Richta's theory of scientific and technological revolution from the originally reform-communist, emancipatory, and technology-optimistic concept of the 1960s into a hegemonic legitimation paradigm allied with the closely related social management theory elaborated by František Kutta. Then the paper addresses the more practical side of the paradigm, as exemplified by Jaroslav Kohout's economic sociology and his theory of labour collectives as central sites of state socialist socialisation and the disciplining of citizens. Finally, the paper considers semi-official research endeavours and expert "niches" during the 1980s, and how they drew legitimacy and state financial support from the claim that they were contributing to the "social-scientific steering of society" – while they stayed away from direct ideological engagement. It is these "niches" that formed the new sociological mainstream in the early liberal democratic period after 1989. That mainstream gave legitimacy not only to post-dissident social concepts such as "civil society" but also to the managerial and governance techniques of the emerging neoliberal capitalism. The paper exemplifies this branch of research by the mainly Bratislava-based group revolving around Fedor Gál and Pavol Frič and their development of a nonconformist method of "problem-oriented participative forecasting" during this period.

Keywords:
Czechoslovakia, forecasting, Marxist sociology, scientific and technological revolution, social management

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THE WARSAW SCHOOL OF MARXISM

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Every student of social studies in Poland has almost certainly heard of the Warsaw School of the History of Ideas, whose members included, among others, Leszek Kołakowski and Jerzy Szacki. The school was important in Polish intellectual life both due to the high quality of its academic works and because of its members' ideological and political trajectories, which were typical for a large part of the Polish intelligentsia. Such a trajectory began with involvement in communist ideas and participation in building a new political order, then proceeded to revisionism – that is, a critique of the socialism that actually existed from the perspective of communist ideals – and finished with a rejection of totalitarianism and termination of any affiliations with communism or socialism. No one speaks of a Warsaw School of Marxism, although, as I will try to demonstrate, there are many arguments for considering that the people from Julian Hochfeld's circle, including Zygmunt Bauman, Jerzy Wiatr, Aleksandra Jasińska-Kania, and others, did comprise an academic school. I believe that distinguishing the school can shed a new light on the intellectual and social history of post-war Poland.

In discussions about the appropriateness of using the term "school" for the Warsaw School of the History of Ideas, attention is drawn to the non-existence of a founding manifesto, the lack of a common methodology linking the work of individual scholars, and the absence of anyone who could be recognised as an unquestioned leader with disciples (Bucholc 2013). However, the view prevails that Kołakowski, Baczko, Walicki, and Szacki nevertheless formed an academic school. Their common desire to study a diversity of philosophical and social doctrines, which were analysed in relation to the historical context, has been emphasised. Furthermore, the members of the school came from the same academic commu-

nity (primarily the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Warsaw). Lastly, Kołakowski and others are recognised as members of an academic school due to their common historical experiences related to Stalinism, the breakthrough in October 1956, the events of March 1968, and finally the changes and conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s (Kołakowski A. 2013; Śpiewak 1981).

If these three criteria are applied to the people in Hochfeld's circle, then obviously we can speak of an academic school. Hochfeld's disciples were formed in the same academic environment; their fates were deeply connected to the course of political changes in Poland; and, in terms of their common intellectual points of reference, which stemmed not only from mere ideological but also conceptual relationships with Marxism, there is an even greater theoretical coherence than in the case of the Warsaw School of the History of Ideas. To these three criteria we can add Julian Hochfeld as a leader. He fulfilled an important role as a person who exposed young scholars to ideas from pre-war and international academic life, as the organiser of a standing seminar where research ideas and texts were discussed, and last but not least, as a source of intellectual stimulation and inspiration.

Of course, the value of the works created by the school members has been questioned. Jerzy Szacki, in the introduction to the important anthology *Sto lat socjologii polskiej* [One Hundred Years of Polish Sociology] declares authoritatively, in relation to the Marxists we are referring to and their work before 1968, that "the scholarly achievements of the sociologists-Marxists were not at that time particularly impressive [...] They were not, strictly, an academic school. The Marxists did not have a clear idea of sociology as a discipline, or of its relation to historical materialism, or any specific ideas for conducting their own sociological research" (Szacki 1995: 116). For Szacki – who in this place is not only an impartial historian of the discipline but also a representative of a competing academic school – Marxism owed its position between 1956 and 1968 mainly to its political affiliation, and its main achievement was peaceful coexistence with other sociological paradigms in Polish sociology and resignation from exercising political force in academic discussions.

After a thorough examination of the works of the academics forming what I propose to call the Warsaw School of Marxism, it is difficult to agree with Szacki. Certainly, sociologists from this school remained closer to the party in a political sense (with exceptions, such as Zygmunt Bauman and Maria Hirszowicz in the 1960s and later), but it does not discredit their ef-

forts to treat Marxism not as a dogma but rather as a living tradition that must be confronted both with changing social reality and with other scientific perspectives. The members of the school produced books of theory (Bauman 1964b; Hirszowicz 1964; Hochfeld 1982), empirical studies in the sociology of work (Hirszowicz 1967) and sociology of the nation (Wiatr 1969), and research on social structures (Wesołowski 1966). Sometimes the objection can be made that there was a gap between the high aspirations of the authors and the effects of their efforts, but it must also be remarked that representatives of the school wrote more than thirty books before 1968. Furthermore, when it comes to some of the works – for example, Wesołowski's *Klasy, warstwy i władza* [Classes, Stratas, and Power] (1966) – it cannot be denied that we are dealing with unique books which are among the handful of most important post-war achievements in Polish sociology and which set the framework for decades of research into the social structure in Poland.

It is not solely the derogation from dogma that constitutes the high value of the works produced in Hochfeld's circle but rather their manner of processing Marxist thought in a particular historical and political context. I therefore propose to talk about the Warsaw School of Marxism and not about "open Marxism," a term created by Hochfeld to establish the genealogy of his own perspective in the nineteenth-century historical materialism of Kazimierz Kelles-Krauss and used by people in his circle to define their intellectual positions (see, e.g., Raciborski 2007; Wiatr 1973b, 2017). Open Marxism suggests a distance from official Marxism and a positive interest in other theoretical perspectives and research orientations. At the time, the declaration of open Marxism was an important gesture of relinquishing the demand for exclusive access to truth on the one hand, and on the other, of signalling autonomy from the political power of the Party. Over time, however, it was interpreted primarily through the prism of the second part of the name, that is, the openness that signifies a departure from Marxism and readiness to mix it with other orientations. It is better to talk about the Warsaw School of Marxism by analysing how Marxist ideas were transformed by individual members of the school before 1968 and to search for Marxist elements in their intellectual biographies even after the events of that year.

The history of the Warsaw School of Marxism is an important supplement to the history of the Polish intelligentsia after 1945, going beyond the well-described trajectory of the circles for which Leszek Kołakowski was a symbolic figure – a trajectory which started with a strong commitment to

building a new regime, then had its revisionist turn, and ended in radical criticism of real socialism from a liberal or liberal-conservative position (see, e.g., Gawin 2013; Król 2010; Siermiński 2016). In all important moments in post-war Polish history – including Stalinism, the period between October 1956 and March 1968, the 1970s, and the times of so-called transformation after 1989 – the paths of members of the Warsaw School of Marxism were distinctive.

/// Julian Hochfeld – Intermediary, Master, and Organiser

The Second World War, with the destruction of the country, the deaths of millions of citizens, the change of borders and political order, and the destruction of the former elites, made a dramatic break in Polish history. Nevertheless, when we look at the intellectual and academic elites, there was a significant level of continuity despite the severe war losses. In the case of sociology at the University of Warsaw – which was quite closely related to philosophy – the connections with pre-war academic life were very strong. Several important figures who mediated between the pre-war and post-war periods can be indicated: Tadeusz Kotarbiński and Władysław Tatarkiewicz, members of the Lvov-Warsaw School of Philosophy (Woleński 1989); Maria and Stanisław Ossowski, who were influenced by the latter school but developed their own project of humanistic sociology (Chałubiński 2007); and Nina Assorodobraj, a former student of Stefan Czarnowski, a thinker referring to the sociology of Durkheim (Czarnowski 2015). As Randall Collins demonstrated in his work on the sociology of academic creativity, the role of such intermediaries in the intellectual environment goes beyond the transfer of knowledge in the sense of passing on information. The role of masters is important when it comes to learning how to problematise academic matters and is crucial for building affective engagement in scholarship through rituals of discussion, spending time together, and enjoying collaboration (Collins 1998).

After 1945 Julian Hochfeld played this kind of role for young sociologists. He came from a well-to-do, educated family which had links, through his father, with the governing "Sanation" camp before 1939. In spite of these ties, young Hochfeld involved himself in the socialist movement while studying in Kraków and became one of the most active members of the Association of Independent Socialist Youth – the youth organisation of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). He held both political and ideological functions in the organisation, engaging in disputes concerning the socialist

party's strategy in regard to the Sanation government, the communists, the USSR, and the spread of fascism in Europe (Chałubiński 1991). Representing the radical wing of the party, he demanded a rapprochement with the Polish Communist Party (KPP) and a more explicit critique of capitalist reality. The successes of the popular front in France, which he followed while studying at the Parisian École de Science Politique, convinced him of the necessity of an alliance between the socialists and the communists. How hopeless those dreams were in regard to Poland was shown by Stalin's decision to liquidate the KPP in 1938 and by the wave of purges in the USSR, which cost the lives of many Polish activists of the communist movement (see, e.g., Shore 2009). Hochfeld tried to unite political activity and scholarship from the very beginning. Favourable conditions for this combination were created by the proximity of prominent scholars among his party friends: for instance, Oskar Lange, later a classic writer on the economy. In 1937, Hochfeld defended a doctoral thesis in statistics and economics, dealing with social security issues, a topic closely linked to the interests of the workers he wanted to represent by political activity.

During the war Hochfeld found himself in the USSR. With the Second Corps – a Polish military grouping formed on Soviet soil – he set off for the Middle East and ended his war trek in London, from where he returned to Poland in 1945 and immediately became involved in political and academic life. Until 1948 the political situation in Poland was far from unambiguous. There were legal political parties independent of the new communist Polish Workers' Party (PPR); the authorities were making conciliatory gestures toward the Catholic Church, and sought to win the favour of some of the intellectual elites by organising a "Democratic Professors' Club," a gathering of progressive-thinking academics who were not necessarily of communist and Marxist orientation.

In this atmosphere, an important discussion on Marxism between Stanisław Ossowski, Julian Hochfeld, and Adam Schaff took place in the journal *Myśl współczesna* [Contemporary Thought]. The starting point for the discussion was a text by Ossowski (1970 [1947]), who belonged to the tradition of the left-wing, non-communist intelligentsia. He wrote that there was no cooperation or will to understand each other between Marxists and representatives of other intellectual perspectives. Marxism, Ossowski argued, had to reach for new scientific methods and to become a "movement factor" instead of repeating old nineteenth-century formulas. He also expressed the hope that the introduction of Marxism to universities would be an attack on ignorance rather than on scholarly criticism and that Marxism

would treat capitalist and socialist reality symmetrically, as orders requiring thorough investigation and criticism (Kraśko 1996: 113–114). Marxism, instead of adopting a rigid attitude in the struggle for power and perceiving every criticism as an attack on its doctrine (treated with almost religious celebration), should be open to debate and should explore changing conditions by new scientific methods. For Marxism in the socialist countries, the choice of such a path meant active participation in changing social conditions step by step. According to Ossowski, this would resemble the role of Marxism in the West, where it was used to critique existing institutions and contribute to partial rather than revolutionary changes. The post-war transformation in Poland – Ossowski pointed out – was far from having a revolutionary dynamic and the Marxists could not ignore that fact.

The text was answered by two intellectuals of the Marxist orientation. Adam Schaff, who was attached to the PPR and represented Marxist orthodoxy, attacked Ossowski for questions striking at the essence of Marxism (Schaff 1948). Since he draws attention to the dual character of Marxism – scientific and political – and Marxism rejects the duality of theory and practice, the adoption of Ossowski's perspective would equate to a death sentence for Marxism. According to Schaff, presentation of the materialistic view as a religion is characteristic of sociology and leads to a confusion of concepts, creating a convenient point of reference for a "reaction" that represents the religious and the materialist worldview as two identical phenomena. According to Schaff, Marxism by definition is anti-dogmatic, so any concern that it clings to doctrine is unreasonable.

Hochfeld criticised Ossowski in a polemical but much more favourable manner. Hochfeld argued that the things Ossowski criticised in Marxists – such as dilettantism, ignorance and presumption – could be found in every academic and theoretical movement; they were not restricted to Marxism but were common phenomena (Hochfeld 1982b [1948]: 60–61). For Hochfeld, Marxism belonged to the fabric of modern science, which meant accepting the material nature of the world and exploration of the interdependence between phenomena and the search for causalities. The dispute between the Marxists and the representatives of other orientations is not so much about the method but rather about the emphasis on certain subject matter. Marxists focus on investigating the transformations of productive forces and the material side of social processes. From this polemic the principles of Hochfeld's programme of Marxist sociology can be derived: it is based on empirical research and critically complements the findings of other perspectives of a more "idealistic" character.

Hochfeld's position may be surprising given how quickly he became one of the scholars involved in the reconstruction of Polish scholarship in accordance with the Soviet model, including the removal of sociology from the university as a bourgeois science. Understanding this turn requires taking into account the specificity of Hochfeld's participation in Stalinism in Poland – a participation that does not fit in the dominant interpretation of the involvement of intellectuals in communism as proposed by Czesław Miłosz in the *Captive Mind*. For Miłosz, fascination with communism was a derivative of secularisation and the search for a new guiding principle for organising the world. Intellectuals were supposed to be particularly vulnerable to the charm of this doctrine; it was a system complex enough to entice educated people, to give them a sense of contact with the masses and hope for a just order built by state structures. This combination proved so appealing to people of culture and science that they were completely absorbed in Marxist theory and Stalinist practice. Although this explanation – especially when it comes to the fervour of faith and sense of power connected with proximity to the state apparatus – provides an explanation for the attitude of the younger generation (people born in the late 1920s and early 1930s, called the "spotty Stalinists"), it does not enable an understanding of how people such as Hochfeld came to be enrolled in Stalinism.

To elucidate the question one has to reconstruct the political context of the post-war period, when after a few years of coexistence it became clear that Stalin's tolerance was over for the parties not controlled by communists in the countries subordinated to the Soviet Union. In Poland, communist dominance was to be realised by unification of the communist PPR and the socialist PPS, which was still independent from Moscow. Although at the end of 1947 the Socialist leaders asserted that the PPS was needed in Poland as a separate party, in the following year they became advocates of unification (Grochowska 2014: 206–208). This did not mean that they underwent a radical conversion, but rather that they had bowed to necessity. In the records of the PPS Central Executive Committee from this period Hochfeld argued that consenting to unification was the only chance of avoiding unpredictable conflict and playing a role in the new political structure. He was fully aware that the intentions of the party's opponents were not pure and that they retained the advantage of controlling the state apparatus. Nevertheless, he thought that starting to work with them was a better option than making a romantic gesture of refusal (Grochowska 2014: 192–193).

The dynamic soon moved from the political field to other areas of life. In 1949 the authorities demanded a diminution of the non-Marxist professors' influence on academic life and a limitation of their contact with students. The impartiality and neutrality of scholarship was attacked as an expression of reactionary thinking, hostile to the logic of socialist change in Poland. In connection with academic life, the culminating moment of Stalinism was the First Congress of Polish Science in 1951, which condemned non-Marxist scholarly currents and expressed support for the reorganisation of academia according to the Soviet model. At the congress, Hochfeld and Assorodobraj emphasised that sociology and Marxism were two separate lines of development in scholarship, and only the latter was progressive (Kraśko 1996: 136). With the academic year of 1952 a reorganisation of teaching in higher education began. Sociology at the University of Warsaw was liquidated and in its place Marxist chairs were instituted and taken by Hochfeld and Assorodobraj. Maria and Stanisław Ossowski, although they maintained their offices and workplaces, were kept from teaching. Sociology as a lecture subject returned to the university only four years later, in 1956.

Quite soon it emerged that even the moderate hopes of Hochfeld for shaping politics in the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) – a new party formed after the unification of the PPS and PPR – turned out to be unrealistic. The party was monopolised by communists close to Moscow, and Hochfeld himself was systematically marginalised and his real influence on politics was negligible, although he remained a member of parliament and for some time was a deputy member of the Central Committee (a high-ranking party official). Even though the changes to which he contributed in academia were short-lived, they left a mark on sociology by limiting the debate between scholarly currents: what was involved was an abuse of political power in academic debates (see Kilias 2012). Hence, in Polish sociology after 1956, various paradigms existed side by side, avoiding open confrontation (Szacki 1995). Interestingly, contrary to Ossowski's predictions, this did not lead to the ossification of academic schools.

In the case of the Warsaw School of Marxism it was not without significance that Hochfeld, being deprived of political influence, was increasingly devoted to scholarship. After 1956 he promoted three young doctoral students: Zygmunt Bauman, Maria Hirszowicz, and Jerzy Wiatr. He created the only academic journal in the communist countries to be devoted to sociological research into political systems: *Studia Socjologiczno-Polityczne*

[Sociological and Political Studies]. This journal was one of the institutional pillars for the school and published articles and books by members of Hochfeld's circle. During its existence between 1958 and 1968, twenty-five issues were produced; they included texts devoted to such non-orthodox Marxist topics as British socialism, public opinion, and local elections. Another institutional pillar of the school was a seminar led by Hochfeld. During the seminar his collaborators presented the findings of their research and investigations and had an opportunity to openly discuss scientific and political problems. The atmosphere and high standards of the discussions attracted important figures of Warsaw's academic life, such as Jan Strzelecki, Tadeusz Kowalik, and Adam Przeworski, who did not have professional connections with Hochfeld (Jasińska-Kania 2007: 370). Hochfeld's intellectual and organisational skills led to the rapid formation of a group of scholars who collaborated even after he went to Paris in 1962. There he worked in a UNESCO committee and died in 1966, just before his intended return to Poland.

Hochfeld's scientific activity after 1956 should be placed in the full picture of his life, which was marked by constant political disappointments and, nevertheless, efforts to improve the social world. Regardless of the significance of his activities during the Stalinist period and the assessments that may be made of his role in the academic world at the time, Stalinism was only one stage in his life, not the moment that defined his identity. This was the difference between him and the "spotted Stalinists," for whom involvement in Stalinism was key to their generational experience and later defined their way of viewing the world and subsequent conversions. Hochfeld did not depart sharply from his previous ideas and convictions about the need for a deep redefinition of the socialist project. On the other hand, he did make efforts to influence the shape of the existing social system – mainly to preserve some democratic elements, both in the form of civil rights and in regard to the people's influence on social life.

Hochfeld's reflections on parliamentarianism (1982c [1957]) should be analysed from this perspective. The point of departure for him was to compare the system of democratic centralism – that is, the model of Bolshevik politics – with parliamentary democracy. According to Hochfeld, the specificity of the former was a prerequisite for radical social change in a backward and isolated country such as Russia in the early twentieth century. Only the determination of the centralised leadership, controlling the political, administrative, and economic power, could change the course of

social processes. The party's elitist character was supposed to protect the organisation from involvement in the existing order and reproduction of its elements. Yet the fate of democratic centralism provided an ambivalent picture: the system had managed to stabilise, but the consequences for democratic latitude had been significant.

On the other hand, there was parliamentary democracy in the Western style. Hochfeld noted at the time that scarcely anyone considered it to be a system in which the citizens simply ruled. Rather, what was involved was a complex system in which the bourgeoisie, because of its dominant position, managed to control many areas of social life. However, it could not be considered that parliamentary democracy was a mere illusion. The ability to vote had been won by the workers' movement, and the existing workers' parties, even if they were not revolutionary, could act as a counterforce to the bourgeoisie, which was not free to impose its interests. Institutions were not an emanation of ideas; they were an effect of forces but also had some autonomy.

In Poland – Hochfeld pointed out – there could be no Western-style parliamentarianism as it would mean turning away from the reform process and disregarding the international situation. However, efforts should be made to develop institutional solutions that would limit negative trends within the socialist state. There was no question of limiting the PZPR's leadership. However, parliamentary autonomy could be increased to counterbalance the Central Committee. This did not mean the establishment of an internal opposition, but that the parliament must be more than a place exercising the will of the party – MPs should have autonomy in their discussions, comments, etc. Such a parliament should work within a system of "checks and balances."

Hochfeld's investigations lack deep reflection on the issue of the masses' representation by the party. He thought that the existing mechanisms of functioning should be improved, but he also assumed that the party represented the interests of the working class. There was no answer to the question (Marxist in principle) of what kind of forces lie behind parliament in a socialist state. The idea that there was thus a conflict of interests would have been considered revisionism and an attempt to undermine the existing political order. Hence, Hochfeld departed from Marxist schemes of analysis and reached for liberal "balance of power" concepts; he advocated for institutional solutions designed by intellectuals and accepted by the party. The theoretical inconsistency can be seen, but it comes directly from

the structure of the situation in which Hochfeld found himself. On the one hand, his Marxist affiliation and professorship gave him a certain influence and the right to speak on public matters; on the other, there was a thin line beyond which one became an enemy of the system, even if Marxist rhetoric were used. This was the case with Karol Modzelewski and Jacek Kuroń, who wrote the famous "Open Letter to the Party" (2009), criticising the existing social reality from the position of Marxist revisionism. As a result, they were expelled from the Party and sentenced to prison in 1964. Hochfeld and his disciples, at least until 1968, would move in the space between official Marxism – which confirmed mono-party leadership as an embodiment of progressive currents – and a revisionism that critiqued the existing socialist system from Marxist positions and fidelity to communist ideals.

In this space, the project of critical social science was not rejected but built on the basis of elements drawn from various intellectual traditions. References to the liberal idea of checks and balances should not be interpreted as an abandonment of Marxism, or selective use of it only in order to criticise the capitalist order, but rather as a search for various tools to critique a system in which the state exercised both economic and political power.

Hochfeld's constant use of Marxist elements to criticise socialism is confirmed by his book *Studia o marksowskiej teorii społeczeństwa* [Studies in Marx's Theory of Society] (1982d [1963]). To see how the book uses Marxist notions to construct the foundations for a critique of socialist societies it is worthwhile to focus on the problems of work and alienation. Hochfeld asks about working conditions in today's societies, that is, whether the unprecedented growth of productive forces was related to the humanisation of work. The issue must be considered by reference to the industrial system and not to the type of ownership or organisation of the political world, which makes the question common to capitalist and socialist societies. Reflection on the issue requires a return to Marx's classic works and the traditions of reform movements.

Marx's hope was for the complete abolition of alienation, and the establishment of unity between human nature and real humans, through a revolutionary change that primarily involved social ownership of the means of production. In the tradition of reform movements, it was assumed that reducing alienation by making partial changes – limiting working hours and extending free time – was possible. This would extend the boundaries of the "kingdom of freedom," which was nonetheless built on

the "kingdom of necessity," a prerequisite for social reproduction. In the latter case, the stake was not so much a change in the form of ownership of the means of production but rather in the form of organising labour relations. This is a problem both in socialism and capitalism and involves the actions of various social actors: from the revolutionary activities of the workers' movements, through the reformers, to the activities of actors "competing against the workers movement" (ibid.: 637).

Although the volume of production had changed tremendously in the middle of the twentieth century and the level at which needs were satisfied had increased, work remained mainly standardised, industrial work, subject to even greater rationalisation and control (ibid.: 648). To these could be added the ongoing standardisation of management and design activities. The growth in labour productivity could partly be seen as an optimistic sign, but it must be remembered that productivity growth is accompanied by a parallel increase in social needs and the cost of collective consumption. These include health and education, as well as administrative support and defence expenditures, giving rise to justified criticism from people producing goods in industry (ibid.: 652). Although more goods are available to satisfy important needs, new products of control and alienation are created simultaneously with their production (ibid.: 653). The masses can be manipulated by the mass media and indulge in mindless entertainment. When the peak of aspiration is to have a radio, a television, a refrigerator, or a car, a person is reduced to his needs and separated from the ability to create, develop, and cooperate with others.

Recognising the emergence of post-war mass societies, Hochfeld went along with such contemporary theorists as Mills (1951), or Adorno and Horkheimer (2002 [1947]). He saw the project of sociology as a constant confrontation of the legacy of the critical tradition with historically changing social reality in order to grasp the dependence, domination, and alienation reappearing in new forms. It is possible to say of Hochfeld that in his criticism he remains abstract and does not cross the line to deliver a concrete critical analysis of socialist societies. On the other hand, by locating the problems of the industrial order and work in both socialism and capitalism, he was opening the prospect that all the inconveniences of capitalism were at the same time the inconveniences of socialism. In the 1960s, his project of creating an empirical Marxist sociology that could somehow be critical of social reality under socialism was completely unique in all the countries under Soviet influence (Kilias 2017: 58–59).

/// Defense and Internal Criticism of Socialism – Hochfeld's Circle before 1968

Whereas the absence of explicit empirical references to the reality of socialist societies may be regarded as an understatement in Hochfeld's writing, a similar allegation cannot be made about one of his heirs, Włodzimierz Wesołowski. He linked Marxist theoretical and political perspectives with modern positivistic research methods, which he assimilated during a scholarship in the US, where he had the opportunity to collaborate with Lazersfeld, Lipset, and Bendix (Sułek 2011: 126). This combination produced an interesting effect in the book *Klasy, warstwy i władza* [Classes, Stratas, and Power], which is a combination of theoretical considerations and an interpretation of empirical research.

Understanding the full background of this book requires recalling a point of reference that will not be found in its footnotes: namely, the revisionist tradition. This is an obvious intellectual standpoint for Wesołowski's criticism – although he does not get into a direct polemic due to fears of official repercussions. In the 1960s, when Wesołowski was working on his book, revisionism in Poland was represented by Kuroń and Modzelewski, the authors of the above-mentioned "Open Letter to the Party," which inspired radical circles on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In the "Open Letter," the party bureaucracy is interpreted as a new ruling class, whose interests are at odds with the interests of the workers. The party bureaucracy was striving to expand its power by increasing the scale of investment at the expense of consumption. Conflicts of interest, however, were leading to constant tensions between the workers and the party, which would end with a revolutionary explosion and the establishment of a real working-class order. This would be neither a bourgeois democracy nor a dictatorship of the bureaucracy, but a democracy realised by the workers' councils. Wesołowski's analysis is a polemic with this perspective and an attempt to provide legitimacy for the existing socialist order.

An alternative revisionist to Wesołowski was Bronisław Minc, a former officer of the Central Planning Bureau and an economics professor, who proposed that socialism should be analysed through the prism of the conflict between the state and cooperative sector (see Tellenback 1975). Wesołowski accused Minc of formalism, which in the Marxist dictionary, was naturally the worst of insults. It was unacceptable to assume, as Minc was doing, that the form of property itself determines the conflict, and to disregard the fact that workers hired in each of the sectors had opposing

class interests. According to Wesołowski, Minc's proposal was too static and did not take into account what was really happening in socialist society, that is, the gradual abolition of class differences.

An analysis of socialism must take into account the difference between capitalism and socialism. In capitalism, relationships between classes are determined by their relationship to the means of production. In socialism, classes in these terms disappear as well as the antagonism between them. This does not mean, however, that there is no such thing as a social position. After all, workers do physical work and work in an industry. They also receive a certain income and have a certain education, attitudes, and lifestyle.

The position of the workers must be investigated in relation to representatives of other strata of socialist society, that is to say, the intelligentsia and small-scale producers not hiring workers. In capitalism, the intelligentsia can occupy an ambiguous position in regard to class conflict, because it is not a class but a strata. In socialism, the intelligentsia differs from workers by education, kind of work, income, and prestige, but it becomes equated with workers as a strata. Small-scale producers, in turn, are sometimes defined as a class and sometimes not. The reason for treating them as a class involves the means of production – they are the owners. Against this standpoint, the argument can be brought that as they do not employ workers they do not exploit and control the work of others. They also do not have the power to create their own social formation. Here Wesołowski evokes Hochfeld, who referred to small-scale producers as the defective class. Farmers, counted as small-scale producers, are a special case. In the context of the socialist state, there was a visible effort to integrate them as deeply as possible into the socialised economy and to equalise their life chances – by organising machinery parks and agricultural circles, and by care for their children's education, which would further reduce their possible distinctiveness as a class.

Relations between the strata in socialism must be analysed by distinguishing the factors of social position: the kind of work, income, education, and prestige. There are two ways to describe the stratification associated with these factors. First, the degree to which certain attributes were distributed in the population should be investigated, and second, the relationship between the attributes must be grasped. Wesołowski observes – and it should be considered a significant contribution to analysis of the system of real socialism – that the transformations in socialist countries had led to the decomposition of stratification factors. This implied, for example, that

some of the groups with lower education were able to achieve substantial incomes. Wesołowski's theses are based on empirical data and research findings. He mentions that before 1939 every non-physical worker earned a better wage than a physical worker, and the wage of the former was two times higher than that of the latter. By the 1960s the situation had changed: 30% of physical workers earned more than 60% of non-physical workers, which indicated the decomposition of income and work factors. Another type of decomposition was related to work and prestige. Research into the prestige of occupations showed that some of physical-labour occupations, such as steel-working, enjoyed higher prestige than, for example, the occupation of an accountant. Wesołowski notes that in capitalist societies some stratification factors are also decomposed, but the scale of the decomposition is incomparably smaller than in the socialist countries.

The greater egalitarianism of socialist societies does not mean that no tensions are present. The fact that socialism does not rely on the market and the state allocates social resources and decides on the distribution of income leads to a situation in which the conflict is no longer a struggle between social groups but becomes a conflict with the state. In socialism there are also other types of conflict not related to income distribution. For example, conflict exists between the intelligentsia and the peasants and physical labourers for access to education. The former demand affirmative action and the latter are in favour of "purely meritocratic" criteria. While the contradictions of capitalism lead to a conflict that abolishes capitalism, tensions in socialism do not have that effect. People accept how social goods are distributed because it is just and a development toward even greater justice.

The fact that socialism derives its legitimacy from the promise of a transition to communist society leads Wesołowski to reflect on political power guiding social development. Wesołowski proposes a distinction between governing and ruling. Both in capitalism and socialism there are people who govern because that is their profession and such are the "functional requirements" of social systems. However, it is less important who governs than whose rule is expressed by this governance. The question is whether it is possible to speak of "ruling" in socialism when society is classless. In socialism no class controls the means of production and uses the state to safeguard its interests. The social product goes straight to society. But it can be said that the working class is the ruling class in socialist society for three reasons: maintenance of the socialist state is in its interests; its party protects this system; and the system is sanctioned by the

working-class ideology. In the long run, the working class will no longer rule and power will become "socialised."

For Wesołowski in the 1960s, two ideas were not subject to discussion. First, the working class was the progressive class, that is, the class whose rule would lead to the desired social change and the transition from socialism to communism as the embodiment of a just society. Second, the interests of the working class as a progressive class were represented by the party, which retained a leading and unquestioned role in conducting social change. On the one hand, this approach opened the way to bolder empirical study of social relations in socialism, including social conflicts, but on the other hand, the critical power of these studies was weakened by considering certain conflicts to be insignificant due to the logic of social development.

A slightly different view of sociology in socialism appears in the writings of Zygmunt Bauman. In the Warsaw School of Marxism in the 1960s they stand as a specific reversal of Wesołowski's proposals. Bauman made rather little use of empirical sociology (in connection with his distanced approach to positivism) and was more in favour of abstract reflections. At the same time he remained a proponent of a critical approach toward socialist society. It is worth pointing out that both Wesołowski and Bauman worked within the limits sketched earlier in the case of Hochfeld; that is they did not question the leading role of the party in socialism and rejected revisionism.

The book *Wizje ludzkiego świata* [Visions of the Human World] (1964a), which is devoted to the relationships between knowledge and the changing social ground, can serve as a good example of Bauman's work from this period. At the outset of the book Bauman notes that the social sciences were born with the crisis of faith in the marketplace, the factory, and technological progress as a means to progress and prosperity for all mankind (ibid.: 12–14). The social sciences were driven by the hope of creating a more predictable order and of gaining control over chaotic and destructive social forces. Although some scholars believe that this type of knowledge can be built by introducing impeccable empirical approaches and extensive research by mathematical methods, this is a perspective that ignores the social foundations of knowledge production. The multiplicity of paradigms, which appeared in sociology from the outset, resulted from the heterogeneous nature of social reality itself. It is a man-made environment that mediates the human relationship with nature, but at the same time the social world is subject to objectivisation and operates according to

its own rules, which permanently divide people and oppose them to each other (Bauman 1964a: 19–21). Unifying knowledge would only be possible in a situation of far-reaching unification of the social world, which did not seem likely in the close future.

Diversity of knowledge is not limited to the coexistence of a plurality of theoretical perspectives but also encompasses different ways of using knowledge, which Bauman differentiates as engineering by rationalisation and engineering by manipulation. The first is to create knowledge that gives different groups a more appropriate picture of the situation and enables efficient action. The role of such engineering is well defined by Gramsci – it is a kind of theory that converges and intersects with specific moments of history to make the action more homogeneous and coherent. In this situation the theory intensifies practice (Bauman 1964a: 39). In a given period, different systems of knowledge are competing, and the one that prevails is better suited to the specific historical situation of the masses, allowing them to identify their goals precisely and carry them out more effectively. The second type of use of social knowledge is engineering by manipulation. It is the knowledge of human activities that is at the disposal of the elite and is used to direct the activity of the masses. It manifests itself by setting certain parameters to a situation in order to induce people to action that is not favourable to them and serves the interests of the elite.

In socialism, due to the abolition of formal and actual class divisions, there are no social conflicts that must be engineered by rationalisation. Socialism can be compared to a mammal that is equipped with a central nervous system. Capitalism, in turn, is like an annelid. The individual segments work to some degree independently of each other. The problem of socialism's proper functioning as an organism is connected with the effective functioning of the centre. This involves the need to adequately diagnose complex social processes and make decisions that help to reduce alienation. An empirical sociology plays an important role in this process (Bauman 1964a: 556). The lack of discussion on the usefulness of specific theories and doctrines may lead to actions inadequate to the status of social actors and consequently to violence, as happened during Stalinism (ibid.: 550).

For Bauman, sociology's role in socialism is certainly not about designing a new political order, or holistic social criticism. This does not mean, however, that sociology becomes merely a narrow-minded discipline supporting technocracy. The socialist order creates its own forms of alienation and the role of the social sciences is to discover and propose remedies. A number of perspectives appear to be prerequisite for effective coping

with the negative phenomena emerging within socialism. Although Bauman accepts the central role of the Party as the main political principle, he clearly advocates a division of power in the creation of knowledge about the social world and the formulation of reform projects.

Bauman's caution in confronting the party was rooted not only in general acceptance of the direction of developments in Poland, but also in the fear of the possible consequences of open criticism. To what degree Bauman's fears were justified was soon to be revealed, after he defended the students against repressive power in connection with the publication of the "Open Letter to the Party." From that moment on, he began to be perceived as a dangerous revisionist and subjected to the surveillance of the secret police. Later, matters took a more dramatic turn. During the March events – a political crisis in 1968 that ended as an anti-Semitic and anti-intelligentsia campaign organised by the party – Bauman was portrayed as one of the symbols of "revisionism" and expelled from the university, along with Leszek Kołakowski, Włodzimierz Brus, and Maria Hirszowicz. Repression of academic and cultural elites acquired much more brutal forms than in the 1950s. Soon members of the Warsaw School of Marxism – Zygmunt Bauman and Maria Hirszowicz – would be forced to leave Poland (like thousands of other Poles of Jewish descent). Of course, this meant breaking the close ties between school members and the end of intensive cooperation between them, but the story of the school does not end there. The way its representatives reacted to the changing conditions is significant and retains a "family resemblance."

/// Towards an Active Society - Disciples of Hochfeld after 1968

In the film by Andrzej Wajda, *Man of Iron*, one of the most influential movies on modern Polish history, March 1968 and December 1970 are depicted as involving the unhappy desynchronisation of social protests. When the students protested, the workers did not respond. When the workers protested, the intelligentsia was silent. During the 1980 strikes, the two kinds of protest combined and consequently there was a resounding social revolt, as a proper objection to one-party rule. In that interpretation, the decade of the 1970s was just an interlude between the waves of social protests and the period of waiting for the "inevitable." In fact, the reaction to the events of March and especially of December 1970 was very profound and brought significant changes to the functioning of the social order, as was also reflected in the works of the Warsaw School of Marxism.

It is worthwhile to begin by looking at the evolution of Wesołowski's views. Just a few years earlier Wesołowski had sought legitimacy for socialism by demonstrating that the socialist system is the most efficient in implementing the ideals of equality and that the party guarantees social development and the representation of workers' interests. In a text written less than a year after the December events of 1970, he advocates that workers must be allowed to participate in setting the country's economic policy and production goals in companies. People who speak of the necessity of enlightening the masses or deciding on behalf of backward citizens are defined by Wesołowski as conservative and anti-modern (Wesołowski 1974). Belief in the party's leading role is marginalised by the hope that socialism can be revitalised by the bottom-up activity of the workers. Importantly, this change took place in a relatively short time and its direction is characteristic of the changes to Polish culture, science, and politics that would set the dynamic of the next forty years.

The writings of other representatives of the Warsaw School of Marxism fit in the new cultural framework. The differences between their writings allow us to see how they shaped this framework by reflecting on modernisation and its perils without reference to the historical mission of the working class (which still resounds in Wesołowski's texts).

In the texts of Jerzy Wiatr, one of the most productive and institutionally important members of the school, we can easily trace the change in how he dealt with the question of the political dynamics of socialist societies in the 1960s and 1970s. In his influential book, *Czy zmierzch wieku ideologii?* [The End of Ideology?] (1968 [1966]), which was praised by the Polish Academy of Sciences and reprinted, Wiatr engages in polemics with Raymond Aron's and Robert Lipset's ideas about decreasing the role of ideology in modern, post-war societies. As an intellectual representing the socialist world, Wiatr criticises the assumed disappearance of ideology in the Western capitalist states, pointing out the existence of communist parties in some capitalist countries, such as France and Italy, and emphasising the role of anti-communism as an ideology in the USA. In contrast, Wiatr declares the existence of a socialist ideology in the East, founded on ideas of equality, social justice, collective property, and the authority of the people. This ideology is supposed to unite different strata in the effort to finish the revolutionary process under the guidance of the party. Wiatr's perspective of the 1960s is still highly concerned with Cold War division and competition.

In articles published at the beginning of the 1970s Wiatr focuses not on ideology and revolution but on the participation and autonomy of different levels of political organisation (Wiatr 1973a). The dynamics of socialist societies are analysed from the perspective of modernisation – which means both the development of industry and urbanisation, as well as increased participation in the party, various social organisations, and electoral activity. The relations between modernisation of the means of production and social participation are analysed empirically to create knowledge that could be used to deepen the autonomy and responsibility of social actors (Wiatr 1973a: 20–24). This perspective is also present in Wiatr's more detailed and technical considerations on local governance. He postulates broadening the autonomy of local authorities in order to encourage individuals, as citizens, to organise their immediate social environment (Wiatr 1973a: 113). The former flame of ideological confrontation and collective revolutionary mobilisation that appeared in *Czy zmierzch ery ideologii?* [The End of Ideology?] had given way to a pragmatic attitude and the will to create a space for social activity that is not defined in terms of one collective aim.

Among the new topics that were extremely important in a changing cultural context were the questions of organisation and management. They were interestingly addressed in the writings of Witold Morawski, one of Maria Hirszowicz's students. Significantly, in the 1960s Hirszowicz and Morawski jointly researched workers' councils, which emerged after 1956 as a means of self-organisation (Hirszowicz & Morawski 1967). Morawski himself was involved in research on industrial relations in the USA, analysing, among other things, the mechanisms of conflicts and their institutionalisation, and criticising business ideology (Morawski 1970). A few years later he modified his interests, turning to the subject of management and organisation in the belief that knowledge of these areas was crucial for understanding Polish conditions and formulating development projects for socialist society.

He reflected, for example, on the subject of industrialisation. He noted that this process had been analysed through its effects, such as how local labour markets change, how workers behave, how a city alters after a large factory is built, and so forth. As a change of scope, he proposed distinguishing between development processes and organisational mechanisms. This proposal showed the need to grasp the complexity of social processes. Morawski noted that socialist industrialisation was strongly linked to the doctrine of satisfying the needs of the people, enlarging the working class, and overcoming underdevelopment. Nevertheless, in the previous stages

of industrialisation, significant decision-making errors had been made. For example, after 1956 a very low level of consumption was maintained in order to accelerate the pace of investment. Referring to the 1970s, Morawski stated that the new party team had a different vision of development. Instead of economic growth it spoke of socio-economic development, which has not merely a quantitative but also a qualitative aspect. Industrialisation had been imposed in the 1950s and 1960s. The goals were defined by planners; changes were rapid and controlled by the central bureaucracy. This strategy was effective, but only when a non-complex economy was being built. Complex industrialisation needs more bottom-up activity and innovations. This is where Morawski's radical switch of perspective takes place. It is not that industrialisation generates modern society, but rather that a modern, active, and innovative society is a condition for development and industrialisation. This creates a need for the economy to be de-bureaucratised, for increased consultation, stronger links with Western countries, the purchase of licenses, and consideration of change as a permanent part of the planning process. The barrier to such development is the continuous dominance of politics over the economy in socialism; according to Morawski, such dominance should be limited.

A slightly different theme appears in Aleksandra Jasińska-Kania's works, but they also fit in the new cultural framework of an active society. In the 1960s, Jasińska-Kania explored issues of politics and alienation in Marx, in order, in the 1970s, to address questions of personality and attitudes. With Renata Siemieńska, Jasińska-Kania wrote *Wzory osobowe socjalizmu* [Personality Patterns of Socialism] (1978), a book in which the historicisation of socialism itself is clear. The analyses are not based on a division between the new order as opposed to the old one, or on the Cold War perspective of opposing socialism to capitalism (Jasińska-Kania & Siemieńska 1978, see, e.g., p. 318). Based on party documents, popular culture, and research on attitudes and values, the book presents the evolution of socialism itself.

Jasińska-Kania and Siemieńska showed, for example, how the heroes of novels had undergone transformation. In the days of socialist realism, the hero was either a worker or a party activist taking up the fight for a new order. In the period after 1956 only 18 out of 81 leading characters in the novels they studied were workers; in almost 40% of cases, the readers were not given much information about the characters' class or occupational origin. Instead, emphasis was placed on the individual's experience of interpersonal relations. In the 1970s, more emphasis was placed on the

de-idealisation of the characters. They were presented as people subject to tensions and facing difficult decisions and dilemmas. Some contemporary commentators cited in the book even point out that socialist culture (literature, theatre, and films), instead of promoting good patterns, was presenting broken families in which the members were disturbed and there was a lack of mutual trust and understanding. At the same time, in the official language of the Party, there was a strong emphasis on individual involvement in the construction of socialism: terms such as "initiative," "commitment," and "self-determination" were often present in official speeches and party materials (Jasińska-Kania & Siemieńska 1978: 261).

Of particular interest is Jasińska-Kania and Siemieńska's interpretation of their empirical research on attitudes, which testified to the change in basic cultural vectors in the 1970s. The research showed that as the education of the respondents increased, they attached higher importance to issues such as interesting work, dedication to others, and commitment to social issues. In turn, the lower the level of education of the respondents, the more often their attitudes could be characterised as "individualist-consumer" and desirous of "stabilisation" (Jasińska-Kania & Siemieńska 1978: 298). Jasińska-Kania and Siemieńska demonstrated a positive interdependence between the dynamics of multi-faceted modernisation (education, standard of living, access to culture, participation in organisations) and personality. The more socialism develops, the greater the chances of creating a rich personality – complex, sensitive, and motivated to work for others. The dynamics of these two dimensions are not opposed. Individual development is not a manifestation of particularism, egoism, or bourgeois deviation. It is rather an effect and condition for the successful historical transformation that will humanise social life and bring relief to mankind from satisfying basic needs.

In the 1970s, Bauman as well – as part of redefining his critical project out of the Polish context and after his disappointment with real existing socialism – was increasingly interested in individualisation and the role of culture in the reproduction of the social order. Unlike Kołakowski, who turned to liberal-conservative positions and became one of the main intellectuals involved in the critique of totalitarianism, Bauman did not break with Marxism but subjected it to reconstruction; his aim was to preserve its utopian dimension while distancing himself from part of its theoretical apparatus.

In *Socialism: Active Utopia* (1976), Bauman sets a new direction for his research and engagement, which would later evolve into his widely read and

recognised works on modernity and post-modernity. In *Socialism* Bauman emphasises the importance of culture in constructing the social world, and additionally of culture that places the individual at its centre. The individual is the point of reference for both the system's reproductive mechanisms, such as consumption, and for criticism of the system, as in counterculture and social movements.

This diagnosis involves departing from the belief that different levels of social reality can be explained by their reference to the production process. As far as social criticism is concerned, this shift means that not all types of social oppression can be explained by their relationship to private property and control over work. Bauman cites an example of the Holocaust as a social phenomenon that is insufficiently explained in Marxist terms. What is important for understanding the specificity of Bauman's position is his distance from the belief that the tasks of criticism entirely coincide with the goals set by new social movements and the focus on individual emancipation. He saw a double task for contemporary criticism. On the one hand, it should reveal the negative effects of consumer culture and the promise of individualisation – as in his later books on the ambivalence of postmodernism (see, for example, Bauman 1991). On the other hand, Bauman noted the specific blindness of the kind of critical thinking that focused on cultural and individual matters while omitting two important dimensions: the global differences between the centre and the periphery, and the difference between the rich and the poor within nation-states. Subsequently, Bauman wrote a whole series of books showing the brutality of social change in postmodern societies (see Bauman 1998, 2003), and promoted an ethical attitude associated with revealing social exclusion and demanding recognition for people deprived of their human dignity.

In addressing the questions of an active society, the representatives of the Warsaw School of Marxism were certainly not exceptional. They were participating in the redefinition of the general cultural framework that took place at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s on both sides of the Iron Curtain. What is specific in their reflections is reference to the Marxist tradition by linking new problems with issues of the state and development, or alienation and personality, or finally, by asking questions about the task of social criticism in changing historical conditions. The way they conducted their studies was influenced by dispositions formed within this school in the 1950s. Two things are important here. The first was their ongoing attempt to combine Marxism with empirical research. The second was that they

thought about the possibility of social change rather within the context of existing conditions than by attempting to question the totality.

Of course, the question remains of how much Marxism was left within the Warsaw School of Marxism after 1968, when important members of the school were forced to leave Poland and on both sides of the Iron Curtain the new cultural hegemony of active society was established. It seems that with the passage of time and the changing historical context the Marxist impulse was weakening, but it is too simplistic to say that it completely disappeared. If direct references to Marx, Marxist themes (the state, development, and power), and using at least some Marxist concepts (such as alienation), are insufficient for a perspective to be recognised as Marxist, then perhaps it is worth stressing the continuity of a certain utopian Marxist heritage in the writings of the authors of the Warsaw School of Marxism. Furthermore, their conviction that existing social forms must be judged and questioned from the perspective of persons suffering exclusion should also be recalled, along with their hopes of overcoming this condition.

/// Conclusion

The achievements of the Warsaw School of Marxism remain so rich and extensive that a thorough examination would require considerable time and a huge amount of work. However, studying many thousands of pages of the books written by this narrow group of scholars is a worthwhile task both because of the value of the works themselves and because of the intellectual and political history of Central Europe.

In Hochfeld's circle, original works were created whose value came from cooperation in a rather cohesive environment. Analysis of these texts shows that the history of Marxism in Central and Eastern Europe can not be reduced to the pair "official Marxism–revisionist Marxism." There was also – to borrow the term created by Erik O. Wright and Michael Burawoy (Burawoy & Wright 2002) – a kind of sociological Marxism, associated with efforts to deliver empirical studies on socialist societies and attempts to use that knowledge to rebuild the existing order.

An analysis of successes and failures in this respect is interesting as one kind of trajectory among the intelligentsia after the Second World War. Members of the Warsaw School of Marxism were involved in social change, but they were not radical: they were more or less close to the Party. These dispositions toward social reality have survived the collapse of so-

cialism and manifested themselves in the attitude of Hochfeld's disciples to capitalism, which they have subjected to criticism though not absolutely rejected. There is a significant difference in the approach of the revisionist Marxists, who (with the important exception of Karol Modzelewski) rejected socialism in the 1970s, and after 1989 clearly engaged in the legitimisation of the capitalist order.

Tracking the history of the Warsaw School of Marxism provides new perspectives on the changes in post-war Poland during at least three important periods. With regard to academic and intellectual life, the period immediately after the Second World War should not be analysed through the prism of a violent break. In academia there was a high level of continuity, which defined the shape of academic life for decades to come. The history of the Warsaw School of Marxism helps us to better understand the mechanisms of Stalinism and go beyond the interpretations that limit it to phenomena within the borders of politics and religion. Finally, a good insight into the cultural dynamics of socialism in the 1970s, when individualisation and the imaginary of an active society increased in importance, can be gained from examining the writings of the school's members. Such an examination gives us a more objective view of the still-popular anti-totalitarian narrative of oppressed individuals forming a civil society, and allows us to treat that vision as merely one manifestation of the profound cultural changes that constitute the genealogy of contemporaneity.

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/// **Abstract**

This article concerns the Warsaw School of Marxism, which was created at the University of Warsaw after the Second World War and functioned simultaneously with the famous Warsaw School of the History of Ideas.

The Warsaw School of Marxism was formed in the circle of Julian Hochfeld, a pre-war socialist who not only wanted to bring Marxism into the social sciences and culture in Poland but also to redefine it in order to use it to analyse socialist societies. Inspired by Hochfeld's ideas, his pupils – including Zygmunt Bauman, Włodzimierz Wesołowski, Maria Hirszowicz, Jerzy Wiatr, Witold Morawski, and Aleksandra Jasińska-Kania – engaged in original reflection and research. Some of their studies came to be seen as milestones for sociology in Poland. The history of the school is presented here in the context of the social and political changes occurring in the Polish People's Republic: Stalinism, the "Polish Way to Socialism" after 1956, and the breakthrough between the 1960s and 1970s. The history of the school is interesting in itself and can also serve to further an understanding of the dynamics of "real socialist" societies within the framework of totalitarianism.

Keywords:
The Warsaw School of Marxism, sociology, "real socialist" societies

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NEOLIBERALISM AND CIVIL SOCIETY: SWEDISH EXCEPTIONALISM IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE – ON THE CONCEPTUAL AND REAL HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY

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/// Introduction

Is there a Swedish model of civil society? Probably yes, although it is in demise: there has been a drastic drop in membership for such civic associations as political parties, and other special-interest associations have become increasingly empty shells, raising the question whether they really need their members. Yet Swedes do still have a relatively high degree of participation in various grass roots associations; they are not "bowling alone."[1]

The notion of an exceptional case implies a nomothetic bias – that there is or should be a normal case. This has teleological and metaphysical implications that should rather be avoided.[2]

Moreover, the rhetoric about "exceptionalism" or "Sonderweg" is something we find in many places, for instance, the USA, Japan (S.M.Lipset),

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[1] Despite some ups and downs the Social Democrats have lost some 100,000 members during the last decade, roughly one-third of their membership. Other associations, such as the Tenants' (Hyresgästföreningen), have become quite corporatist, in the latter case to the extent that they have their counterparts – the real estate owners – distribute their material. In particular the political parties have become a crisis branch and would have difficulties to survive without state subsidies.

[2] It is partly avoided in Stein Rokkan's stages theory, which builds upon the experiences of predominantly north-western European nation states.

and Germany (Veblen, Barkin, Sheehan, Stern, Eley, Plessner, Kocka, etc.). There is no primrose path to modernity, peace, and welfare. However, the variations in political culture seem to be relatively unaffected by political and ideological factors. The future started long ago. In Europe we can already find a handful of different roads to modernity.[3] Understanding political culture requires a *longue durée* perspective on history, looking for the future in roots in the distant past. Even if we don't find the independent variable, to use the language of the quantitative method, comparisons are nevertheless meaningful; moreover, it is the method we normally have available in the humanities or social sciences. Since all nations are "dinosaurs" this calls for the *longue durée* in history and time relativism.

Due to its strategic mixture, Sweden is very useful as a comparative case for studying the role of civil society in political culture in the search for independent variables. Sweden is one of the most Americanised countries in the world, or at least in Europe (the Philippines might be even more so). Yet Sweden's political culture is very different from America's in regards to what the state should do and what things should be financed by public transfers or from individuals' own pockets. Sweden is historically a highly centralised, small, homogenous, and egalitarian, peasant nation, born of taxation – that is, it is pretty much the opposite of the USA in all these respects.[4]

Sweden also displays some exceptional traits that deserve attention in regard to civil society, both concerning its conceptual history as well as its actual history.

In Europe – and one might even say in universal discourse – the old concept of "civil society" re-entered the intellectual scene in the 1980s, following developments in East-Central Europe, originating in Poland. The Solidarity movement was the only truly independent civic association to emerge within the Soviet satellites. It provided an example of civil society as a concept for new social movements that were characterised by civil disobedience against regimes with a deficit of civil rights and democracy – and legitimacy. Latin America was also mentioned in the discourse; there

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[3] Peter Flora (1986) is a good example. "Do politics matter?" was a frequent question in political science in the 2000s; evidently the answer is "yes" – but to what extent? For European paths to modernity, see Greenfeld 1993.

[4] Sweden historically, of course, includes Finland, and the two countries are still today in many respects "communicating bowls." The Finns were loyal Swedes and Finland was part of Sweden. In its great-power period, Sweden also included the Baltic provinces and was more multicultural. The relation between Swedes and Finns is complex. Perhaps Erik Lönnroth formulated it best, that in the end – after the Kleinschwedische Lösung 1809 – Sweden and Finland turned out to be two countries built together by two people.

were several examples of corrupt regimes with low popular legitimacy where some monitoring of the government was provided by new networks, and "civil society" was used as an old and revitalised label. Civil society might be rather impotent as an analytic or taxonomical concept, but it has certainly proved useful for generating debates about what makes a society hang together and tick.

/// Four Modalities of "Civil Society"

The conceptual history of civil society is complex and could take its point of departure anywhere between Aristotle and Hobbes (or Samuel Pufendorf, who represents the diffusion of Hobbesianism), or from the "republican" parts of Machiavelli's oeuvre. Today we have a sudden oversupply of new or reborn concepts, such as globalisation, risk society, glocalisation, postmodernity, mixophobia, and so forth – not to forget civil society. Only some of these concepts will survive. Other concepts, such as "class" and "nation" are still going strong but need monitoring for their cognitive relevance, which might vary considerably. In well-consolidated north-western European welfare states they have become increasingly less relevant since the Second World War.[5]

Four main clusters of civil society types can be identified. One is the Scottish type, which was engendered by the Scottish Enlightenment and in which civil society is synonymous with bourgeois society, commercial society, or sometimes with "polished"[6] (civilised) society, in contrast to previous stages of human development, such as those centring on gathering, hunting, herding, or agriculture. The market and private property are the core. Evidently there is a lot to it, from a historical point of view, while previous Hobbesian approaches have been restricted to rational reconstructions, explaining why the individual has to adjust to peaceful coexistence in a legitimate order. From Ferguson on, this variation has been the classical one, which also dominates in neoliberal usage.

It is a puzzle, in the history of ideas, why no breakthrough to Enlightenment social science occurred in France at the same time, especially since there are links between, for example, Turgot and Adam Smith, and there are many embryonic elements in the works of Montesquieu that would

[5] Not fully irrelevant – perhaps "dismantled" is a better characterisation. Thinkers such as Richard Rorty stress the need most common people still feel for a natural identification with a nation state, even in the age of globalisation and Europeanisation. The same point was made by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (for instance, in *Die Zeit*, 22 April 2004).
[6] Ferguson often used this term.

have made a French breakthrough rather natural. Instead, the Scottish Enlightenment and the various four-stages theories brought us both civil society and sociology. Since Saint-Simon and Comte continued the French tradition, one possible explanation could be the inhibiting effects of Rousseau's Romantic, anti-Enlightenment confusions and contradictions (Eriksson 1988).

There is evidently a high correlation between the state, the market, and civil associations promoting democracy – or at least a constitutional order (*Rechtsstaat*). It is a paradox that the anonymous mechanism of the market stimulates both (limited) state power and generates a considerable amount of human interaction, both in trade (which is less surprising) and in clubs of various sorts, just as de Tocqueville, and later Max Weber, noticed during their American travels (Offe 2004). It appears that all democratic states employ the market system, but there are evidently also market systems without democracy. In one way the market appears to be a threat to democracy, since decisions are made outside the representative, democratic decision-making polity. Yet the market provides a basis for the revolt of the masses against the elites, in terms of free choice – in regard to nutrition, for instance, or the many allocation decisions about goods, where centralised decisions simply tend to be clumsy and dysfunctional.[7]

Second, we can recognise a Hegelian type, in which the state has a certain primacy, with a focus on civil society as a conglomerate of civic associations forming the state. We avoid the "iceberg" of scrutinising the Hegelian case more closely, except for noting that independent of what distinctions Hegel makes between the state and civil society, there is a strong state-idealist bias in his approach, which is less intrinsically interesting to us, although, of course, it is a nice example of the seminal contextual element in conceptual history, since state idealism has more fertile soil in nations without states or in strong states with undefined nations. It is not by chance that liberal doctrines develop in countries with a relatively well-established state power and calculability in the legal system (although we have the so-called problem of England here – and to some extent also the problem of the USA – in regard to the legal framework, which deviates from systematic Roman law).

Third, there is what I call a "Polish" type, meaning civil disobedience and protest movements against regimes with low legitimacy. This definition was embraced by a number of American sociologists travelling east

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[7] I would like to mention Charles Lindblom's work (1977) as a particularly nuanced account, in a field full of ideological believers.

of the Elbe in the wake of 1989 (for instance, Jeff Alexander and Rogers Brubaker), but it was also cultivated by local scholars.[8] During the long partition the Catholic Church substituted for a missing real society. The role of the family is hard to understand for a Swede, who has grown up with state-sponsored individualism.

Fourth, we can speak of a "Graeco-Roman" republican or communitarian or perhaps Habermasian-conservative variation, with a focus on local self-determination. Alan Wolfe (1989) is one prominent exponent of this approach, synthesising Graeco-Roman elements with Habermas's ideas about the need for *Lebenswelt* regaining ground from a suffocating *Systemwelt*. There is a human need for a sphere of self-control, to get central government off one's back.

If I see somebody at an airport gate reading, for instance, Plato or Aristotle, I can be rather sure the person is American. In the US constitutional order, the link with the classics of antiquity is alive and visible, a heritage carried over the Atlantic via Switzerland. Swiss scholars contributed to California's constitution, which appears to be an exaggerated version of the US constitution, with lots of local referendums, and so forth. In Machiavelli's Florence, moreover, the Florentines did not think they lived in the Renaissance but thought of their city as a recent "Greek" city state.

Despite the fact that both Hegel and Habermas are pretty much "dead dogs" in Swedish discourse, the Swedish case of "real" civil society (civil society *avant la lettre)* nevertheless unites traits from both the Hegelian, Scottish, and Habermasian/conservative/Graeco-Roman modalities, while the Polish type is almost absent and the Scottish one rather neglected, despite its central role in intellectual history.[9] In Sweden, uncontrolled but trusted expertise tells the citizens what is good for them, for instance, to "eat six to eight slices of bread every day," and so forth. There is a perhaps naive trust in state agencies as being well intended and at the citizens' service.

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[8] For instance, Geremek 1991.

[9] This is a judgment with some anomalies that have to be explained ad hoc. For instance, religious non-conformists in the mid-nineteenth century fall outside the general pattern but are very momentous for cultivating more inner-worldly associations and interest groups, thus unintentionally paving the way for modern mass democracy. Yet they also illustrate the typical Swedish merger between a top-down and bottom-up perspective; being a practising sect member and a state church member simultaneously was more the rule than the exception in Sweden. This had to do with Swedish law. It used to be illegal not to be a member of the state church. The early Age of Liberty was not very liberal in terms of freedom of thought, especially not dissenting religious ideas, a legacy from Arvid Horn's days in power.

The classical Scottish modality of civil society also makes us face problems that remain unresolved with the concept of civil society. Doesn't the market have an inhuman, deforming, and corrupting influence on us as human beings?[10] Civil society combines self-determination with utopianism, which might appear to be squaring the circle.

/// Civil Society in Sweden

In Sweden, in contrast to the countries of East-Central Europe, the concept of civil society entered the scene about a quarter of a century ago, as part of a neoliberal and social-conservative reaction against social-democratic rhetoric about the strong society, or the strong state, as supportive of the weak individual. The very lack of a distinction between the state and society in Swedish consciousness was one point of departure for this anti-socialist offensive.[11] There are paradoxes involved. If the general picture is that scholars in the USA and Europe have tried to re-conquer the concept from the neoliberals, in Sweden the neoliberals won by walkover. The *concept* of civil society was shaped by the anti-socialists as indicating a mediating sphere between the state and the "small context" of interpersonal ties, be it households or individuals interacting in clubs, civil associations, or parishes. As such, the concept remained uncontested. "Less state, more civil society" could be a slogan for this reaction against centralised state power and excesses in rapid large-scale solutions, which have already been criticised by Gunnar Myrdal (1982).[12]

There is a certain resemblance between the way the "right" (whatever that concept today is supposed to denote) managed to hegemonise the concept of civil society and the way the social democratic leader Per Albin Hansson in the late 1920s managed to take over the concept of *Folkhemmet*

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[10] Erich Fromm and Robert Lane might have some problems with intersubjectivity, and there is a risk that non-testable clichés or "interpretative schemes" will replace theories. Yet they are telling and have "value added" for our understanding of modern market society. "Shop until you drop" syndrome; manipulated "market-soldiers" who instead of consuming real life, substitute pseudo-experiences, such as watching reality TV shows, becoming soccer-hooligans, attending so-called bingo-lotteries, etc. Social psychological research is called for, to follow up on Fromm, among others.

[11] There is a distinction in the Swedish language between *stat* and *samhälle* – but the words are often understood by the ordinary Swede as synonymous.

[12] In his case this must be seen as a self-criticism – highly relevant but little noticed. In the 1930s Myrdal was a great social engineer in the Saint-Simonian, "Jacobinian" non-liberal tradition. As Sweden's "grumpy old man" he made a reckoning with his own creation, probably without being aware of the boomerang effect.

(the people's home, *Volksheim/Volksgemeinschaft*), which was launched by the social conservative Rudolf Kjellén.[13]

Anti-socialist is a better term than neoliberal, since one of the many paradoxes in recent Swedish conceptual history is the unholy marriage between neoliberals and conservatives. For some time, the problem nexus "less market, more civil society" remained a tacit dimension, a neglected complication (that is, that both the state and the market could damage civil society). The leading and bridge-building role of the Swedish-American sociologist Hans Zetterberg provides one possible explanation. Zetterberg emphasised the small-scale context and compassionate dimension of love and personal concern. The state, according to Zetterberg (1995), is more of a machine, to which no personal ties of responsibility or accountability really apply, while the family or parish somehow promotes reciprocity and solidarity, which has been lost during the growth of the top-heavy public sector.[14] It is also easier to cheat the system than your neighbours. *Der innere Wächter* or the internalised "Martin Luther" needs some help from social control, which calls for a smaller context and less anonymity, to check that you are not "cultivating your garden" when you are supposed to be in bed with a fever. It is an odd fact that the Swedes are simultaneously the healthiest and sickest people in Europe, depending on which statistics one consults – insurance data or social-medical indicators (life expectancy, child mortality, etc.).

However, the successful hijacking of the concept by no means meant that the neoliberals and/or antisocialists won the debate (as such) about the proper balance between the state, the market, and (civil) society. At least on the scholarly level this discussion – about the design of the welfare state and its institutions, and the principles of (re)distribution – employed the

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[13] Kjellén is sometimes characterised as a proto-fascist, although his term "national socialism" is accidental. He is most known for geopolitics and his scholarly relevance is perhaps due to his early brand of resource analysis in international politics. He was a main source of inspiration for Gunnar Myrdal, especially *Asian Drama*. Kjellén, however, was not the first to use the concept of *Folkhem*, whose provenance is unclear. Norbert Götz (2001) has traced the term to Denmark in the 1860s.

[14] One example is "Kindergulag in Schweden" in *Der Spiegel*, an article by Herman Orth, documenting how taking children away from unfit parents is many times more frequent in Sweden than in any comparable country. This might be humane – yet it is problematic from the viewpoint of human rights (*Rechtsstaat*) and integrity. Certainly many cases are well motivated (suburban "latchkey kids," perhaps with drug-abusing mothers, etc.) but if this is many times more frequent in Sweden than in comparable countries it appears alarming, especially as the officials making the decisions have little legal training and the need for the "service" is decided by the service providers, a problem common to some public sector activities, especially in health care.

famous "Titmussian triad" (Titmuss 1962), or its more ideologically coloured "regime" re-conceptualisation by Gösta Esping-Andersen.[15]

It would be an exaggeration to suggest that Sweden has been unaffected by the general neoliberal wave. The market mechanism came into use as an indicator, albeit fictive, in public services, and privatisation in various forms became fashionable and was increasingly also practised in the form of "contracting out," franchising, and so forth. Hospital patients became "customers" or "clients." This was more noise than deeds and also had other reasons, such as a Machiavellian decentralisation of decision-making in times of scarcity and cost elimination. The decrease in state-level relevance is illustrated by the fact that many topics on the national political agenda at election times were really about decisions that had to be made on the local or regional level, due to how the social state is organised in Sweden, with local government taxation financing education, health care, and so forth.

Neoliberalism is alien to Swedish political culture, even if a couple of decades ago the social democrats were influenced by fancy, predominantly neoliberal, yuppie culture to initiate a certain flirtation with this group in the electorate. The weak basis for neoliberalism is further indicated by the aftermath of the neoliberal wave, which in Sweden seemed to result in an increased interest in the communitarian alternative, as a pragmatic synthesis. This is furthermore indicated by the renaissance of traits common to socialism and conservatism. A re-evaluation of Rudolf Kjellén is part of the trend. So is the interesting fact that the main combatants in defending or attacking the large public sector have displayed, independently of each other, a certain positive curiosity about communitarian strands of thought. They might have very condescending things to say about each other, but they are clearly more cautious in what they claim about Robert Putnam, Etzioni, or Sandel, for instance. It might be said that there was a convergence once the heated ideological confrontation had peaked. It might also be added that communitarian notions about *Lokalvernuft* as a pragmatic solution to the value-incommensurability, "polytheist" problem in the post-Enlightenment harmonises well with the tradition of Scandinavian legal realism, with the legal positivists following in the wake of the so-called Uppsala school of value nihilism, and with Axel Hägerström as prophet and Gunnar Myrdal, Alf Ross, and Karl Olivecrona as (some of) the apostles.

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[15] Sven E. Olson (later Olson-Hort, and later than that, Hort) is a good example. See also Esping-Andersen (1990).

Sweden, again, provides a case of "real, existing civil society" *avant la lettre*. What is quite typical of the Swedish case is private local initiatives seeking state support – and getting it. This is the way Sweden became electrified, the way savings and loan banks were created, and the way early insurance systems emerged. These were initiatives for modernisation from below, from the bottom-up, but soon growing into the state apparatus, with its surveillance and top-down perspective. This merger between top-down and bottom-up is perhaps not exclusive to Sweden, but it is a typical trait.[16] Local government, being simply in need of people to fill all the necessary functions, desired citizens with a creed of citizenship.[17] A high level of literacy, even long before the school reform decision of 1842,[18] and the immense role of people's mobilisation and participation in various popular movements, created a political culture of active responsibility and accountability. This political culture managed to accommodate a strong central bureaucracy, which survived a number of radical constitutional shifts, and represented continuity.[19]

/// The Intimacy of the Rulers and the Ruled in Swedish History

The roots and reasons for the farmers' (sense of) participation are to be found in Swedish history, going back even to medieval times, as indicated by research by Eva Österberg and others. The peasants in Sweden felt they had a stake in the running of the government – and to some extent they did. The landowning and tax-paying peasantry formed a recognised po-

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[16] There are a number of civic-culture organisations between the private and public spheres. These are often so-called promoting associations (*främjandesällskap*); they take off as private initiatives but later become part of the bureaucracy. See also Stephen Turner (2006) about Swedish-type civil society.

[17] This has changed, due to local government reforms and rationalisation, in two waves, in 1952 and in the 1960s (a decision taken in 1962), reducing the number of local governments from around 2,500 to below 300. Whether the middle level of *landsting* (county council) should remain or not is a recurrent issue; today much of health care is handled by the *landsting*.

[18] In 1711 no less than 58% of the soldiers in Elfsborg regiment could read and exactly one hundred years later 99% could read; today the percentage is probably higher. The corresponding numbers for the ability to write readable texts were 5% and 18% respectively (according to an email from Jan Lindegren of 1 June 2004).

[19] Axel Oxenstierna is in several ways the pivotal historical figure in building a central state bureaucracy that managed to accommodate a number of regimes, including the social democratic one in the twentieth century, and in making individuals attached to central government. Oxenstierna also promoted the careers of commoners, often the sons of peasant students with whom he had become acquainted as a young student in Germany. They launched into careers in the priesthood. During the Era of Liberty, further formative steps were taken towards the creation of independent and impartial Swedish state agencies. Charles XI broke the power of the high nobility – but also created a new "domesticated" civil-servant nobility.

litical force very early. Between one-third and half of the land was in the hands of "self-owning," tax-paying peasants (although the legal regulations for title to land varied somewhat; the issue has a complicated history and was at times a matter of conflict).

The word for peasant in the Swedish language (*bonde*) has no genuine correspondent in other languages. It has positive connotations of pride and self-reliance which are not found in other languages, where words such as "villain," "peasant," "farmer," "Bauer," and so forth, often have a slight whiff of condescension about them. Something very important here gets lost in translation. The Swedish peasants also had a long tradition of local self-determination and "freedom." Swedish peasants were never fully feudalised. There is also a mythical tie between the king and the people, reflected in the right of the citizens to "write to the king." The king was seen as the "First Peasant." It is less important if these images about local self-determination and peasant power were myth or reality. To a large extent they are an invented tradition of nineteenth-century patriotic national "liberal" history-writing with its recurrent criticism of the nobility. This live myth was a useful fiction. The high nobility might have been powerful during the Great Power period (mainly the seventeenth century), especially during the reign of Queen Christina, but had "bad press" in Sweden, especially in nineteenth-century history-writing.

In actuality, Gustaf Vasa (reigning 1523–1560, Sweden's Kemal Atatürk or Józef Piłsudski) had to depend on the nobility in his power-balance act. His grandson Gustavus Adolphus even had to make major concessions to the higher nobility in order to secure his throne. This, however, does not really alter the dominant stereotype of the king and people keeping the nobility on a "short leash." As demonstrated in Eva Österberg's research (e.g., 1991) the mental structure of the late medieval peasant village with its combination of solidaristic egalitarianism and envy is an embryo for the design of the twentieth-century welfare state.

Sweden is one of the few places in Europe where the peasants actually won during the many uprisings in late medieval days. This happened also in Dithmarschen (a part of Schleswig-Holstein) and Switzerland. While Wilhelm Tell is mythical, Sweden was indeed ruled by Engelbrekt Engelbrektsson for about two years (1434–1436) after he led a rebellion backed by farmers and miners against King Erik. Engelbrektsson was assassinated by a nobleman and became a martyr.[20] In Swedish state-formation – as

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[20] Engelbrekt as a man of liberty is a retrospectively invented story, yet his role in history is quite remarkable. However, it is a matter of interpretation. Lübeck owned shares in Falu copper mine

reflected in Swedish educational indoctrination – Gustaf Vasa's adventures in Dalecarlia loom larger than his later brutal assaults to punish grass roots reactions against his methods of taxing the peasantry. Peder Svart's chronicle is not exactly unbiased, yet it is live memory still today. Until recently, every Swedish school pupil had heard of Gustaf's adventures in Dalecarlia and how the peasants from Mora finally offered their support for his insurgency against the (Danish-)Union king, Christian "The Tyrant," as he was sometimes called in Sweden. Peder Svart's narrative might be propaganda; the fact is that still today, on the first Sunday in March of every year some 15,000 cross-country skiers compete between Sälen and Mora. Gustaf Vasa was going in the other direction, trying to escape to Lübeck, when the peasants caught up with him and said they had changed their minds; now they wished to join the rebellion against the Danish-dominated Nordic Union (the Kalmar Union between 1397 and 1523).

Swedish political culture is today still much imprinted by Gustaf Vasa and also by Axel Oxenstierna (chancellor 1612–1654), who promoted – far more than most Swedes are aware – the idea of impartial state officials. They are the source of one of the main characteristics of the Swedish welfare state and its public sector: a relatively[21] high propensity to pay taxes, even if with a certain masochistic chill, combined with a trust in institutions.

There are other factors that deserve mentioning. One specific circumstance was that sons of peasants could study and become priests, which produced a sort of "intimacy" or partnership between the rulers and the ruled. The priests were the voice of the central power, and not that rarely the priest was also "one of us." The priest's residence was the local power centre and the priest normally chaired meetings of the local government council. In addition, the priests were sometimes themselves literally peasants, since part of their salary involved a homestead, which they could either cultivate themselves or lease to a tenant. They were additionally also public servants in their capacity of priests, and not infrequently priests'

(Stora Kopparbergs Bergslag, today StoraEnso) and the iron mine in Norberg, very close to where Engelbrekt came from. Evidently the Hanseatic League and the small-scale iron producers in Bergslagen had common economic interests, which conflicted with the Nordic Union. This has been pointed out by Erik Lönnroth (1934).

[21] This characterisation of Gustaf Vasa might be a stereotype. After all, the Reformation was a widespread phenomenon. What happened in Sweden (including Finland, of course) was not unique and not extreme. Closing down Uppsala University, which was a Catholic stronghold, appears in a different light from this perspective, although Gustaf Vasa could have re-opened it as a Protestant institution, which happened two generations later.

sons became high state officials. Thus there was a ladder for class circulation: from peasant, to priest, to *Beamter* (state official).[22]

In addition to the free-peasant mythology, there is another tradition that contributes to the negotiated order and atmosphere of consensus, but more from the top-down perspective, that is, the tradition of "feudal capitalism," especially in the iron industry, before it became large scale. The word *bruk* is another of those terms having very typical denotations and connotations that simply get lost in translation. The literal and "flat" translation could be "plant" or "factory," but *bruk* also means a place where the owner-family and workers live in a sort of community, generation after generation. It is not market capitalism, since the owner has a responsibility for the welfare of his community; there is no "outsourcing" on the decision agenda.[23] The existence of this type of community is not specific to Sweden; we need only mention the Fuggerei in Augsburg, and Marienthal, south of Vienna (today part of Graumatneusiedl). Henry Ford's family housing at his car factories is also a parallel. But the *bruk* is part of the background of Sweden's climate of consensus and class compromise.

The cooperative network economy that was cultivated in the *bruk*-ambience is worth more research to elucidate how the transformation into the modern Swedish welfare *Folkhem* took place.[24] This is an important piece in the puzzle.

Swedish social engineering has thus been historically well prepared for its strange merger between top-down and bottom-up. The long background of the peasants' (feeling of) having a stake in the running of the state, as an integrated political force, is also the reason for a certain blind-

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[22] Sten Carlsson – a leading Uppsala historian with a background in Lund – makes this point in his works on Swedish social history. Although the last, rather formal, privileges of the Swedish nobility have lasted into the third millennium, the nobility never had an efficient monopoly on high offices. (The most famous example of class circulation is Johan Skytte, who was the son of a bourgeois and who re-established Uppsala University after its demise under Gustaf Vasa and his sons. He also, together with Salvius and Grotius, negotiated the Treaty of Westphalia on behalf of Sweden.) In this context, we should also mention that we had a state church in Sweden until 2000.

[23] A good example is Lesjöfors *bruk*, where Baron de Geer has to pretend that he likes "bandy," a strange variation of ice hockey but with a smaller ball and played outdoors, sometimes at 20 °C below freezing point. The spirit of the *bruk* is rather egalitarian (among the workers; it is also a stable, class society) and somewhat "thick" or "ingrown" – not that different from a medieval village, with its typical combination of solidarity and envy. Fairly large communities might have a live *bruk* tradition. This goes for Bofors, where howitzers are made. No one sticks out in this (very un-American) ambience. This is where the famous "law of Jante" rules (Bernd Henningsen has written on this, and Aksel Sandemose gave us the concept).

[24] There are some relevant studies, for instance, Ylva Hasselberg 1998.

ness to the "free-rider" problem in modern welfare states and for trust in institutions (which is more of a deficit in most comparable countries).[25]

One of Zetterberg's main observations was that Swedish social insurance is very individualistic – meaning that it enables, for instance, single mothers to enter or remain in the workforce, to exit ingrown paternalistic family contexts, and to recast their lives and achieve "self-realisation."

/// The Swedish Case in Comparison

The contrasts are clear between the peasant legacy in Sweden, and countries such as Poland, where the history of self-determination in modern times is fairly short, or Russia, where the full-scale Soviet experiment in expert rule was quite hostile to spontaneous civil society manifestations, which, moreover, had a poor seedbed in the lethargy deriving from *semstvo-* and *mir-*traditions.

It has actually even been suggested that the self-owning peasants in Sweden had in effect as many political rights as the poorer nobility in Poland, although the *szlachta zagrodowa* shared a value system with the high nobility (David Kirby 1995[1990]). This might be an exaggeration – but a telling one.

There are reasons to be on the alert against teleological and apologetic interpretations of the Swedish case. Any account of roots might invite "whiggish" interpretations, especially since the Swedish system has been very successful in many ways, with the Social Democrats as the "Whigs." But there is no determinism involved. There are many alternatives in history. The above account only indicates that the development that actually did result was deeply embedded in long historical traditions. It remains nevertheless a historical question why the Swedish way has differed so much from the Swiss way. Both countries had many similar historical conditions, including the religious factor and a nature that made feudalisation a difficult project. Both countries have been rather successful, but with different polity designs.

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[25] There is a great deal of literature on the subject, such as the recent contributions by Bo Rothstein on trust, which is also the topic and title of a whole book by Fukuyama. Ten wallets with money and no owner's address were dropped in the street in various cities. In Oslo, ten were turned in to the police; in Stockholm, seven, in Istanbul zero. This does not mean that Turkish citizens are more criminal than Norwegians; rather they feel no trust in their police institutions, so it would be pointless to hand the money over to the police. I have had similar experiences in Poland, where I lived in the years 2002–2007 and where I regularly visit.

The long-term traditions also indicate why Sweden is hardly a model to copy. To a liberal, moreover, the Swedish case must appear as a dystopia, with its authoritarian and top-down traits, which have been made even more pronounced by the Lutheran social reform creed, with its almost totalising Saint-Simonian Enlightenment reason. The Myrdals' social engineering provides good examples of this. Roland Huntford's book on "the blind totalitarians" might be much exaggerated but has a kernel of truth, in the sense that Swedes seemingly are happily unaware of the dangers of Rousseauian "populism," or that democracy has a totalitarian element and is to some extent opposed to liberty. One might say that Sweden, even formalised in the constitution of the 1970s, is too much a ("monistic") democracy but is hardly a full-fledged *Rechtsstaat*. The Swedish constitution would be totally unfit for, let's say, Belgium, Germany, or Bosnia. There is, furthermore, no tradition of law review in Sweden and the judiciary is not independent but is considered part of the administration (which is, it must be added, fully independent of the government cabinet). Minority rights and even individual rights are not as strong as in more liberal and less democratic systems, for instance, the constitutional order of the USA, where legitimacy rests on the individual and John Locke is still going strong.[26] Furthermore, there is no constitutional court, since it would violate the sovereignty of the people in parliament assembled. But we do have a deeply rooted culture of laymen in the court system. That Sweden is – historically – a small and homogeneous peasant-state, with a lot of solidarity – and envy – is the main source for the specificities of the Swedish modality of civil society. Today Sweden is, of course, rather multicultural, but a hundred years ago it was as homogenous as Poland is today (about 98% of the population was of the "ethnic" majority stock; I put "ethnic" in quotation marks, since the provenance of the term is somewhat opaque).

Regional cleavages are normally not capitalised in politics, despite the fact that there are some such gulfs, although certainly much less than in regional and federal Germany. One has only to look at the electoral map of recent EU-referenda to realise that there is a gulf between the backward northern territories, the large city regions, and the Europe-oriented south. Sweden might indeed be historically – mainly – a small, centralised, homogeneous, peasant country,[27] but there is the partly Finnish-speaking

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[26] The role of Hägerström and Lundstedt and so-called Scandinavian legal realism must be mentioned and can hardly be overestimated. I don't elaborate on this very intriguing theme here. See Eliaeson (2000, 2006a, 2006b).

[27] Recent multiculturalism might make this a suspect statement, bringing to mind the racist bedmates of communitarianism, as Zygmunt Bauman formulated it. Today's Sweden is multicultural – rather

Tornedalen up north, and greater Scania, including the lands of Blekinge and Halland, with their own identities and centrifugal powers.[28] The same is true of lands such as Dalecarlia (Dalarna) and Värmland. In general, though, local patriotism is not much of a factor in political life, where electoral geography plays little role. There is no serious separatism anywhere. Stein Rokkan is very sensitive to cleavages but notices that Sweden lacks any major ones.

An almost amusing example of the tacit corporatism in the small and homogeneous peasant state and the merger between top-down and bottom-up is that the representation of the Sami people (*Sametinget*) is also in fact part of the Swedish state administration (see Vasara-Hammare 2002), and to some extent functions as a state agency, despite extremely important lawsuits between the Swedish crown and the Sami people about who really owns the mountains up north, including many iron-ore-rich areas. Independently of what the court decisions may be, it can safely be predicted that the original Sami owners will not take over the iron-ore fields in Lapelonia (Lapland). A consensual solution "the Swedish way" is anticipated.[29]

Another corporatist-promoting peculiarity (shared with several continental powers, but distinguishing us from the Anglo-Saxon tradition) is that civil servants are eligible to run for public office and, for instance, get elected to parliament, where they can decide on money for their own special interests. The notion that they are sitting on two chairs and have a self-interest in budget decisions and so forth is lacking. This is part of the Swedish climate of consensus, in which responsibility may be taken on various levels.[30] In Sweden, there is an unnoticed risk that public tax money

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than integrationist – and has an immigrant population of about 15% of the population as a whole. However, in Swedish statistics, one foreign-born parent is enough to cause a person to be classified as of immigrant background – and of the immigrants the Finnish part is about half of the group as a whole. After 700 years of common history it seems slightly odd not to take this into account. The point with the homogeneous and egalitarian peasant population is that Sweden has never been at the crossroads of people coming through before finding their homelands, in contrast, for instance, to northern Italy or Ukraine, where countless new waves have left their imprints. Sweden has never been occupied by foreign forces, if we keep in mind that we entered the Nordic Union voluntarily. The Nordic Union did not really become a "starter," basically due to communication difficulties, but was in principle in force during the fifteenth century, until Gustaf Vasa conquered Stockholm on Midsummer 1523.

[28] Finnish history before 1809 is identical with Swedish history and Scania's (Schonen's) history before 1658 is identical with Danish history. But the history curriculum is the same throughout Sweden. Finnish websites might be a good source for learning about Swedish history.

[29] In Sweden any mining company can make a claim to exploit ore resources on land belonging to any private owner. So owning land in Sweden means owning the surface soil, to about a meter deep.

[30] Gunnar Myrdal (1982) makes quite a point of this.

may become a *Selbstbedinungsladen*, as the German expression goes – a self-service shop.

To a pure-hearted socialist, Sweden must appear to be a strange hybrid (a middle way, a "third way"), since the revisionist class compromise has resulted in a system with socialised consumption and monopoly capitalism in good consensual cooperation, with a high degree of involvement of organised interests: first the blue-collar workers, followed by the white-collar workers.

Yet another illustration of Swedish corporatism is *Folkets hus* (see Kohn 2003), where sometimes the formal power even becomes a tenant of the people's movements, when the local government council has its headquarter in *Folkets hus*.

To the communitarians the Greek city state, Swiss canton, or US local government traditions apply better; here Sweden rather provides fertile soil for missionary endeavours, due to the stalemate between liberals and socialists in the civil society controversy. But Swedish traditions imply ready soil.

That the Swedish system nevertheless enjoys high legitimacy and consent is due to long traditions promoting participation and trust in institutions. The relations between civil "promoting associations" and institutions require further empirical and historical research. On a theoretical and heuristic level, game theory and Mancur Olson's thinking about collective versus individual rationality might be helpful. Rational choice plus history is a nice combination, which we find already in Max Weber's critical scrutiny of Eduard Meyer (Tenbruck 1987; Weber 1906). Solidarity and democracy can hardly be deduced from the viewpoint of individual rationality. Yet they exist and are increasingly popular, in the worldwide perspective.

In the Polish case, in contrast, the Solidarity movement as a conglomerate of interest groups was successful in articulating discontent with a dysfunctional and corrupt system – but apparently it was not ideally designed for the furtherance of common goals and values (*Gemeinwohl*). In that regard it is even dysfunctional. To unite *against* something is much easier than *for* something. As a social movement Solidarity in Poland was the success of the twentieth century.

One root of modern Sweden that deserves mentioning – although we won't delve into the topic – is the parliamentary experience in the Era of Liberty (see Metcalf 1987; Roberts 1986). It is remarkable that Sweden actually already had a (sort of) parliamentarian rule in the eighteenth century, with parties in parliament – especially considering that the breakthrough

to modern mass democracy and equal suffrage was late – half a century later than, for instance, in Prussia. A cynical observer might, of course, claim that this proto-parliamentarianism – just like in the British case – was really a system of bribery and that power holders bought support from members of parliament (this being the origin of party groups and the parliamentarian system). Towards the end of the period it was actual parliamentarianism, and shifts in power were no longer motivated in judicial terms.[31]

There is little constitutional debate, or much serious security-policy debate, as issues on the political agenda.[32] Security policy has, however, re-entered the agenda after Russia's annexation of the Crimean peninsula. The main parties are not in conflict over the basic lines but over the details of financing, and so forth, and the more precise nature of our relation to NATO. Today, it is documented that Sweden has been a "secret member" since the early 1950s.

Some "community of assumptions" – not only over the rules of the power game but also concerning belonging and community – supposedly promotes cohesiveness and civility. There might be a certain frustration over a lost sense of identity in Sweden, although this should not be exaggerated. Belonging somehow implies exclusion, just as Carl Schmitt said,[33] and Sweden is after all a country without deep cleavages. On the other hand, a community without a purpose or common goal might start to erode and disintegrate. Again, a sense of proportion suggests that we should not exaggerate this threat; talk about "atomisation" and the dissolution of natural bonds in "industrial society" has been going on for two centuries and even very rootless societies, such as California, seemingly hang together.

It is easier to preserve national unity and social peace in a consensus-oriented homogeneous state, compared to, let's say, India or Canada. Swe-

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[31] Jan Lindegren points out that the Swedish constitution of 1721 was very momentous and the text was taken seriously in the American way (instead of the later focus on constitutional praxis). The processes of modernising the forms of the state and political exchange were parallel in Sweden and the UK – but the "Modernists" won in Sweden and remained in opposition in the UK, although Sweden then experienced a royal counter-revolution in 1772. Lindegren even suggests (in an email from 1 June 2004) that it might even be suggested that a parliamentary initiated revolution was imminent in Sweden a quarter of a century before one took place in France. This provides food for thought given that the development of modern mass democracy, as a contrast, was very late in Sweden).

[32] There is scholarly debate, though: for instance, Olof Petersson's pioneering work in matters of citizenship and the public sphere (the SNS's "Constitutional project"), and Bo Huldt and his collaborators at the Swedish "Försvarshögskolan" (Defence Academy), trying to realign Swedish foreign policy doctrine in the wake of *die Wende*.

[33] Carl Schmitt claims that friend and foe are the basic concepts in politics. He anticipates later discourse by S.P. Huntington, Bo Stråth, and George Schöpflin, on "the identity-giving other."

den as such might lack a goal except for the trivial but crucial ones of welfare and stability. John F. Kennedy's old imperative "Ask what you can do for your country" would sound odd to modern Swedish ears. But there are no major divides. We don't even have much tension between generations, since there is a general consensus that the generations that once built our welfare deserve their fair share of wealth, health service, and so forth.[34]

Real, existing, Swedish civil society is historically linked to nation-building, in odd contrast to the self-image in Sweden in the post-Second World War era.

It should also be noted that Sweden is a country "in the centre of the periphery," with a deficit of Enlightenment, yet quite a lot of Enlightenment reason in the formative years of social engineering (1930–1960), and with "rationalising intellectuals" in close conjunction with the political power.[35] The Myrdals are again very good examples, as both of them had dual careers and became members of the Swedish government.

It would be misleading to conclude from previous reflections that the Swedish way is the "constructive" and responsible one, while the Polish model of civil society is anarchic and irresponsible. The models serve different purposes and are products of the historical determinants in their respective political cultures. The Swedes, like the Germans, have "never chopped off a king's head" and have had no real revolution since 1434 (1809 was a bourgeois *coup d'état* and Gustaf Vasa's war of independence in the early 1520s was a rather complex story with several conflicting interests involved and with Swedes on both sides). However, the Swedish model of civil society is evidently instrumental in promoting the infrastructure that made "Sweden, Inc." a historical success story.

On the eve of post-Westphalian Europe it might be noted that the Polish way was also extremely successful in eroding the legitimacy of a dysfunctional regime. Evidently it offers no optimal prescription for "beyond" or "towards the future," as Solidarity's charismatic leader Lech Wałęsa clearly saw early on. Yet both models answer the core intention of civil society, namely self-organisation (Kocka et al. 2001).

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[34] This is, however, a problem area, where a lot of hardship is to be expected "around the corner," and which can only be solved on the pan-European level. Stein Ringen has done work on this. In Sweden the pension reform of the late 1950s (ATP) was regarded as the "flag-ship" of the modern welfare state, but simply had to be realigned, since it was not sustainable. According to a recent prognosis we have to work until age 78 or so in order to make ends meet. The system was not designed as an insurance system but as a redistribution system (between generations) and the new crisis in the population question is increasingly hurting, even if reproduction rates are higher in Sweden than in, for instance, Germany.

[35] Ron Eyerman's concept (1985).

/// Concluding Remarks

What should be done, research-wise, and what can we learn? The latter question I leave to others – it depends on perspective and interest – but I would suggest that, for better or worse, long-term historical factors can be instructive. And that to understand Swedish exceptionalism, in the conceptual history of civil society as well as in real, existing civil society, further research needs to be done on *främjandesällskap* (promoting associations), social movements, and collective memory.[36] Studies of early social-insurance initiatives, forestry cooperation, and electrification in the countryside might be particularly rewarding. This is a reasonable forecast, not an established fact. To a large extent, such a study might be a matter of scrutinising old substance from new vantage points. Considerable historical research may already have been done, for instance, on "promoting associations" between the private and the public. Re-conceptualised interpretive schemes or even theories might contribute to the formation of cumulative – perhaps even testable – knowledge. One might also speculate that combining research from history departments and the Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan, the technical university in Stockholm, might prove seminal, by throwing light upon civil society and infrastructure development (see Eliaeson & Lödén 2002).

There are anomalies. Swedish religious non-conformists functioned more like the Poles, in effect contributing to an associational culture that facilitated the breakthrough to modern mass democracy. This followed a couple of decades of bad atmosphere in the country, with uneasiness over the new organisation of a conscript army in a Swedish *Obrigkeitsstaat*; the result was mass emigration to the USA, the largest people's movement in Swedish history. "One man, one rifle, one vote" was a slogan in the democratisation process leading up to the 1907–1909 compromise. The conservative paternalistic rule in Sweden was not in lockstep with the demands of modern mass democracy and the period between, say, 1880 and 1909 was characterised more by class conflict and stalemate than consensus and cooperation. Although there is a clear "merger" in Swedish political culture between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, to employ Tönnies's terminology, this does not preclude the fact that the great transformation to industrialised mass society in Sweden also had its "bottlenecks." It appears, however, to have been a relatively smooth process, with two new elites in politics and

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[36] The term "collective memory" creates some methodological problems. Eva Österberg's work is important for the understanding of its deep roots.

the economy soon learning to cooperate in a simultaneous, intertwined process of constitutionalism and democratisation – which also explains the relative absence of crucial distinctions in Swedish political life between the *Rechtsstaat*, constitutional order, and democracy.

Of course, the labour movement was also momentous, although in comparison to Poland the political and trade union branches behaved early on as if they had read Mancur Olson Jr. before his main works were written. Mancur Olson in fact refers to Sweden as a deviant case in regard to the fiscal stress caused by special interests, which is lower than in other countries. The main and dominant Swedish labour union, the *Landsorganisationen* (LO) felt a responsibility for society as a whole, and behaved accordingly. When the large labour unions shifted to imposing their programme through legislation in the 1970s the cooperative spirit vanished and the Swedish model of consensus was replaced by so-called block politics and ideological confrontation. This has changed again, but that is an altogether different story.[37]

A brief summary might state that the neoliberals won the conceptual battle but not the related debate on the optimal relation between the state, the market, and civil society; rather the neoliberals have merely somewhat altered Sweden's state-centred understanding of society, which has very deep roots and displays a peculiar mixture of top-down and bottom-up features, of obedience and self-reliance.

Some limitations of the *longue durée* in history should, however, be mentioned. The perspective is telling and there is a deficit in our awareness of it, especially in Sweden, less so in Central Europe (*Mitteleuropa*). But it doesn't really exhaust the search for explanations and there are some obvious methodological problems. Sudden shifts such as *die Wende* in 1989 make the *longue durée* view and its lingering strength visible, but it cannot really be said that the view explains why "1989" happened precisely in 1989. We need to supplement explanations by the dull, idiographic, "jurisprudence" approach: "What led up to this event?" Pure long-term historical *Entäusserungen* doesn't easily live up to the Popperian criteria of testability (falsificationism).

The focus on the *longue durée* in the Swedish case might bring with it a harmonising or idyllic bias. However, although the consensual element is

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[37] The so-called wage earners' funds being the most famous example, but it also applies to several very rapid (according to their critics) work-life reforms in the 1970s, probably explaining the shift in government in 1976. The wage-earners' funds were – in effect – inspired by previous theories of so-called functional socialism (Gunnar Adler-Karlsson), building upon legal positivist ideas formulated by Hägerström and advocated by Vilhelm Lundstedt.

important and the sense of belonging to the *Volksheim* is genuine, it nevertheless appears reasonable to suggest that Swedish nation-building is also shaped by violence and war, in combination with taxation and national Bible translation.[38]

The Swedish model or experience is a success story – but not an export commodity. This does not preclude that it may contain useful elements from which to learn.

Interest in Swedish social history may be explained by the fact that several states in the post-Soviet space actually had a *Stunde Null*, when a fresh start from scratch seemed possible. It was thus perhaps tempting to try to apply the Swedish model – or some shining parts from its tool-shed. We can learn from history, but Swedish history, with all its particular formative factors, can not be repeated.

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[38] The Uppsala historian Jan Lindegren elaborated on this in his inaugural lecture a few years ago. See also Lindegren 1985. In fact, Sweden was a prototype for Prussia, both militarily and in regard to rational bureaucracy in general.

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/// **Abstract**

Social science is a battlefield for the formation of concepts. The Swedish case is particular. "Civil society" re-entered the scene as a neoliberal and social-conservative reaction against the social-democratic ideology of the "strong state," in which the state and society were conceived to be almost synonymous.

The Swedish revival of an old concept is in obvious contrast with the concept's reception east of the Elbe in recent decades, where "civil society" has often been used as a label for grass roots social movements, which are independent of the state and the *nomenklatura*, in malfunctioning regimes with low legitimacy and poor output. This idea is lacking in the Swedish case, where we find a characteristic merger between the "top-down"

and "bottom-up" perspectives. "Real, existing" civil society in Sweden has a long history. Self-organised initiatives sought support from the state and often received it – in some cases creating institutions that grew into state agencies. Forestry, electrification, and early social insurance provide examples of the interplay between the state, the market, and society.

Swedish civil society has deep roots in history, going back at least to late medieval days. Civil society was a formative element in the design of the relatively successful "Swedish model" through social engineering and piecemeal reforms during the period from the 1930s to the late 1960s.

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REVIEWS

COMMUNIST UTOPIA REVISITED

PAVEL KOLÁŘ, *DER POSTSTALINISMUS. IDEOLOGIE UND UTOPIE EINER EPOCHE*

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In recent public debates on the communist past in East-Central Europe, communism is more often than not taken for a uniform experience of terror and decay, doomed to failure from its outset. Throughout the region, dominant historical master narratives tend to play down the chances for progress and for reforming the system from within. Instead, they externalise communist rule by picturing national societies as collective victims of Soviet oppression. In effect, East-Central Europe's multiple experiences and entanglements with communism are frequently reduced to one single story of totalitarian rule, foreign domination, and all-embracing regress. Such narratives provide little more than a convenient contrast for the triumphalist resurrection myths flourishing since the capitalist transformation of the 1990s.

Against this background, Pavel Kolář's recent investigation into what he calls the ideology and utopia of post-Stalinism is all the more inspiring and thought-provoking. Moreover, it is a necessary corrective to the undifferentiated black-and-white verdicts on four decades of communist rule in East-Central Europe that are commonplace in public discourse and the politics of history. Reading this book offers a fresh encounter with the many facets of communist hope, belief, and disappointment that were so crucial to the twentieth-century history of East-Central Europe (and far beyond), but which have become deeply hidden under layers of rejection and oblivion. In this sense, Kolář's book can rightly be seen to have come just in time.

Kolář sets out to reconstruct the specific historicity of communism, and he does so in two regards. First, instead of reducing communism to a uniform, immutable system whose fate was doomed right from the beginning, he emphasises the distinctive historical changes the communist regimes and their followers underwent in the course of the post-war decades. More specifically, he is interested in the major changes and reconfigurations that occurred in communists' minds after the demise of Stalinism, and he considers these changes as main signifiers of a distinct epoch he calls post-Stalinism. Second, Kolář claims that the key to understanding the changes is to be found not in communist approaches to social structure or economic modernisation, but in the historical dimensions of the communist symbolic universe *(Sinnwelt)*. Thus his book focuses on how communists perceived the past, present, and future in the 1950s and 1960s, after the Stalinist certainties were gone but before utopia and authentic historical meaning had been lost in the formalised discourse of sclerotic late socialism.

This approach does not aspire to extraordinary originality, as far as the caesura of de-Stalinisation is concerned. More conscious historians of postwar communism generally agree on the fundamental sea change triggered by Stalin's death in 1953 and furthered by Khrushchev's Secret Speech at the twentieth party congress in February 1956, the Hungarian Rising, and the October events that resulted in the return of Gomułka in Poland later that year. However, while historians of the Soviet Union usually refer to this systemic break as a "thaw" *(Tauwetter, odwilż)*, Kolář consistently (though implicitly) avoids this metaphor (which was probably coined after the title of Ilya Ehrenburg's famous 1954 novel) because he is uneasy with the naturalist and cyclical connotations it carries. He argues convincingly that de-Stalinisation was as much an end to something old as the beginning of something new. It definitely closed an epoch in Soviet communism characterised by ubiquitous mobilisation and terror as means of realising linear beliefs in a communist future, but it was no simple return to an earlier state that had somehow been frozen before. Rather, it initiated a period of authentic reorientiation and renegotiation of political and historical expectations – post-Stalinism.

Thus, Kolář explicitly opposes the bipolar paradigm brought forward by scholars like Andrzej Walicki or François Furet, who equate de-Stalinisation with the beginning of the end of communism as a whole. In a sense, their notion of inevitable downfall shares the static, commonplace view of communism as an immutable totalitarian system, with the only difference

being that, instead of denouncing it right away, they constrict the meaning of "communism" to "Stalinism" and decline to ascribe any features of "real" communism to late socialism.[1] Whereas Walicki, Furet, and others conceive of the thirty years following 1956 as a more or less monotonous period dominated by cynical opportunism and non-productive "false consciousness" (Walicki 2013: 12–13), Kolář's main thrust is to show that the idea of a communist utopia did not suddenly disappear with the fall of its Stalinist version, but that utopian energies did indeed prevail in a specific post-Stalinist setting. In his view, the linear, clear-cut utopia typical of high Stalinism was transformed into a fragmented, processualised utopia, which nonetheless proved capable of creating authentic post-Stalinist models of subjectification steeped in hopeful beliefs in communist progress. Referring to an influential contemporary concept by Ernst Bloch, Kolář sees post-Stalinism as being characterised by "concrete utopia" rather than by abstract, static ideology in the Mannheimian sense that had been distinctive for Stalinism.

The very persistence of communist utopia, although in a specifically ambiguous, post-Stalinist style, is the rationale behind Kolář's distinction of post-Stalinism as an epoch in its own right, delimiting it from the subsequent period of late socialism. Drawing on the seminal work of Alexei Yurchak, who has applied Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of "authoritative discourse" to the late-socialist Soviet Union and pointed out the "hypernormalisation" of the public language of the time, Kolář identifies late socialism with a lack of any utopian ambition or authentic political discourse at all. In contrast to the state aptly captured by the title of Yurchak's book, *Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More* (2006), Kolář maintains that in the late 1950s and 1960s communists' world-views were still far from late-socialist immobility. In post-Stalinism, he posits, authoritative discourse was constantly in the making and did form – in spite of obvious constraints – a field of true debate, where ambiguities and impulses from below were permanently negotiated and renegotiated.

Therefore, Kolář's ambition is to provide a new explanatory approach to the middle period of post-war communism, which he considers relatively under-researched, and most notably, under-conceptualised. This appears

[1] Walicki pointedly described October 1956 as "początek procesu faktycznej dekomunizacji Polski" [the beginning of the process of actual decommunisation in Poland] and added that "Milczące zdystansowanie się od zadań dalszego 'budownictwa komunistycznego' było więc faktycznie odłożeniem na półkę samego 'komunizmu'" [Silent self-distancing from the further task of "building communism" was thus in actuality a matter of putting "communism" itself on the shelf] (Walicki 2013: XIV–XV.)

fairly plausible, as most historians indeed have concentrated either on the early post-war years of "building communism" or on the (later) crises and challenges to communist rule, such as the popular protests and upheavals in Poland, the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, or the final demise of the system. The latter way of framing post-war history as a story "from conflict to conflict" is especially common in Poland, not least because here communism was unquestionably shaken by serious crises more often than in neighbouring countries. However, this narrative framing results in a certain conceptual vagueness in approaching the period "in between," as is reflected quite tellingly by the vacuous notion of "*środkowy PRL*" which is sometimes used for the middle years of Polish communism. The term "*mała stabilizacja*" [small stabilisation], which has become another common label for the Gomułka years, is also somewhat misleading, even though it certainly conveys some sense of the time. As Marcin Zaremba and Błażej Brzostek pointed out a decade ago, the one-sided images of greyness and stagnancy evoked by this designation rather prevent a deeper understanding of the period, which was likewise characterised by considerable social dynamism and profound modernisation (Zaremba & Brzostek 2006).[2] After all, Kolář's book can also be read as an answer to Zaremba's and Brzostek's call for a new paradigm in researching this period, which transcends patterns of contemporary reflection and offers a genuinely historical interpretation. Obviously, his emphasis on the sustained vigour of communist utopia and the comparatively optimistic outlook that goes with it come as bold irritations of common vernacular notions associated with the period.

/// In Search of a Post-Stalinist "Utopia from Below"

So where does Kolář search for a post-Stalinist utopia? Geographically speaking, the scope of his enquiry encompasses Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the GDR. Topically, he focuses on how the communist parties dealt with their past, and which traditions and models of identity and alterity they invoked after the fall of Stalinism's ideological certainties. As Kolář underscores the bottom-up agency in the making and re-making of post-Stalinist "utopia from below" (2016: 14), his ambition is to go beyond the discourse of the party leaderships and elites, and to grasp how rank-and-file members of the communist party conceived of these questions. To this end, he bases his study on material from the party archives documenting

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[2] In an earlier text on Polish social history of the 1960s, Zaremba has even opposed "mała stabilizacja" [small stabilisation] with "mała destabilizacja" [small destabilisation] (2004).

debates inside local or district party structures, or reflecting conflicts between the party's grass roots and central party institutions. Amongst the latter the respective institutes for the history of the party, and the apparatus responsible for ideological instruction inside the party, appear most frequently. Additionally, in a move to avoid the common tendency to confine scholarly attention to developments in the capitals, Kolář has paid special regard to the periphery and carried out research in regional archives in all three countries, namely at Halle/Merseburg, Ostrava, Liberec, and Katowice. While this research strategy convincingly widens the traditional focus of historical scholarship centred on the highest echelons of the party, it is quite evident that Kolář predominantly relies on sources conveying views from inside the parties. Moreover, he does not seem to worry too much about cross-checking these views from within by consulting empirical material from outside the parties, or at least by drawing on evidence less concerned with internal questions of party tradition and communist identity. I will return to this point later, after taking a closer look at what Kolář brings to light from these sources.

Kolář presents his findings in five chapters, each of which is devoted to one aspect of the evolution of the communist parties' historical self-images. While the regional focus shifts throughout the chapters, and some aspects get more or less attention with regard to respective cases, Kolář succeeds in integrating the developments in all three countries into one common story without overly blurring the differences between them. Furthermore, he devotes considerable space to contextualising the processes under scrutiny with the broader history of communism, especially with regard to the Soviet Union.

The first chapter opens with the "historical turn" initiated by Khrushchev, who restored the supremacy of historical facts over the voice of the ideological "master editor," which had previously been controlled by Stalin. Thus, Kolář adopts Yurchak's discursive approach to Soviet de-Stalinisation as a starting point for his analysis. Subsequently, he traces the emancipation of the "archive rats" (as positivist historians were decried by Stalin) and delves into the boom of party history in the late 1950s which had been set off by the revision of compromised Stalinist dogmatism. Although it proved fairly difficult to integrate the diversity of historical facts and experiences at the party grass roots into a coherent post-Stalinist master discourse *(poststalinistischer Herrschaftsdiskurs)*, Kolář makes it seem plausible that the constant rewriting of history fostered the emergence of a hopeful belief in the necessity of an endless effort of perfecting *(systematycz-*

ne doskonalenie). The characteristic spirit of post-Stalinism was, therefore, encompassed by the notion of "not yet" (Kolář 2016: 90).

The ideological limitations of this new opening turned out, however, to be quite different in the three countries researched. As Kolář shows in the second chapter, the reassessment of the Stalinist "personality cult" led to an open and vigorous debate in Poland, but less so in the GDR and in Czechoslovakia. Still, the overall tendency of discursive change was pretty much the same everywhere: the historical agency previously ascribed to great, infallible leaders was now transferred to the party itself, which rose to the position of the collective agent of history responsible for carrying on and perfecting the communist project. Kolář comes up with the insightful ancient allegory of a demiurge to illustrate the creative but imperfect status of the agency ascribed to the party in post-Stalinist philosophy of history (2016: 112–114). In this light, one may be ready to condone, as a permissible concession to academic fashion, his supplemental thesis of a "biopolitical turn" in post-Stalinist semantics, which he observes in the replacement of the Stalinist semantics of destruction (*Zerschlagung*, liquidation) by terms such as "creative" (*schöpferisch*, *twórcze*). Although this semantic shift was certainly a telling phenomenon of the time , one cannot avoid the impression that the label proposed by Kolář slightly overstates this point (2016: 110).

While Kolář's investigations into the semantic twists of post-Stalinist discourse offer brilliant insights into the processualisation of communist utopia, the actual social scope of that utopia remains more obscure. The endless laments of party officials over ideological deficits, misunderstandings, ambiguities, and complexities (*Unklarheiten*, *niejasności*) at the party grass roots, which are quoted throughout the book, as well as the general passivity on the part of rank-and-file party members, which is referred to sporadically (e.g., Kolář 2016: 60ff.), cast certain doubts on the overwhelming success of post-Stalinist utopia amongst the "masses." True believers appear to be found rather among party intellectuals and officials professionally attached to the dissemination of ideology than among rank-and-file communists. This modification does not question the relevance of the approach, but slightly qualifies Kolář's emphasis: while he stresses the integrative dimensions of the post-Stalinist ideological project (which was evidently remarkable among certain social groups), the reader may wonder at some points if he does not underrate what he himself calls (quoting Thomas Klein) the "politbureaucratic" nature of this integration project (Kolář 2016: 219). From this point of view, the recurring complaints over

"misunderstandings" in the party documents look rather like euphemistic paraphrases for dissenting opinions, and could as well be interpreted as the first symptoms of the formalisation of party discourse typical for late socialism.

/// The Challenge of Nationalism

In the third chapter, Kolář turns to discuss a matter of central importance to communist models of identity and legitimation: the complicated relation between nation and class as competing "imagined communities." Kolář rightly accentuates the particular relevance of this conflict in Central and Eastern Europe, where nationalism had emerged as the principal "matrix of modernity" in the nineteenth century (2016: 145). Not surprisingly, he finds the most consistent embodiment of national communism in Gomułka's "Polish way to socialism," whereas the concepts of nation and homeland (*Heimat*) remained highly problematic and unclear in the GDR, especially after the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961. But even for Poland, Kolář stresses that nationalist narratives were far from replacing class-based ones. Rather, he observes continuous mutual permeations of elements of nationalist and Marxist discourse.

Although Kolář hardly provides substantial new sources or facts in this context, the light he sheds on the problem is illuminating. Contrary to Marcin Zaremba's benchmark work (2001) on communist nationalism in Poland, he rejects the interpretation that nationalism was cynically instrumentalised by the Polish communists as an unauthentic substitute for true popular support (Kolář 2016: 146, 177). Instead, he agrees with Katherine Verdery (1991), who has assessed the interplay between nationalism and communism (with regard to Ceaușescu's Romania) as a social process with a potentially open outcome. In Kolář's view, the typical post-Stalinist discourse of ambivalence enabled a productive ideological convergence of nationalism and communism. Hence, he asserts that Polish communists "sincerely" and "untiringly" strove for the integration of national and Marxist narratives, and emphasises the consolidating effects of their "sustainable identity work" in the late 1950s and 1960s (Kolář 2016: 177) – even though the ideological revaluation of nationalism turned out to be detrimental to communist rule in the long run.

This perspective certainly helps in investigating the authentic driving forces and productive effects of national-communist legitimation. Unfortunately, Kolář is quite reluctant to push these questions further. Al-

though he undoubtedly has a point in that genuinely communist traditions remained important to the historical discourse of the PZPR (particularly in the specialist discussions of party historians), the evidence he offers to sustain his view appears rather scarce and unbalanced. Most of it focuses on the party's own history in a narrow sense, namely on the debate over the rehabilitation of the pre-war KPP in 1958 (Kolář 2016: 165–172), while the much-discussed rise of nationalism in official discourse throughout the 1960s is taken into account only marginally. Significantly, the name of Mieczysław Moczar, the influential minister of the interior and leader of the nationalist wing inside the party, is completely absent from Kolář's book. The neglect of these currents makes him underestimate the considerable shift in the self-declared genealogy of communist Poland that came with the reassessment of non-communist traditions of resistance to German occupation – first and foremost of the *Armia Krajowa* (Home Army). Far from being a purely cultural or discursive phenomenon, the so-called "partisan" culture offered attractive chances of integration for many Poles, who until then had kept their distance from the communist party, and prepared the ground for the wave of nationalism dominating Polish public discourse in 1968 (compare Wawrzyniak 2009).

Here, Kolář's study could probably have been even more instructive if he had taken a closer look at the social contexts and functions of internal party discourse. Namely, it would have made sense to link the problem of nationalism more directly with the anti-Semitic campaign unleashed in Poland in March 1968, which he discusses only at the end of the following chapter (devoted to concepts of alterity). Sure enough, the so-called anti-Zionist campaign was closely interconnected with other concepts of enemies, most notably with the concept of revisionism, and therefore should not be reduced to a simple eruption of anti-Semitism. Still, Kolář's analysis of the session of the Wrocław voivodeship party committee dealing with the disciplinary procedure against the philosopher Wacław Mejbaum in June 1968 (2016: 248–251 – inadvertently misdated to "spring 1956"), does not really reveal new insights into the complex mixture of antirevisionism, anti-Zionism, and anti-Semitism that dominated Polish party discourse in these crucial months.

As Piotr Osęka and Hans-Christian Dahlmann have shown, the dynamics of the 1968 events resulted from a complex interplay between a top-down campaign (with an anti-revisionist and anti-Zionist edge) and independent actions by rank-and-file party members as well as lower party functionaries, who made their own sense of the situation and used the

opportunity to get rid of disliked career rivals – often exploiting forthright anti-Semitic resentments like the notion of *żydokomuna* (compare Dahlmann 2013: 375–388; Osęka 2008: 250–266). Irrespective of whether this grass root agency was primarily guided by individual career ambitions fuelled by Secret Police dossiers (as Osęka maintains) or rather by deeprooted ideological predispositions amongst Polish society (as Dahlmann would probably have it), these dynamics do not really seem to fit Kolář's thesis accentuating the lasting impact of a truly communist "utopia from below." What they unmistakably demonstrate, however, is the authentic rootedness of the Polish party discourse of the time in the attitudes and desires of the so-called "masses" – for better or for worse.

Apparently, the transnational design of the study fails to account fully for the contradictions and inconsistencies that characterised the Gomułka years, with the Polish party discourse evolving from the enthusiastic opening of October 1956 to the national-communist bigotry of the late 1960s. Since Kolář is more interested in reconstructing the general characteristics of post-Stalinism as an epoch than in tracing its inner dynamics, he has obvious difficulties in explaining why it resulted in the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia but in a nationalist cleansing in Poland. On the methodological level, here is where the boundaries of Kolář's view from inside the party become visible. Most notably, Kolář seems to underrate the degree to which party discourse (at least in Poland) was influenced by authentic popular claims and expectations, and also by the powerful ideological competition of the Catholic Church, which was of crucial importance for the millennium campaign of 1966. Grzegorz Wołowiec and others have argued for further research in which these developments would be more broadly contextualised with the continuities and changes in Polish society, and not solely considered as part of the history of communism, detached from national history (compare Wołowiec 2014: 39–68). The long-standing significance of national patterns of identity and alterity is actually acknowledged by Kolář, too. In an interesting digression devoted to the difficulties of Czech-German and Polish-Czech relations in the border regions, he reports on the substantial difficulties of party authorities in overcoming traditional national animosities in the name of proletarian internationalism (Kolář 2016: 188–200).

/// Contours of an Epoch

Eventually, in the fifth chapter, Kolář returns to more general questions concerning post-Stalinist concepts of time and temporality. Resuming his earlier examination of the "historical turn" of the late 1950s, he reflects on how history and memory shaped contemporaries' perception of their own age. Again, he seeks to bring out the peculiarities of post-Stalinism by de-limiting it from Stalinism and late socialism. Referring to Stefan Plaggen-borg's work on communist concepts of time, Kolář perceives post-Stalinist concepts of time as an ambivalent mixture, reflecting the difficult passage from the Stalinist time of action *(Handlungszeit)* – which had equated future revolutionary aims with the party's present actions – to the cyclical concep-tion of time dominating late socialism (compare Plaggenborg 2006). While the renouncement of Stalinism inevitably undermined communists' belief in the one and only straight way to the future, the proclaimed return to the "golden age" of true Leninism did not yet result in stagnant cyclicity. Instead, key words of the time like "renewal" *(odnowa)* retained optimistic visions of socialist progress. They indicated the fragmentation and plurali-sation of linear notions of socialist progress rather than their renunciation.

    In party historiography, the new awareness of complexity went along with an emerging interest in the history of the everyday. Kolář exemplifies this with an oral history project by GDR historian Wolfgang Jonas, who in the late 1950s recorded the experiences of miners in the Mansfeld region near Halle (Kolář 2016: 273–283). Furthermore, the abandonment of revo-lutionary dreams fostered the emergence of nostalgia (especially among party veterans), and visions of a better future came to be accompanied by memories of a better past. This makes Kolář – in a paraphrase of Johan Huizinga's famous work on the Late Middle Ages – speak of post-Stalinism as the "autumn of communism" (2016: 314). Even so, he insists, the epoch continued to be dominated by the persistent belief in the reachability of communism, albeit relativised and processualised by a "post-revolutionary culture of planning" (Plaggenborg quoted by Kolář 2016: 305). This uto-pian belief constituted a lasting political resource, which could be actuated into true "fireworks of visions of the future," as staged by Gomulka in 1956, by Khrushchev in 1961, by Ulbricht in 1966, and ultimately during the Prague Spring of 1968 (Kolář 2016: 314). It is in the precarious balance between the persistence of utopian thinking and the longing for stabili-sation that Kolář sees the specific mobilising power of the post-Stalinist regime of historicity.

These considerations are truly insightful and inspiring, as Kolář impressively traces the meanders of communist utopia and convincingly highlights the openness of post-Stalinist world views. Thus, he succeeds in presenting post-Stalinism as an important period of transition that was neither dominated by ideological fanaticism nor by bare opportunism (Kolář 2016: 330). Yet a certain vagueness about the chronological contours of the epoch remains, which tends to blur the definitive characteristics of the age. Whereas Kolář accentuates the break between Stalinism and post-Stalinism in 1956 very clearly, he is less precise about the end of the period and does not explicitly name a closing point. Although he incidentally seems to accept 1968 as the closing date (Kolář 2016: 321), he hesitates to endorse interpretations that take the violent suppression of the Prague Spring or the nationalist fury of the Polish March for the definitive fall of the communist project (compare Śpiewak 2012: 236). In his final remarks, he even dates the final collapse of the post-Stalinist utopia to the 1989 revolutions (Kolář 2016: 330).

Essentially, Kolář is more interested in the emergence of post-Stalinism from the ruins of Stalinism than in the further developments that paved the way for late-socialist ossification. He therefore privileges hope, utopia, and mobility over tendencies of stabilisation, stagnancy, and even regress. Consequently, his account is less accurate in mapping the depressing features of the time, like the disillusionments linked with Poland's *mała stabilizacja* (Kolář 2016: 310ff.), or the resurgence of nationalism. Compared to the subsequent modernising promises of the early 1970s, the late Gomułka years certainly did not seem a realm of future-oriented optimism and liberality. But surely Gierek's consumerism-on-credit seriously undermined the core elements of communist belief, thus rendering meaningless all the debates over the right way of interpreting Marxism that had been at the centre of post-Stalinist revisionism. By blurring the distinction between post-Stalinism and late socialism, Kolář avoids further questions on the relationship between communist utopia, political power, and social reality.

So it cannot be overlooked that Kolář's portrait of post-Stalinism resembles rather a sketch than a panoramic landscape painting. It would be unfair to reproach him for disregarding fields like economic modernisation, cultural liberalisation, or social history, which all seem essential for a comprehensive picture of an epoch, because he explicitly restricts the scope of his book to matters of ideology. Still, his empirical focus on party historiography and the historical self-perceptions of communists, though highly instructive, turns out to be a quite narrow footing for broad gen-

eralisations about the "ideology and utopia of an epoch," as promised in the subtitle. In his move to transcend more traditional approaches to the history of ideas, Kolář manages to include plenty of views from below, but he leaves major fields of contemporary experience and ideology production unnoticed.

This applies most notably to a field communists considered especially important for their ideological self-perception: the so-called "base" of economic, material, and social realities. After all, post-Stalinist "processualised utopia" was to a high degree an economic and technical one. Walter Ulbricht's famous claim "to outperform [West Germany] without catching up" (*überholen ohne einzuholen*) was materialised throughout the 1960s in a whole array of economic reforms, which were not stopped until his successor Honecker gave top priority to the satisfaction of present-day social needs. In Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary as well, the post-Stalinist era was a heyday of economic reforms aimed at transforming the Stalinist command economy into more sophisticated and sustainable models of socialist planning (although the extent to which the reforms were actually realised varied considerably). Maybe the euphoric belief in "scientific" methods of planning and steering, including cybernetics and computerisation, should be seen as one of the most characteristic features of post-Stalinist utopian thinking. Kolář's neglect of these aspects is all the more regrettable as the ambitious efforts to reform the planned economy in the late 1950s and 1960s markedly distinguish the period from the subsequent late socialism, which was more and more focused on administrating the status quo by means of "patriarchal consumerism" (compare Boyer 2007).

Taking into consideration technological and scientific notions of progress would also facilitate comparisons with countries beyond the Iron Curtain, as similar optimism about technological and societal modernisation was no less common in Western societies of the time. Such a comparative perspective might appear slightly odd at first sight, but Kolář provides even more points suggesting a glance at parallel developments in the West. For example, his observations on the increased attention to the history of the everyday in post-Stalinism virtually call for a comparison with the Western "history from below" movement. The later erosion of meaningful visions of a better future, which marked the transition from post-Stalinism to late socialism, was no peculiarity of the East either, but found parallels in the momentous breakdown of Western beliefs in modernisation and progress after the 1970s (compare Rodgers 2011). To elaborate further on such parallels could certainly deepen the rather essayistic allusions to Thatcherism

and Helmut Kohl that Kolář proposes in the epilogue (2016: 325–327), and would help in more clearly specifying the place of post-Stalinism in the global history of modernity.

/// "Why Isn't There Clarity Yet?"

In summary, Kolář has written an inspiring book that effectively complicates and enhances our picture of post-war communism. Fortunately, he does not stop with questioning conventional schemes of periodisation and interpretation, but proposes a substantial new view on the period of transition from Stalinism to late socialism, which has so far been slightly neglected by historical scholarship. Thus, he exposes himself to constructive critique, but also opens up perspectives for further research. While he impresses the reader by the refinement of his semantic analysis, one might have wished for more extended contextualisation of discursive phenomena with social developments. Kolář's book is a milestone with regard to its comparative focus on East-Central Europe, too. By composing findings from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR into one common story, it offers much more than some scattered case studies from the periphery of the Soviet Bloc. Instead, Kolář demonstrates convincingly that it is possible – and highly instructive – to sketch a portrait of an epoch in transnational communism without focussing as usual on the Soviet Union, or in fact on Moscow. This shifting of perspectives from the centre to the periphery reveals what can be seen as the central purpose of his book: to open our eyes to the fundamental openness and plurality of historical processes, be it in their regional or chronological dimensions.

"Why isn't there clarity yet on some issues?" – this question by an anonymous participant of a SED party schooling in 1967, who apparently felt irritated by the unsettledness of post-Stalinist ideology (cited by Kolář on p. 317), ironically reflects the longing for simplicity and black-and-white judgements that is equally present in many present-day opinions on the communist past. As Kolář shows, in order to adequately assess this part of our history, it is worthwhile to leave our hindsight aside and to cease looking at state socialism solely through the prism of the distressing 1980s. We may find then that the legacy of East-Central European communism is considerably more multifaceted and complex than current narratives praising the national-capitalist resurrection of the 1990s suggest.

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CONTINUITY OR A CHANGE OF MEMORY?
A BOOK ON THE HISTORICAL POLICIES
OF THE LATER POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

FLORIAN PETERS, *REVOLUTION DER ERINNERUNG:*
DER ZWEITE WELTKRIEG IN DER GESCHICHTSKULTUR
DES SPÄTSOZIALISTISCHEN POLEN

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I read large parts of Florian Peters's book *Revolution der Erinnerung: Der Zweite Weltkrieg in der Geschichtskultur des spätsozialistischen Polen* [A Revolution of Memory: The Second World War in the Historical Culture of Late-Socialist Poland] on my way back from the Museum of the Second World War in Gdańsk. At the time, the country was in the midst of controversies about the exhibition itself and the dismissal of the director by the right-wing Polish government. The history of the Second World War and its subsequent commemoration were thus topical. The continuities and similarities of the government's current historical policy with the politics of memory in the 1970s and 1980s, as presented by Peters, are striking. Has a "revolution of memory," as the book's title suggests, really taken place since then?

Until recently, the activity of the Solidarity movement, which is one of Peters's central topics, was described primarily in terms of its demands concerning economics, politics, and human rights. This, however, was only a part of the movement's agenda. Peters proves that the majority of publications in the dissident press referred to historical issues (2016: 137). Nevertheless, the memory policies of Solidarity and other opposition groups in

late-socialist Poland were neglected in academic research of the 1990s and early 2000s. Only during recent years has the topic attracted more interest, stimulated among other things by conflicts of memory that are often provoked by social actors who began their political careers in the underground opposition of the 1970s and 1980s. In his book, Peters offers a detailed overview of both official and opposition memory politics in late-socialist Poland, thus providing a better understanding of the current debates.

Peters has written an extremely comprehensive work, consisting of three introductory chapters, four case studies, and a conclusion. Each of the case studies deserves a separate research project. Peters focuses on late-socialist Polish memory of the Second World War; hence the case studies refer to commemoration of the occupation, the Katyń massacre, the Warsaw Uprising, and the Holocaust. Memories of these events are interwoven. Remembrance of the Katyń massacre is thus connected with remembrance of the Soviet occupation; commemorations of the Warsaw Uprising and the German occupation cannot be analysed separately. As a result, Peters's narrative is extremely dense and detailed, which makes some parts of the book difficult to read. Since Polish collective memory in the 1970s and 1980s was dominated by issues concerning the war, the book covers almost the entire mnemonic discourse of this time.

Peters often uses the language of his sources, thereby helping us to dive into the historical period under examination while also preventing us from maintaining an analytical distance. The keywords in his book are "heroism," "martyrdom," "victims," and "nation." The notions derive from the debates conducted in the 1970s and 1980s, and serve as analytical categories. Peters's theoretical framework also makes reference to contemporary concepts of historical culture (*Geschichtskultur*) and memory/history politics (*Erinnerungs-* and *Geschichtspolitik*). In order to depict the Polish attitude to history in the last two decades of communism, he uses terms that were introduced by German intellectuals such as Jörn Rüsen, Edgar Wolfrum, and Christoph Cornelißen.

Peters identifies four social agents: the state (represented primarily by the notables of the Polish United Workers' Party), the dissidents, the Church, and professional historians. Each was split into smaller groups and often riven by conflicts, which are described by Peters in detail. It is worth mentioning that an insight into the heated debates on Polish memory that were conducted back then can be very useful for discussion of the present situation. The main actors of this discourse, such as Adam Michnik, Marcin Król, Antoni Macierewicz, Lech Wałęsa, and Władysław Bartoszewski,

have been shaping the Polish public discourse for over forty years – first as members of the Workers' Defence Committee or Solidarity and later in the political debates about the Third Republic (after 1989).

Peters's objects of study include anniversaries – the thirtieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War, the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising, the fortieth anniversary of the Katyń massacre, and so on; monuments – the most prominent being the monument of the Warsaw Uprising erected in 1989; press articles, such as the famous essay of 1981, "Two Fatherlands, Two Patriotisms" by Jan Józef Lipski; speeches; and programme papers. His analysis proves that there are only subtle distinctions between history and counter-history. Not only can counter-history become the mainstream narrative after a "revolution," but they are also intertwined. Both the Polish United Workers' Party and the opposition constructed their historical narratives on the basis of notions such as heroism, martyrdom, victimhood, and the nation. Peters analyses these similarities very convincingly. Especially in his last chapter about the memory of the Holocaust he proves that both groups avoided issues relating to the persecution and murder of Jews during the Second World War. During socialism, Poland's collective memory became more and more nationalised and Jews were excluded from the mnemonic community. The German and Soviet occupation was remembered as if it had only been a part of Polish history, even though other ethnic groups, including some 3 million Jews, lived in Poland before the outbreak of the war. When Willy Brandt knelt in front of the Ghetto Monument in Warsaw in 1970 the dominant interpretation in Poland was that his gesture was addressed to Poles. When the Polish television broadcast fragments of Claude Lanzmann's *Shoah* in the mid-1980s, the Polish audience was interested solely in what the film had to say about Poles, not about the Jews. Although Peters does not focus on the mechanisms of excluding the Jews from Polish collective memory he keeps emphasising that the official and oppositional mnemonic practices were nationalist in kind.

In his last chapter, Peters explains the title of his monograph. As he sees it, the revolution of memory, which among other matters enabled the narratives of marginalised groups (i.e., the Jews) to enter Polish mnemonic practices, was possible because of the preceding social revolution deriving from the Workers' Defence Committee and the Solidarity movement. However, in contrast to the social and – to some extent, political – revolution of the 1970s and 1980s, the mnemonic revolution was limited to the opposition intellectual elites, who supported a broader and more pluralistic

historical discourse. From the contemporary perspective, this "revolution" has not lasted for more than one generation – if it has really taken place. Most of the Polish elites persist in promoting an ethno-nationalistic view of collective memory. Pluralistic and inclusive narratives remain an exception. Peters explains the roots of these processes very elaborately in his book.

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THEORISING THE FALL(S) OF COMMUNISM

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It is a commonplace to perceive revolutions as a form of theatre, with an assortment of roles and historical costumes to provide a frame for the actors' actions. Equally important is the way past revolutions are used in the day-to-day theatre of politics, especially in democratic states. The heritage of every revolution is controversial and is used in forming the symbolic background for current political actions. This holds true for the most important revolutionary events in history – the French and October revolutions to name the most obvious cases – but also for events that have a local character. Some revolutions, though, are even more problematic: the dilemma begins not with the evaluation of their outcomes and possible future symbolic uses but when we want to answer the question of whether they were revolutions at all.

The processes that dismantled authoritarian regimes in East-Central Europe around the end of the 1980s and beginning of 1990s are examples of this situation. Should we treat the fall of "real socialism" as a revolutionary break or only as a transfer of power with system-changing consequences? Did that fall more resemble a mass political upheaval of the nineteenth-century sort or just a change of regime – a major change, but negotiated and controlled? Lastly, even when we state that those events bear no resemblance to historical stereotypes of revolution (there was no

Bastille to seize, nor shot from the Aurora to mark its beginnings) does it mean that we should abandon attempts to discern revolutionary potential in those events?

These questions are addressed by Przemysław Sadura in his book *Upadek komunizmu w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w perspektywie współczesnych teorii rewolucji* [The Fall of Communism in East-Central Europe from the Viewpoint of Contemporary Theories of Revolution]. Sadura analyses six countries in the region – Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, and Romania – to show that the fall of communism was indeed revolutionary in character. Yet those revolutions did not follow the same pattern: each one differs; each one should be treated as an assemblage of specific circumstances that had a major influence on the nature of the process. At the same time, thanks to a comparative perspective, it is possible to build a model that explains the specific, differing patterns of the revolutionary events occurring in each country that underwent a major change of power around the year 1989. Sadura proposes such a model, but before describing it I would like to address the timeliness of his book.

The book came out in 2015 – which could be perceived as a symbolic date in current Polish political history, since that was the election year that elevated Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) [the Law and Justice party] to power. PiS campaigned as a fairly moderate, modernising agent, but its political milieu is well known for its critique of the order built in Poland after 1989. After its seizure of power, PiS initiated a major shift in the way the modern history of Poland is presented and interpreted. Some of the central figures of 1989, such as Lech Wałęsa, the former Solidarity leader and president of Poland, are currently accused of having been in fact dependent on the political elites of the old regime. The whole breakthrough of 1989 in Poland is presented as a revolution that should have taken place but did not because the core of the 1980s opposition was too compliant during negotiations with the elites of the old regime. What was formerly praised as a peaceful transition is now criticised as a lack of determination in making a clear break with the past.

It is not difficult to see why this discussion is still so important, if we take into consideration the role of "peaceful transition" in liberal discourse. It was nothing less than a proof of the force of deliberation in politics. The vision that major systemic change was possible as an effect of elite negotiations was a suggestive success story for a certain vision of politics – one that accentuates the role of rational discussion among political lead-

ers instead of, for instance, mass opposition to the system and its lack of legitimisation.

In opposition to this, the founding myth of those currently in power in Poland is what Sadura calls "the discourse of a 'stolen revolution'" – which is the same belief held, for instance, by right-wing Hungarian political circles (see Sadura 2015: 24–26; the term "stolen revolution" is widely used by right-wing politicians and publicists). In Poland this narrative is a decisive reason for critiquing the post-transition order of the III Rzeczpospolita [Third Republic] as corrupted from birth, because the elites of the old system were not held accountable and were able to maintain their status – if not directly in politics, then at least in business, where they could guarantee their success by long-held connections and influence.

This conflict between two visions of the political change of 1989 – one highlighting its peaceful and rational character, the other its insufficiency and corruption – has somehow been reflected in scholarly discourse. The first is represented by accounts that perceived the revolutions in Central-Eastern Europe – in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR – to be classic and successful examples of "elite deliberation in the process of political transition." According to this view, the success of a transition to liberal democracy and capitalism was possible thanks to the pacification of popular sentiment and of the political process being kept in the hands of experienced political professionals. In this vision the aim of key processes was known: it was to build democracy and capitalism after years of authoritarian power and a planned economy. The motifs of the other narrative are present in critiques of the post-communist era as an interim period during which we should speak not of democracy and capitalism, but of specific power and economic structures that combined to produce an improvised reaction to external pressures (the world market and Western power structures) and political assets from the times of the old regime (see, e.g., Staniszkis 2005).

From this viewpoint, Sadura's book has been published at the right moment – when interpretation of the post-1989 events has been revealed to be urgent as both an academic and a political undertaking. Sadura is aware of the political aspect of his project. In the introductory chapters of his book he presents the importance of the discourses of "velvet" and "stolen" revolutions as popular political myths (Sadura 2015: 21–30). Second, he provides a critique of what he terms "transitology" – the above-mentioned political-science discourse of "elite deliberations." Sadura objects to its narrowed vision of politics, which reduces the process to what is some-

times depicted as politics made in "smoke-filled rooms" (see, e.g., Fishkin 1991: 3) – elitist clubs that gather people with influence to arrange matters between themselves and set out the rules of the game. Sadura's main aim is to propose a different perspective – one that uses theories of revolutions to describe the fall of communism in East-Central Europe in all its complicated, multifaceted character.

This perspective involves several elements that should, according to Sadura, be put into the picture. First, there is the geopolitical level of analysis – the role of the USSR and the hegemonic Communist Party, as well as the pressure of Western political structures (such as the International Monetary Fund) and of global capital. This part of the model also involves the question of integrating different states with global capitalism. For instance, Romania remained relatively closed and self-sustainable until the dissolution of the regime, while Poland's industrial investments during the 1970s, financed by foreign credit, made it more dependent on global economic trends.

Second, there was the composition of the main political forces, which comprised not only moderate elites and the radical margins (as in the narrative about "elite deliberations"), but most of all, those interested in reforms and systemic change (both on the side of the Party and of dissidents and the wider political counter-elite) in opposition to those that were confrontation-oriented. This part of the model generates further questions that are crucial in describing the political dynamics of various crises: for instance, was it possible in the given situation to form a tactical alliance between reform-oriented actors? What was the role of external actors, that is, other states from the bloc and, most importantly, the hegemonic centre, the USSR and its ruling party? This part of the model deconstructs a cliché of trivialised historical narration that presents political conflicts inside the countries of the bloc as confrontations between "power" and "society" – which are treated as completely opposing monoliths.

Third, an important factor is the dynamics of the system itself, evolving from its early Stalinist version through what Sadura terms its "bureaucratic" and "technocratic" varieties. Sadura presents those changes as a general process that slowly transforms the system's logic, though it does not develop without conflicts – sometimes of revolutionary potential – as in the case of Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968. To develop this part of his model, Sadura distances himself from the notion of "totalitarianism" – which, once again, is too general a term to be used as an analytical tool. Bureaucratic regimes differed greatly from their Stalinist

predecessors, although the changes were gradual in character and did not develop at the same pace across the bloc. Developing the theme of internal political dynamics allows Sadura to differentiate the countries of the region in terms of their susceptibility to crises, ability to react and transform the structures of power, and so on.

And lastly, a key factor is the class structure of the societies, each having its peculiarities that explain a great part of the dynamics of the political process. For example, we could take the changing role of the new middle classes – the professionals trained in order to provide cadres for industrialisation, which was one of the key elements of the planned economy. The "socialist" middle class was strongly integrated with the system and dependant on it during the "small stabilisation" period of the 1960s. This class was crucial in building support for the bureaucratisation of the system, which started to legitimise itself not by egalitarianism but by a gradual improvement in living standards (Sadura 2015: 161–163). The same middle classes were the force that backed the economic liberalisation of the system during the 1980s, at the same moment when the working class was losing its political force (Sadura 2015: 183–185). At the same time, the Polish workers' protests of 1976 and 1980 are interpreted by Sadura as a revolt against the alliance of the party establishment with the new middle classes of socialism (Sadura 2015: 167–168; Sadura draws here on the important work of Polish social historian Henryk Słabek, see Słabek 2015) – which is one of the most interesting theses put forward in the book.

The interplay of those factors is crucial for the model of revolution that Sadura applies to the main breakthroughs in the region, not only to the literal fall of communist regimes during the late 1980s and early 1990s. For instance, Sadura proposes that certain groups of events should be read as counter-Stalinist revolutions: from the insular workers' protests in the 1950s in the GDR, which were not politically integrated or developed and were quickly suppressed; through the full-blown revolution in Hungary in 1956; to the sort of belated de-Stalinisation in Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Sadura 2015: 151–158). In the case of Romania, certain important features of Stalinism – for instance, strong, personal leadership as a legitimising factor – were in place till the end of the regime in 1991.

The distinction between a revolutionary situation and a revolutionary change of power is important for the analysis. In Sadura's interpretation, the Solidarity movement was a revolutionary situation – although without a revolution in the sense of a takeover of power – that was possible mainly thanks to an alliance between a dissident sector of the upper class and the

masses of politicised workers (see Sadura 2015: 171–172). In contrast to circumstances from the beginning of the decade, in the late 1980s the technocratic regimes of Hungary and Poland underwent "revolutions without a revolutionary situation." Toward the end of the 1980s, political actors on both sides – the Party as well as the opposition – were not interested in arousing mass protests and were generally inclined to adopt the neoliberal agenda being pushed by the IMF and Western creditors (see Sadura 2015: 183–196). This agenda would not have had popular support anyway.

Sadura uses a range of different materials, including interviews with political elites and statistical data from various widely circulated reports. Most importantly, he uses other historical and sociological analyses. His main ambition is not to discover some genuinely new material, but rather to put already known facts in a different perspective. Accordingly, his analyses are in principle brief and go straight to the point of how certain periods or specific events fit the model. He is clearly more interested in presenting general tendencies than in historical minutiae. His perspective is similar to that of several other sociologists who have also highlighted, for instance, the role of class dynamics in the transition from state socialism to capitalism. The work of David Ost (2006) or Elizabeth Dunn (2004) are important reference points, though Sadura's model is obviously more general in scope as it combines different levels into one explanatory and comparative model.

As legitimate as it may be, the method has its consequences in appearing at times to be a bit too sketchy, even for a sociological perspective, which is generally more interested in processes than in collecting historical details. For instance, as mentioned above, the very interesting point that the Polish workers' protests of 1970, 1976, and 1980 were in fact articulations of opposition to the system's withdrawal from egalitarianism is never properly developed. And it is precisely this point that would be of great significance for interpreting the nature and role of the new kind of elitist opposition that emerged in the late 1980s (and which was clearly different from the so-called "first Solidarity," which had had a mass character and was mainly a workers' movement), and the lack of mass protests toward the end of the decade.

Sustained polemics with different views of the revolutionary nature of the events described by Sadura would add to the picture. One of the most inspiring takes on the subject is Jadwiga Staniszkis's book *Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution* (1984 [2010]), which provides an interesting exposition of the strengths and weaknesses of the Solidarity movement as a revo-

lutionary force in Polish politics. Staniszkis proposes her own take on the dynamics of "real socialism" as a political and social system. Second, she deals in detail with the class composition of the Solidarity movement and the consequences that its class character would have for the type of politics available to it (as her work was written in the early 1980s, it was almost "on the spot" of the most dramatic events of 1980–1982). She also provides a fairly convincing dialectical model of the tensions that would inevitably haunt Solidarity as a political force and limit the scope of its action. Sadura's interpretation of this view or his criticism of it would have been an interesting reference point and considerably more inspiring for the general aims of his book than a critique of the obviously sociologically flawed theory of elite deliberation.

Where Sadura succeeds – and this is an important achievement of his book – is in providing a model that adds a *third* option to the above-mentioned two main lines of interpretation of the 1989 events – the one of "peaceful transition" and the other of a "stolen revolution." The model in his book brings social classes back into the picture, showing the importance of social dynamics for every major political process in the region. It also shows that the revolution was not "stolen" in the sense of not providing a clear break with the past, because it in fact did change the basic coordinates of the region's political systems.

The real predicament of the systemic changes was not the dilemma between dependency on the old elites on the one hand (they were gradually removed from power in the region – if not outright in 1989 or 1991, then in the following years), and mythical "full sovereignty" on the other. The larger problem, and the more important stake of the late 1980s, was different. It can be put in a simple question: if not the fallen socialism, then what? As Sadura shows, the majority of Polish workers, who were the main driving force behind the revolutionary situation of 1980–1981, accepted the basic social aims of the system: social security and cohesion, low levels of income disparity, and so on. They wanted a system that would better serve those aims, not the restoration of capitalism. The same could be said for the majority of Romanians, the majority of people in Czechoslovakia, and the political elites that formed the oppositional "round table" in the collapsing GDR. What was discernible in these cases was a certain movement toward a kind of "third way" politics, a sort of democratised socialism with elements of a market economy, and not a version of capitalism entirely subjected to the demands of "monetarism" and neoliberal globalisation. Needless to say, it was utopian, but this was the real revolution

that was "stolen" during the 1990s. If, then, the central political conflict of today between the conservative and liberal section of the political elites can be shown to be a conflict of two myths about the fall of communism (peaceful transition versus stolen revolution) then what Sadura sketches is a scholarly background for a third myth – let me call it the "myth of the third option," or of a "utopian possibility." That myth, for the time being, has no considerable political representation to reclaim its meaning and potential force.

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THE PREMATURE ENDS OF CENTRAL EUROPE

WERONIKA PARFIANOWICZ-VERTUN,
EUROPA ŚRODKOWA W TEKSTACH I DZIAŁANIACH.
POLSKIE I CZESKIE DYSKUSJE

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In the last dozen or so years, it has been thought proper to advance and defend the thesis that there is no such thing as "Central Europe." This once widespread term was considered blurry and overused. Dragged through muck and mire, Central Europe was supposed to be a utopia, often attributed to a single, equally mysterious, social class – the intelligentsia. "Central Europe" was imagined to be a fantasy, an unfulfilled dream, and even an attempt to fake history. In her book *Europa Środkowa w tekstach i działaniach* [Central Europe in Texts and Actions] (2016), Weronika Parfianowicz-Vertun points to the critical potential of the term. What moved intellectuals to theorise the existence of Central Europe during communist times was the opportunity to build the identity of opposition circles around this notion. Parfianowicz-Vertun writes that "Central Europe can be defined as a region in which dissenters' actions led to the creation of relatively permanent, independent culture cycles" (Parfianowicz-Vertun 2016: 13–14).[1] The author is trying to distance herself from any speculation about where Central Europe actually is – a problem so far unresolved and most probably insoluble. We are dealing here with something that, as the author suggests, manifests itself through discourse rather than through any

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[1] All translations of cited fragments are my own.

political project. Here Parfianowicz-Vertun differs from thinkers who saw "Central Europe" as a useful concept of a new geopolitical order (ibid.: 14).

The subject matter of Weronika Parfianowicz-Vertun's book is the debate about Central Europe in Czech[2] and Polish opposition circles in the 1970s and 1980s. This does not mean, however, that the author limits herself to that bit of historical reality: she refers to the debate's genesis and its aftermath, as well as considering its resonance in Hungary.

Europa Środkowa w tekstach i działaniach consists of four chapters. In the first, Parfianowicz-Vertun discusses problems with defining Central Europe, how it is represented in essays, and her own method of exploring this idea as a social concept. In chapter 2, she shows how Central Europe was created in texts and how those texts were written. Thus the symbolic reality of texts is embedded in the practical conditions of the intellectual's métier. Parfianowicz-Vertun points to certain cultural and social aspects of opposition life in Poland and in Czechoslovakia, such as gender inequality with respect to participation and recognition, or close links between the opposition and alternative culture. In chapter 3 she discusses the above-mentioned questions in the Czech context, focusing on three selected essays by Czech authors: Karel Kosík, Václav Bělohradský, and Josef Kroutvor. She also points to the fact that the concept of "Central Europe" is entangled in the debate over the so-called "Czech question,"[3.] the Czech National Revival,[4] and political tensions between nationalism, capitalism, and modernisation. The last, fourth, chapter is devoted to Polish visions of Central Europe; Parfianowicz-Vertun concentrates on emigrant intellectuals grouped around the journal *Kultura*. She also points to how Polish ideas

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[2] Thus, as the author proposes, in this article I use the word "Czech" rather than "Czechoslovak," because the issues discussed concern Czech culture. What was happening in Slovakia was not included in the book (Parfianowicz-Vertun 2016: 86). However, when I refer to the country in which the phenomena took place between the years 1945 and 1992, I use the name "Czechoslovakia."

[3] Essentially, the "Czech question" is a group of issues consisting of several ways of asking: (a) ontologically – who are we as Czechs, and what does it mean to "be Czech"?; (b) politically – what is the Czech *raison d'état*?; (c) morally – how should one be a Czech?; and (d) esthetically – what kind of an experience is "being Czech"? In some of these points, the "Czech question" is therefore directly connected with the discussion about the meaning of Czech history.

[4] The so-called national revivals took place throughout the Slavic cultures (as well as outside, see Hobsbawm & Ranger 2008), apart from the Polish and Russian lands, where relative cultural continuity has been preserved. In the case of the Czech lands, this process was meant to fill the cultural gap that came into existence after 1620, when, as a result of repression, most of the upper classes either emigrated or were executed or germanised, thus stopping the development of Czech culture, and above all of the language, which survived mostly in the villages. At the end of the eighteenth century the process of reconstructing and redesigning Czech identity started and was called the "National Revival." The intellectuals – the academics, artists, social activists, and politicians – who took part in it are called "revivalists" (Czech: *buditelé*).

of Central Europe were linked to a vision of the role of Poland's pre-war territories, the so-called "Kresy" [Borderlands]. If *Europa Środkowa w tekstach i działaniach* were to be placed on the map of the contemporary humanities, it would lie on the borderland between the history of ideas, studies of material culture, and textual anthropology.

As a scholar in the field of Czech studies, I will focus on the Czech side of the debate analysed by Parfianowicz-Vertun. Incidentally, this review strategy is encouraged by the book itself, as the author invites a reading that keeps the Czech and the Polish debates apart. Parfianowicz-Vertun shows that the Polish and Czech visions have little in common, as in each case "Central Europe" is viewed from a different perspective.

/// Who Creates Central Europe?

Parfianowicz-Vertun's aim is not, as she herself stresses, to propose a clear-cut definition of Central Europe, delineating its geographic, historical, and cultural boundaries (2016: 16). Instead, the author wonders why the concept of Central Europe continues to return, despite severe criticism, and what functions it has performed in respective decades and environments in countries such as Czechoslovakia (later the Czech Republic), Poland, and Hungary, and in the West. Parfianowicz-Vertun bases her claims on an analysis of 1970s and 1980s Polish and Czech *samizdat* press (ibid.: 71), justifying the choice of research materials by the fact that debates were at the time intense and connections between Polish and Czech opposition members strong and numerous (ibid.: 16). She tries to overcome the paradigmatic dilemma of geography, proposing to redefine Central Europe as a social concept along the lines of Ludwik Krzywicki's formulation. Thus Central Europe becomes a task – an ideal that people need to have in order to imagine ways to achieve it (ibid.: 19). At the same time, as she writes, Central Europe is a travelling concept ("crossing borders and developing in parallel in different environments and adapting to different forms depending on the social, historical, and political context," ibid.: 19) which is also "practised" ("from which sprung various activities and undertakings," ibid.: 19). Her understanding of a "travelling concept" has little to do with Mieke Bal's (Bal 2002). Rather than broaden the discussion in the history and cultural theory of ideas, Parfianowicz-Vertun's travelling concepts simply mirror her conceptualisation of a Central Europe that is "not an autonomous, permanent, pre-established value but is updated and can be

captured only in relation to those who call on it, express it, or practise it" (Parfianowicz-Vertun 2016: 19).

Who are "they"? Parfianowicz-Vertun points to the origin of the notion of "Central Europe." It was initially meant to be "the idea of several intellectuals," (Parfianowicz-Vertun 2016: 19, 368) or even "a republic of friends" (ibid.: 189). Any scholar familiar with the Czech context knows this old joke: the Czech nation would probably never have been born, and the Czech National Revival would have ended in a flash, if the roof over the Revivalists' favourite café had collapsed. Of course, the anecdote makes us aware of how few they were, but it is also a starting point for me to ask how strongly the idea of "Central Europe," as Parfianowicz-Vertun describes it, is connected to the idea of the Czech National Revival. Since the author considers the question of what was said about Central Europe to be more important than what Central Europe was (or has been), it is absolutely justified to wonder how large the circle was that discussed the subject (ibid.: 21).

Parfianowicz-Vertun is interested in "practices through which the idea of Central Europe is heard, the content of individual projects, and finally – their reception" (2016: 21). The way these projects looked depended on the context in which they were created. Parfianowicz-Vertun is therefore thinking about "ways of creating and circulating texts, techniques of their reproduction, writing and reading practices" (ibid.: 22), and often also about social activities that have so far gone unnoticed (ibid.: 25). This context also implies *ad hoc* responses to the situation: various projects of Central Europe were responses to the problems people confronted at the time (ibid.: 24).

Whether the reader agrees with the author's findings depends on a variety of factors: first, on the choice of key figures in the Czech part of the book. Parfianowicz-Vertun analyses three essays by three intellectuals whose perspectives differed but at the same time were closely related to the cold war reality. Josef Kroutvor's project of Central Europe was a reaction to the events of 1968 and was designed from the perspective of an emigrant; Václav Bělohradský defined Central European problems from the more comfortable perspective of a scholar at a Western university; and Karel Kosík, a Marxist-revisionist, who stayed in Czechoslovakia, focused on the future, trying to draft future trajectories for the Czechs after 1968.

Parfianowicz-Vertun is certainly right in focusing on intellectuals: after all, the debate over Central Europe mainly engaged this social stratum. However, the discussions of the 1970s and 1980s marked a revival of the "Czech question" (Czech: *česká otázka*) and invited inquiries into the

meaning of Czech history (Czech: *smysl českých dějin*). Parfianowicz-Vertun devotes little attention to this context. Thus she fails to account for the debate over Central Europe as an intellectual tradition.

Miloš Havelka, a historian and political scientist, convincingly argues that it was Jan Patočka, one of the most eminent Czech philosophers of the twentieth century, who reopened the old discussion with his reinterpretations of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk's writings. Patočka's theses and questions underlie the Czech debate on Central Europe in the period studied by Parfianowicz-Vertun, thus giving evidence of the durability of the main dilemmas connected to this political project (Havelka 2001: 103). Parfianowicz-Vertun notes Patočka's influence (2016: 218) but does not reflect on it as a fact in the history of ideas. However, the specificity of this Czech discussion lies in its high autotelity with regard to its "founding father." It is indeed a chain of reinterpretations of the earlier texts on the subject,[5] each more or less directly evoking the theses of the "father of Czech history," František Palacký. As Jan Patočka remarked, all this discussion could be considered as, to use Whitehead's expression, "a series of footnotes" to Palacký.

Narrowing her analysis down to only three essays, Parfianowicz-Vertun cannot grasp the dynamics of the debate: the shifting positions and constant revisions of earlier opinions by its main participants. For example, Kosík, in his text referring to Masaryk's work "Naše nynější krize" [Our Current Crisis] put forward a thesis that is the opposite to the main claim in the essay analysed by Parfianowicz-Vertun, "Co je Střední Evropa?" [What is Central Europe?]. Bearing in mind that both essays appeared in one volume, *Století Markety Samsové* [The Century of Gerta Samsa] after the Velvet Revolution, it is a pity that this shift of opinion passes unnoticed. While analysing Kosík's latter essay, Parfianowicz-Vertun writes that "in this construction there is no question about the condition of society, the responsibility of the individual towards himself, his community, or others – about the possibility of action and the consequences of its lack" (2016: 218). Let us, however, remember that in "Naše nynější krize," Kosík, who was interested above all in human existence as a moral task, writes that

> [a nation] is a nation for as long as it is something more than just an existence. Mere existence cannot be a programme for, and the meaning of, the nation. Where existence is everything, the nation

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[5] *Naše dvě otázky* by Hubert Gordon Schauer (1886) and *Česká otázka* by Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (1895).

becomes nothing, i.e., it is a biological being or a random historical creation. The nation defends its existence, but it is always about the meaning of this existence. Palacký's "*božnost,*" Havlíček's "*poctivost,*" Masaryk's "*humanita*" are a historical response to the question of the meaning of human existence, on the basis of which the role of the Czech nation is studied (Kosík 1993: 37).[6]

However, capturing these differences in the philosopher's thoughts becomes possible only when one grasps them in the perspective of a longer duration. Kosík himself mentions not only Masaryk, to whom he refers in the title of the essay, but also two ideological protoplasts of the Czech parties dominating the political scene until the end of the nineteenth century: Palacký (the Old Czech Party) and Karel Havlíček Borovský (the Young Czech Party).

Havelka pointed to yet other problems with regard to Kosík's essays:

After Karel Kosík's pioneering – albeit in some respects problematic – work *O pojmu Střední Evropy* published in 1969, and indeed from his reflections in the first half of the 1960s on the meeting between Josef K. and Josef Švejk on Neruda Street near Hradčany, the subject of Central Europe on the Czech scene mainly and repetitively attracted propagators of mostly conservative and often unilateral cultural criticism of national history and the Czech present, or at best those who tried to emphasise the moments of independent cultural identity – the mental difference with the East in particular, the political specificity and historical continuity of this space. Historically and politically weak, Czech conservatism unexpectedly encountered Great Hungarian conservatism, whose cultural epitome, for example, is … the book *Requiem pour un empire défunt: Histoire de la destruction de l'Autriche-Hongrie* by Hungarian-French historian Francoise Fejtö (Havelka 2001: 19–20).

The paradoxical character of independent culture in Poland and in Czechoslovakia is noted by Parfianowicz-Vertun when she writes that it was at the same time conservative, with its back turned to the past, reviving old entities – all of which inevitably influenced the concepts of Central Europe that she analyses (2016: 162). However, it might be asked whether

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[6] I quote the texts of Czech authors in my own translation.

these tensions were not a correlate of the autotelic nature of the debate on Central Europe: the constant search for the historical and ideological roots of the concept. Such an assumption would once again make it necessary to look closer at the relationship between the idea of Central Europe and the Czech National Revival.

Perhaps one way to understand the opposing ideas put forward in the essays analysed is to be found in Parfianowicz-Vertun's book – in her interpretation of the meaning of the literary form in which projects of Central Europe were formulated. Understanding the essay as "a kind of intellectual and writing practice" (2016: 33–34) explains, Parfianowicz-Vertun claims, the winding path of ideas taken by the leading debaters. She refers here to Andrzej Stanisław Kowalczyk's remarks on the genre (1990): "the essay is a literary expression of the cultural crisis; it appears most often in transitional periods and disappears when new attitudes, conventions, and expressions are universally accepted and established" (Parfianowicz-Vertun 2016: 36). The idea of Central Europe is revived especially in times of crisis, as Parfianowicz-Vertun writes (ibid.: 37). The claim holds water and even seems inspiring in the case of the Czech National Revival and the debates over the meaning of Czech history and the "Czech question." Nevertheless, the term "crisis" hardly fits the normalisation period, which is precisely the era analysed by the author: the 1970s and 1980s in Czechoslovakia. Generalised claims about the genre and its favourable climate fail to account for actual history – and the case is similar for the tempting proposition that "to read one text about Central Europe is to read them all" (ibid.: 15), which seems to be a metaphysical claim about the Central European *Geist* rather than a useful research tool.

/// The Czech Knot

Parfianowicz-Vertun advances the thesis that the history of the concept of "Central Europe" and its discussion is "a history of the shift of political, geopolitical, and historical discourses towards cultural issues" (2016: 23). And yet she decides to emphasise the link between the so-called "Czech question," the dispute over the meaning of Czech history, and the idea of Central Europe – which calls into question the aforementioned claim. What shifts are we dealing with here? The "Czech question" is inherently political, just as Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk famously formulated it. In his

writings, "political" meant the same as "cultural" in Aristotle's work.[7] "Political" was therefore "civic," and "public," referring to the whole of society. Masaryk himself, in writing about the crisis of the Czech community, stated that every political movement in this situation must also be a cultural formation (Masaryk 1948 [1895]: 236).

Parfianowicz-Vertun does not renounce the connection between these three discourses: Central Europe, the "Czech question," and the dispute over the sense of Czech history. Many of her reflections fall within the scope of what has been going on through all stages of the discussion over the meaning of Czech history: for example, the role of the East and West in connection with the concept of Central Europe, which corresponds to the idea of the Czech lands – or Slavic lands as such – already expressed by Palacký as a bridge between the two spectres of European culture (Palacký 1900: 379). The meeting of the East and West has strengthened the local culture by providing inspiration and impulses for further development. In the context of the second half of the twentieth century, as Parfianowicz-Vertun points out, it often had a purely practical dimension:

> It was not always important to say something new about Central Europe, but to be involved – through speaking or writing about it – in a community, to show activity, to express views and self-identification. Speaking and writing about Central Europe in the 1970s and 1980s also meant keeping abreast of the latest intellectual trends, increasing the chances of being published in a prestigious journal or of getting a scholarship at a Western university (Parfianowicz-Vertun 2016: 60).

The "foggy idea" of Central Europe was clearly also a springboard to a career.

However, Parfianowicz-Vertun does not resolve the question of the interrelation between the Czech and Polish projects of Central Europe and the question of the position from which one should look at the former. She writes that "the Czech projects of Central Europe can therefore be seen in the constant rift between the deconstruction and updating of revival narrations, between critical reflection on national identity and its idealisation, between particularism and concentration on the "Czech question" and the reflection on universal problems" (Parfianowicz-Vertun 2016: 233–234).

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[7] This is due to the etymology of the word (political means "related to polis"), and not to the definition. See https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/ (accessed: 21.06.2017).

The thing is that these are almost always the same questions, traceable back to their first advocates – such as the above-mentioned Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk. Parfianowicz-Vertun cites Martin Kučera, who points out that "Czech culture should be studied in the dynamic tension between the two tendencies, as a synthesis of what is 'national and universal, tradition and avant-garde, continuity and break-up'" (ibid.: 265). This particular tension, let me emphasise once again, results from the fact that the question of Central Europe has been interpreted in light of the debate over the meaning of Czech history (the so called "Czech question"). As Otto Urban remarked, "the Czech question […] has become a complex of all the problems whose common denominator was the reformist attempt to democratise society" (Urban 1982: 443). For the intellectual circles of the 1970s and 1980s, described by Parfianowicz-Vertun, the "Czech question" was sometimes interpreted as a compensatory ideology of post-1968 disillusionment, a means of coming to terms with the recent past (Havelka 2001: 160).

My criticism of Parfianowicz-Vertun's book is partly due to the fact that the author's conclusions are not consistent. She writes that for the Czechs,

> the question about Central Europe is in fact a pretext to reflect on the Czech national identity and cultural heritage (Parfianowicz-Vertun 2016: 139);

> [and also that] when…Czechs discuss Central Europe, among other things they speak about the traditions of the Czech National Revival, and in two ways. First, they refer to the point at which the image of being central on the map of Europe became an essential element in the narrative about the character, role, and mission of the Czech people, and second, discussions of the late twentieth century became a pretext for another (successive in the following years) revision of various myths and ideas associated with the development of modern Czech identity (Parfianowicz-Vertun 2016: 207).

However, the question of Central Europe (and the place of Czech culture in it) is not linked in the book to the question of the meaning of Czech history: a question related to Slavic culture as such, concerning the extent to which the meaning of history can combine visions of the future with assumptions about the origin of a culture (Havelka 2001: 51). It is there-

fore plausible to return to the period of the Czech National Revival and to ask how much the question of Central Europe can be connected with it. Parfianowicz-Vertun gives numerous reasons for a reflective return to this period in Czech history, including in the texts and practices she describes, because she notes, for example, that *samizdat* grew out of the tradition of nineteenth-century national liberation activities (Parfianowicz-Vertun 2016: 73). However, she makes little use of these observations in further analysis. This is also the case in texts that question the ties between Czech culture and Western European tradition (ibid.: 227).

The main question that arises at this point is whether we can simply analyse essays from the 1970s and 1980s, where the meaning of Czech history is a central concept, without any reflection on long-term historical processes. "Czech projects of Central Europe rarely problematise the difficult neighbourhood and the conflicts that haunt this area," writes Parfianowicz-Vertun (2016: 231). A careful student of Czech culture might be tempted to raise an objection here as well: for example, what about František Palacký's idea of the Czech-German *stýkání a potykání* [contact and conflict]. According to Palacký, the constant contact between Czech and German cultures led to their mutual enrichment, even if at times it deepened conflicts or threats "enriching" the military forces, political ambitions, and cultural exclusiveness.

The discussions about Central Europe are also similar to the debates on the "Czech question" in that that they make it possible to trace the clash of ideals (considerations on the political future) with practice. The "Czech question" should be confronted with the reality of the First Republic of Czechoslovakia (1918–1938), and projects of Central Europe with the years after the turning point of 1989. Parfianowicz-Vertun borrows the concept of the relation between ideas and political practice from Krzywicki, and treats Central Europe as a task. The issues raised by Palacký can also be found in the question of Czech nationalism, which is mentioned by Parfianowicz-Vertun (2016: 273). Among other questions, she asks here about the use of the Holocaust in Czech discourse and its unresolved experience – the Czechs have not yet come to terms with it – while she does not address the "German question." The expulsion of about 3 million of Czech Germans after 1945 ended a certain stage in discussion of the "Czech question" (closing the era of *stýkání a potykání*), but in the period analysed by Parfianowicz-Vertun there was discussion among Czech historians on the sense and price of the forced displacements. The articles, collected after the revolution in the volume *Češi, Němci, odsun. Diskuse nezávislých historiků*

(Černý 1990) show a different view of the "Czech question," where the issue of Czech nationalism – including the nationalism contemporary to the authors – is central. Parfianowicz-Vertun emphasises that

> by following the biographies of intellectuals engaged in the discussion of Central Europe, we can see […] that many of them shared an ambivalent attitude toward their own national cultures. The "Central European" project was for many of them an attempt to overcome the limitations of a narrowly defined national community. This was one of the reasons why they were so eager to refer to Central European mythology, especially the one associated with the microcosm of Vienna and Prague at the turn of the centuries (Parfianowicz-Vertun 2016: 383).

This ambiguity about one's own culture was not connected solely with the conservative nature of the unofficial culture but also with the reopening of the discussion over Czech culture as syncretic, co-created for centuries by Czechs and Germans, and thus bridging the imagined boundaries of the national. Two classical ideas of "being Czech" account for this tension: Josef Jungmann's project that linked it with language, and the one by Bernard Bolzano, who emphasised the importance of living on the territory of the Czech lands. These two types of "being Czech," *tschechich* and *bömisch*, were echoed after the revolution as well, and more recently were playfully recalled by Bohumil Hrabal in one of his late *silva rerum* (Hrabal 2005).

/// Where Are You, Central Europe?

Apart from the connections between the questions of Central Europe and the meaning of Czech history, I would like to draw attention to the most interesting part of Parfianowicz-Vertun's book. The core of the book is constituted by a rich, theoretically-informed empirical analysis; the purely theoretical considerations presented in chapter 2 deserve attention as well. Parfianowicz-Vertun calls attention not only to the process of reconstructing texts, but also to the problem of how they circulated: (a) in purely academic publications; (b) in cultural and social journals addressed to the general public; and (c) in unofficial publications. The study of these texts is clearly a methodological challenge. The same texts were frequently reprinted in different versions by different editors. They were directed at

various audiences, on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Finally, it was not solely a text's content but also accident that influenced its readership. Therefore, as Parfianowicz-Vertun notes, the canon of texts about Central Europe is made up mainly of those texts that were published in the West (2016: 70) and not anonymously (ibid.: 112–115) – this was a problem for texts published in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, where authors could be held accountable by the authorities. In addition, the reception of the texts published in the region was smaller due to factors such as those mentioned by Parfianowicz-Vertun: "the difficult, often random, selective access to particular titles; poor print quality and trouble with reading the texts; the unclear status of the authors, who were publishing anonymously or under a pseudonym; and finally the nature of the texts themselves, which often took the form of long, detailed dissertations" (ibid.: 118–119). Since production of a text involved specific "editorial" and distribution practices (such as transcription for further distribution among trusted friends and acquaintances), Parfianowicz-Vertun's suggestion that this form of informal circulation among opposition circles had a greater cultural impact than any open debate on the texts is absolutely legitimate. The processes of producing texts seem to have integrated people even more than the ideas their authors put forward (ibid.: 119).

The texto-centric character of the project of Central Europe on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain was also a result of the aesthetic assumptions adapted in *samizdat*, especially the focus on content, thus justifying an ugly layout (Parfianowicz-Vertun 2016: 105). We should spend some time on this "texto-centric" character: on the one hand, it means here that Central Europe exists primarily in texts, particularly essays, as the author argues. On the other hand, it might be asked whether there are some argumentative structures that are intricately related and chronologically disrupted, leading to a repetition of the blurry geographic-cultural shape of Central Europe in an out-of-shape debate itself. It should also be added that the text, as Parfianowicz-Vertun describes it, is also a material object of a certain type, printed in certain conditions, distributed in a certain way. Hence the title of the book: "w tekstach i działaniach" [in texts and actions]. Text as a physical being is also a social process here which causes a series of actions – or calls for them to take place.

It is possible, on the basis of the author's remarks, to consider whether the real space where Central Europe existed were all the barns, attics, buildings, and state printeries where unofficial newspapers were printed "after hours," and the private houses where texts were printed and tran-

scribed, and discussions on this subject took place (Parafianowicz-Vertun 2016: 134). Central Europe then not only transcends into the area where the texts are functioning, it is not just a kind of "epistolary republic," as the milieu of the Parisian *Kultura* was called (ibid.: 305), but also fails to fit Barbara Toruńczyk's definition of "the area of the spiritual search" (Toruńczyk 2013: 155). It is born in real spaces as it constitutes an actual practice. Obviously enough, the milieu of this idea does not lie where its proponents tend to locate it. I regret that the author of *Europa Środkowa w tekstach i działaniach* does not follow this interesting line of interpretation, which I find capable of shedding a new light on what had seemed to be a worn-out subject.

More importantly, Parfianowicz-Vertun brilliantly points to the irony of the project of Central Europe which on the micro-level was not "a republic" but rather "republics of friends": "Polish projects take equally minor account of Czech historical and cultural experience as the Czech ones problematise Polish specificity" (2016: 205). And thus, when viewed from the Czech perspective, Czech questions seem "central," while the Poles acquire a peripheral character as they address the question of the far away "Kresy" (ibid.: 297). Jan Patočka, while commenting on Masaryk's view of the meaning of Czech history, noted that it is typical for marginal existences to want to be in the centre. His words accurately describe the projects of Central Europe, which appear to be just a conglomerate of national debates rather than a common vision creatively reworking the cultural variety it claims to represent. Each of the national debates is a kidnapper rhetoric which dresses its own perspective in the gown of a bigger cause. Thus it also fails to find a proper place for Central Europe as part of a bigger political project of a common Europe.

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SOCIOLOGICAL INTERVENTIONS FROM THE MARGINS

STANISŁAW OSSOWSKI, *STANISŁAW OSSOWSKI W PEŁNYM BLASKU. SUPLEMENT DO „DZIEŁ",* ED. ANTONI SUŁEK

Friedrich Cain
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Late in 1961, Polish sociologist Stanisław Ossowski finished an essay on freedom of speech in the sciences. It would live to have a long publication history. In socialist Poland, where rigid controls were reimposed following the period of thaw after Stalin's death, Ossowski could not find a publisher, and so the text predicted its own fate: "If a scholar is deprived of freedom of speech, he either becomes a clerk, a player, or a conspirator" (Ossowski 2016: 215).[1] Much like the latter, the essay moved underground. As it could not appear in any official Polish magazine in the early 1960s, typescript copies circulated throughout Warsaw. In 1977, a journal operating beyond censorship made it available to a broader public. Through the 1980s, that is, the times of Solidarity and martial law, the essay was printed in further (semi-)official publications. In 2016, it finally made its way into the volume that is being reviewed here: the *Supplement* to Stanisław Ossowski's collected works, which assembles critical or (assumedly) marginal texts that were not part of the six volumes published between 1966 and 1970.

The volume contains some forty-five texts covering a time span of about fifty years. Given Poland's fateful history, they were written under various regimes. Born in 1897 under Tsarist rule, Stanisław Ossowski went to study philosophy in Vilnius and Warsaw. The first text in the volume,

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[1] All translations from Polish are my own.

from 1916, is an early contemplation on philosophy's role in everyday life (Ossowski 2016: 23). Nine years later, Ossowski received a doctoral degree from Warsaw University, which by then was no longer part of (Soviet) Russia but right in the middle of the capital of the II Polish Republic (1918–1939). In the following years, Ossowski turned to sociology as the result of two longer research trips – the first leading him to France in the early 1920s, and the second to London in the 1930s. Up until the Second World War, he was developing some of the central motifs, terms, and subjects that would guide his further work. Social bonds in modern societies were one of his central focuses, but he was also interested in the conceptual history of social stratification, which he traced through the history of social theory all the way back to antiquity. Owing to his lifelong belief in enlightened humanity, Ossowski never stopped thinking about the social status of scientific research and researchers themselves. Science (and the humanities) could and should help to build a just and equal social life.[2] In this respect the initial quote can stand as a motto for Ossowski's thought.

In autumn 1939, Ossowski feared German persecution and left for the Soviet occupied city of Lwów. Upon his return to Warsaw in 1941, he joined Polish resistance circles. Shortly after the war, he helped build a new university in the city of Łódź, before gaining a professorship at Warsaw University. Around 1950, he and other sociologists were banned from official teaching for several years, which drove him into opposition circles, again. Later, he would go on two research trips to the United States, before he died in Warsaw in 1963. His organisational and didactic efforts were crucial to the development of post-war sociology in Poland and increased his role as a figurehead of Polish, and specifically Varsovian, sociology (see Sułek 2014).

From his early studies in aesthetics and semiotics, Ossowski had a strong inclination to observe social phenomena; his interest eventually caused him to turn to the still emerging discipline of sociology. Having dealt with the mutual relations of art and societies in his early publications, he outlined subjects for his further works. This transition is central in the first sections of the *Supplement*, which contain several texts concerning the relations between religion, the nation, and revolution. These early writings not only give an insight into the mindset of the sociologist-to-be, they could also be a foundation stone for a broader intellectual history of interwar Poland, and especially of the leftist search for a position between Soviet radicalism and the project of a nation state.

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[2] For an English overview of Ossowski's works and central ideas, see Chałubiński 2006.

Following the texts revealing Ossowski's intellectual coming-of-age as a sociologist, the volume's five remaining sections contain a broad range of genres and topics. The editor, Antoni Sulek, has organised them into two sections of commentary on public issues, two sections for academic sociological texts, and one for correspondence. The first section, with comments on public issues, assembles texts from the interwar period up to the early years after the Second World War. At that time, nationalism and social psychology were among Ossowski's central interests. He was intrigued by the integrative powers of national and genetic categories or metaphors and what he called their flipside, namely chauvinism and anti-Semitism. Here, the sociological analysis of the anti-Jewish pogrom in Kielce is especially interesting (Ossowski 2016: 104–113). In July 1946, a Polish mob killed more than forty Jewish people who had survived the German occupation. Afterwards, many other Holocaust survivors took this incident as a signal to leave the country, for anti-Semitism did not seem to have been overcome in a greater part of Polish society. Ossowski's text, in which he considers actual backgrounds and contemporary interpretations shortly after the events, is still awaiting an English translation, and might very well contribute to current (inter)national discussions.

The second section on public issues covers texts from the period of the thaw until the early 1960s. Here the overarching theme is freedom – freedom of speech in particular – and its importance to modern societies. As the initial quote (taken from this section) already implies, Ossowski took considerable interest in a broad sociology of science, which would cover both the exact disciplines and the humanities.

The first of the two sociological sections contains a broad variety of project outlines: there are concepts for small-scale research, and organisational plans for Polish universities, and especially for sociology. Ossowski was also keen to secure a place for Polish sociology in international networks, as his thoughts on Polish contributions to the International Sociological Association (ISA) show. Ossowski was present at the first ISA congress in Oslo (1949) and even served as vice-president between 1959 and 1962. The second sociological section contains two expert reports which Ossowski wrote for legal proceedings: for example, a report on the writings of the Jehovah's Witnesses (1959). The final section on correspondence allows for yet another insight into the breadth and depth of Ossowski's interests. Both the letters he exchanged with Bertrand Russell in 1922 and his later correspondence with fellow Polish sociologists show his broad intellectual, organisational, and political undertakings.

The volume does indeed supplement the whole series of Ossowski's collected works. As has been mentioned, the first volume of the series treats of aesthetics, the second of nationalism, and the third contains studies on social psychology. The fourth deals with the sociology of science, or, more specifically, with knowing and learning; the fifth volume contains writings on social structure; and the formerly final, sixth volume assembles shorter texts from academia and beyond.[3] Given this classification, the volume under scrutiny here is at odds with its predecessors. Rather than reproducing the scheme of the foregoing volumes, the collection attempts to develop its own narrative by linking the various fields of action. As the title says, the aim is to show Ossowski's "full splendour" (Pol. *pełny blask*).

In his introduction, the editor, Antoni Sułek – himself a sociologist at Warsaw University and institutional "heir" to Ossowski – recounts the history of his academic forebear's published and unpublished works. He elucidates the difficulties of academic publishing under successive political systems and varying censorship regimes. While the larger part of Ossowski's output is contained in volumes one to six, the *Supplement* is intended to provide texts whose subjects involve the intersections of scholarship, research policy, and society. Ossowski's literary capabilities are revealed in a voice that moves from subtle critique to pragmatic intervention to open outrage at times. Owing to the genre of the collected works, Ossowski is presented with great fondness. The selection and introduction of the texts has been thoughtful, however, and so the collection could also be useful for readers from outside the field of sociology. For instance, as the editor himself suggests in the introduction, the initial coming-of-age sections will be interesting for intellectual biographers (Ossowski 2016: 12, 18).

As has been mentioned before, there are specific histories to certain of the texts. The status of some was opaque and volatile for many years (occasionally for decades) owing to the many different political situations. At times, Ossowski himself would republish a text (see Ossowski 2016: 214); others were rediscovered by movements, groups, or editors. Such text-biographies are not only illustrative examples for students of recent social history, but could also provide important source material for a cultural history of sociology in Poland, and especially in Warsaw. After all, Ossowski was part of several academic circles. Initially he frequented the Philosophy Students' Club at Warsaw University (see Ossowski's report on its proceed-

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[3] The collected works were published by a committee of friends and colleagues (including Ossowski's wife, the philosopher Maria Ossowska) through Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe in Warsaw (Ossowski 1966–1970).

ings (2016: 46–60)). Later he was an active member in the Science of Science Club that met in Warsaw between 1928 and 1939 to discuss all kinds of research into knowing, learning, and teaching. After the war he was part of the Crooked Wheel Club,[4] where eminent intellectuals discussed art, culture, politics, and philosophy (see Ossowski 2016: 193–203).

The volume contains rich material for studies in the rhetoric or practice of science and the humanities. Great effort was put into the careful editing of the texts, making them worthy sources for studying the literary and social practices of (academic) publishing. The edition expands former published versions of some of Ossowski's texts, taking into account penultimate manuscripts, censored typescripts, and drafts with comments (see, e.g., Ossowski 2016: 193). More than ever before, the publishing histories and connections to Ossowski's unpublished materials are mentioned in footnotes and editorial introductions. In this manner, the volume, which concentrates on obscure and preliminary texts, helps the reader to grasp the breadth of practical work occurring in academia and its many intersections with other systems of modern society. It is also very worth mentioning that the philosopher Maria Ossowska, the author's wife and lifelong collaborator, is granted more space in the editorial notes than ever before.

However, even this volume cannot fill all the gaps in the publication of Ossowski's works; further publications are to be expected, for example, Ossowski's diaries.[5] Nevertheless, the volume should contribute to discussions of the early twenty-first century. Coming back to the initial quote again, what was (and is) at stake is precisely the academic worker's social status and responsibility. The volume presents us with several examples of the ever-growing entanglement of research and political, social, religious, or economic beliefs. While telling these areas apart might have been difficult for commentators of classical modernity, the postmodern jungle of socio-economics and social theory has rendered it almost impossible. To define the borders of functional social systems, discourses, or whatever the methodological approach might be has become increasingly hard: separating the overwhelming masses of communicative acts and social situations

[4] Ossowski was part of the first (Koło Filozoficzne Studentów Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego) when he was a student. He joined the second (Koło Naukoznawcze, 1928–1939) when he worked as a teacher and at Warsaw University. He was a member of the third (Klub Krzywego Koła, 1955–1962) after the Second World War.

[5] Both the *Supplement* and the publication of the diaries are part of a project funded by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education ("W kręgu Stanisława Ossowskiego. Warszawska szkoła socjologii"). Much more material is stored at the joined libraries of the Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology of Warsaw University and the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw. The correspondence of Ossowski and his wife have been published elsewhere: see Ossowska & Ossowski 2002.

has become impossible; the overarching guidelines keep falling apart. Ossowski's observations can help us to think about these theoretical and cultural developments.

The text about freedom of speech was directed at a very similar point. Ossowski meant to intervene not only in science policy but in society at large. Yet, rather than taking aim at the politics of ambiguity, or – anachronistically speaking – fake news and alternative facts, he was interested in the uncanny situation of a society parted into "Us" and "Them," devoid of ethics. Against the political and socio-economic upheavals of his time, which, of course, were also intellectual earthquakes, he kept dreaming about saving mankind through universal humanism.

Some texts in the volume share the freedom of speech as a central topic and even refer to each other. In "Taktyka i kultura" [Tactics and Culture, 1956, Ossowski 2016: 181–192), Ossowski envisioned a system of democratic participation; it had to be liberated from any kind of rule by the few, that is, by parties or classes. Such rule would hinder democratic discussion and confuse society with "social fictions." Even if these did not necessarily find full acceptance or belief, they would influence public life. Ossowski used metaphors of the theatre and the mask to describe the frictions between the public and the private spheres, and how this would undermine the development of democracy all together. Ossowski's answer was perhaps too optimistic: in order to solve the truth problem (especially simultaneous truth claims from counter-movements of all sorts), only free and just discourse would suffice. Here sociology became part of society. First it should help to describe problematic social situations and then it should assist in improving them. Scholars had to find a place in society in order to work for it – which has always been a problem for them, whether now or in the past.

Thus, apart from the historical or systematic interests that are addressed, the volume once again showcases one of Ossowski's central traits. He always tried to speak as a sociologist based in society, without parting the citizen from the researcher. In this respect the volume not only contributes to the genealogy of current discussions, but also reminds us of the need to be aware of the relationship between democratic societies and their (social) sciences.

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REFLECTIONS ON THE PROVINCIALISM OF POLISH POLITICAL SCIENCE

TOMASZ WARCZOK, TOMASZ ZARYCKI,
GRA PERYFERYJNA. POLSKA POLITOLOGIA W GLOBALNYM
POLU NAUK SPOŁECZNYCH

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In the fall of 2016 Scholar published a book entitled *Gra Peryferyjna. Polska politologia w globalnym polu nauk społecznych* [A Peripheral Game: Polish Political Science in the Global Social Science Field] by Tomasz Warczok and Tomasz Zarycki. The book is a sequel to a series of works in which the authors employ the concept of the centre-periphery divide to explain Poland's pattern of development. Some of the works have already dealt with the country's social science (e.g., Warczok & Zarycki 2014; Warczok 2016), but *Gra Peryferyjna* is the first monograph on a particular academic discipline: political science.

The book opens with a comprehensive presentation of a variety of sociological theories of science and/or knowledge. Starting from the ideas of Émile Durkheim, the authors review the concepts and ideas of such thinkers as Karl Marx, Karl Mannheim, and especially Robert K. Merton. As for more up-to-date ideas on the sociology of scientific knowledge, only Barry Barnes's and David Bloor's "strong programme" is presented. Two theories are described in a more detailed way: Pierre Bourdieu's analyses of science and academic fields and Randall Collins's theory of interaction rituals. Most of the concepts presented in the introduction do not relate to the topic of the book, the centre-periphery divide, or to dependent development in any direct way. Curiously, the

chapter deals mostly with Bourdieu's analysis of science, and not his study of the academic field (Bourdieu 1988), which would have been much more relevant to the analysis of international political science. Furthermore, the authors not only ignore current science and technology studies, they also overlook the existing literature on academic dependency (e.g., Alatas 2003; Sinha-Kerkhoff & Alatas 2010), which should have formed the theoretical backbone of their argument.

The second chapter deals with a number of different subjects. It introduces another of Warczok and Zarycki's theoretical inspirations, that is, Immanuel Wallerstein's theory of world systems, with its distinction between the core, the peripheries, and the semi-peripheries of the system. Later in the same chapter they describe Poland's position as a periphery of the capitalist West. One may of course wonder how the country's position has been influenced by belonging to the communist zone and by the changing geopolitical situation, but there is no answer to such questions in the book. In fact, the authors do not offer any actual analyses of Poland's history or its economy, simply asserting that the country has always been a periphery of the Western world. Instead, they describe the role of the intelligentsia as a specific stratum that has been living on a supposedly close relation with the core, and the dualism of peripheral knowledge production, which is usually divided between institutions connected to foreign centres and ones that participate solely in the local circulation of ideas.

In the third chapter the authors explore the structure of the global social science field. Having analysed the original language of translations published in various countries, Warczok and Zarycki suggest that the dominant, American section of the Western core provides most of the quantitative research, while most new and original ideas come from Europe, and especially France. They also describe the development of the institutional infrastructure of political science, including the histories of the International Political Science Association and the European Consortium for Political Research. In chapters four and five the authors deal with the history of political science in Eastern and Central Eastern Europe, including in Poland. They show how local political science emerged mostly from faculties of law and relatively late compared to other social sciences, achieving institutional autonomy only in the late 1960s. In Poland, political science retained a close connection with communist politics for a long time, and the political science discipline often served as a means of social advancement for party bureaucrats.

The disciplinary status of the new branch remained ambiguous and its academic prestige was lower than that of other social sciences, especially sociology. It probably attracted more students from provincial regions, with lower social capital, than did its more prominent academic counterpart. Its closeness to the power elite and the dominance of official Marxism caused a serious crisis after 1989, when political science became a subject of criticism and underwent a partial reconstruction, which resulted in the formation of a number of new institutions that were not heirs of any socialist predecessors.

The final chapters of the book deal with the international status of Polish political science, as measured mostly by citations indexed by the Web of Science. Applying their concept of the institutional duality of peripheral science, the authors show that the duality is relatively insignificant in Poland and takes the most rudimentary form in sources of local and international academic capital. Interestingly, most Western-oriented scholars (who also participate in international academic life) are people from the intellectual margins of the branch, especially political sociologists and social psychologists.

To assess Warczok and Zarycki's book is by no means an easy task. The authors have set themselves the overly ambitious aim of analysing the place of Polish political science in global social science. They declare that they are going to apply Immanuel Wallerstein's theory of world systems and not merely use the words "system," "core," or "periphery." Surprisingly, as another theoretical instrument, Warczok and Zarycki selected Pierre Bourdieu's theory of fields. One may of course wonder how Bourdieu's ideas can at all combine with Wallerstein's. Unfortunately, there is no trace of an answer to this question in the book, and the authors make liberal use of such words as the "core," "periphery," or "semi-periphery." It is not clear whether they realise the fundamental difference between the latter two concepts (at least from Wallerstein's perspective) as they avail themselves of both in dealing with Polish political science (e.g., Warczok & Zarycki 2016: 43, 45, 247). They never attempt to use this theory to examine the actual mechanisms of academic dependency (compare Alatas 2003). Although Warczok and Zarycki employ the term "semi-periphery" at times, they do not disclose any semi-peripheral development strategies based on a specific position between the centre and more distant academic peripheries. Obviously, Wallerstein's theory serves them only as a source of vague metaphors. In general, theory is not one of the book's assets. Among the many theories

described in the opening chapters, only Bourdieu's seems to be actually applied and the rest function merely as ornament to give the book a more academic and less essayistic look. Even the case of Bourdieu is slightly problematical. The original Bourdieusian (1988) analysis of the academic field included considerable data on its socio-political context and the social background and biographies of individual scholars; it offered a truly synthetic view of French academia amidst the class and power hierarchies of French society. Warczok and Zarycki almost conflate the field of international political science (…but is it really a field in the Bourdieusian sense?) with intellectual production, and especially with papers and citations (as indexed by the Web of Science). Unfortunately, Web of Science is hardly an effective instrument to deal with a peripheral social science in the context of historical change, as it offers a limited capacity for cross-time comparison and is an instrument of the academic dominance of the core itself. On the other hand, one may ask how it is possible to describe an academic discipline without analysing a single scholarly work, as the authors of *Gra peryferyjna* do in the case of Polish political science. They do not take into account any data on the political or economic power relations within international academia, which are the key factors shaping international social science. Clearly, analyses by students of academic dependency, such as Syed Farid Alatas, would have been a much more useful inspiration than the works of Collins or the antiquated ideas of Merton.

Measured only by the declared research goals or the theoretical ambitions of the authors, *Gra peryferyjna* is a pioneering work in the sociology of social science, but also an evident failure. Although it offers a wide range of data on the social and institutional history and the functioning of political science in Poland and abroad, it lacks the requisite data, the effective application of theoretical instruments, and the analytical rigour to deal with academic dependency.

Fortunately, the book could be read in at least two other ways. First, *Gra peryferyjna* can be considered as a slightly one-sided but comprehensive, relatively rich in detail, and well-written social and institutional history of Polish and international political science. Second, despite the type and range of empirical evidence used in the book, it can be read not as an analytical, theory-laden study, but as an essay on the provincialism – or, in the usual, non-academic sense of the word, peripherality – of Polish political science. For a historian, the most interesting parts are the authors' observations regarding the social role of political science

in the communist countries as a vehicle for the social advancement of Party cadres, and political science's relation to sociology, especially the differences between the cultural capital of the academic cadres of the two branches. Would that they had been studied in more detail and supported by more empirical data! As an essay on the peripherality of Polish political science the book offers a few thought-provoking observations and ideas and a lot of interesting information, especially on international scholarly production. Probably the most important and original item is the concept of the institutional duality of peripheral science. Paradoxically, the phenomenon of institutional duality plays a rather marginal role in Polish political science, being much more visible in places that are more peripheral to the Western academic core. Once again, similar observations by established students of academic dependency, especially Alatas, might have helped the authors to refine their idea and turn it into a genuine theoretical concept. It would have enabled them not to invent their theoretical and analytical instruments from scratch and might have allowed them to compare the case of Polish political science with the forms and types of academic dependency in countries of the global south. On the other hand, among the book's obvious strengths are the reflections on the socio-psychological effects of peripherality and its impact on local (mundane) academic discourse and strategies of academic capital-building.

All in all, *Gra peryferyjna* is a thought-provoking work which offers the reader a lot of interesting information on Polish and international social science, together with a few useful concepts and reflections on academic dependency. Still, the book requires a critical reader, who does not take all the authors' proclamations and assertions at face value.

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PHENOMENOLOGY AS A POSSIBILITY OF SOCIAL THOUGHT

ELŻBIETA HAŁAS (ED.), *LIFE-WORLD, INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND CULTURE: CONTEMPORARY DILEMMAS*

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A subsequent volume in the series "Studies in Sociology: Symbols, Theory and Society" is dedicated to the memory of Richard Helmut Grathoff (1934–2013), a German scholar noted for preserving and developing phenomenological heritage in social thought. In the monograph on post-war German philosophy, Gérard Raulet remarked that it was Grathoff who, with Thomas Luckmann and Peter L. Berger, restored the work of Alfred Schütz – the pioneer of the phenomenological perspective in sociology – to the German *episteme* (2006: 38). Grathoff is also an influential scholar for Polish sociological thought. In the opening essay of the volume, Zdzisław Krasnodębski discusses the multidimensionality of Grathoff's merit. Krasnodębski remarks that his essay is more personal and sentimental than strictly academic, as is reflected in the title: "Grathoff's Life-World." It was Edmund Husserl's concept of the life-world (*Lebenswelt*) – as prominently and predominately interpreted by Schütz – that became key for conducting phenomenological social research. This volume, which was edited by Elżbieta Hałas and features Polish and foreign authors, including Grathoff's students and collaborators, addresses the need to rethink the concepts of *Lebenswelt* and intersubjectivity within the context of contemporary sociological thought.

The relevance and prospects of phenomenology – understood as a philosophical current and a research orientation in the social sciences

and humanities – have for many years been a subject of ongoing debate. In the 1960s, Martin Heidegger, in his tellingly entitled essay "My Way to Phenomenology," summarised his attitude to this philosophical direction. Although Heidegger considered phenomenology's time to be over, he suggested treating it as a "possibility of thinking" which is changing over time and thus remaining open. He valued this possibility more than any "institution" of a philosophical current (Heidegger 1969: 90). Paul Ricoeur, who suggested that "phenomenology is first and foremost a history of Husserlian heresies," underlined its open and historical dimension in a different manner (see Raulet 2006: 39). In his academic handbook on phenomenology, Jean-François Lyotard wrote defensively about phenomenological style – a term he borrowed from Jean Wahl – arguing that the sense of phenomenology is constantly being created (Lyotard 1991). Nonetheless, Lyotard was convinced that phenomenology played a great role both for understanding the new subject of the humanities and social sciences, and the practice thereof.

Certainly, phenomenology as a possibility of thinking has been realised in different domains in different ways. Ferdinand Fellmann regards it as a science of structures, a type of cognitive psychology (it is important, however, to point to the differences of influence between Husserl's early and late philosophy). A phenomenological orientation is still vividly present in cultural anthropology, which is interested in the question of experience. It is also a source of inspiration for neuroscientists (see F. Varela). *Life-World, Intersubjectivity and Culture: Contemporary Dilemmas* provides insight into the present condition of phenomenological thought in social research, including processes of social and cultural transformations.[1] Grathoff's ideas remain a source of inspiration and a subject of lively discussions for many contributors to this volume.

Thomas S. Eberle, a Swiss researcher and one of the authors of the first, meta-theoretical part of the volume ("Interpretative Perspectives on the Life-World"), is convinced that the phenomenological orientation in sociology is alive and well. He proposes a certain arrangement of the field of relationships between phenomenology and sociology, or more specifically, between a phenomenological life-world analysis and interpretative sociology. This topography is marked by three "points" – three theoretical approaches with their prominent figures and geographical spheres of influence. The first one, with Luckmann as the key figure, differentiates

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[1] This is also the title of an international conference organised in Warsaw in September 2014 and attended by Grathoff's students and collaborators.

between philosophical analysis and sociological research while emphasising the need for their compatibility. In this perspective, phenomenological life-world analysis is understood as "protosociology." This approach – argues Eberle – reflects Schütz's intentions by regarding phenomenology as a potential foundation for sociological methodology but objects to its simple and naive application. Schütz sought the foundation of empirical sociology not in transcendental phenomenology but in the constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude. This required a certain "mediation" of philosophical anthropology and thus references to Max Scheler. As Eberle argues in great detail, Berger and Luckmann's *The Social Construction of Reality* is an excellent illustration of the compatibility of phenomenological analysis and sociology. Eberle considers that the work remains worthy of interest and research application – a statement that is difficult to argue with. Eberle observes that the above approach remains prominent in Germany, and more generally Europe, while a different approach achieved prominence in America. Its most remarkable representative is George Psathas, whose concept of "phenomenological sociology" – understood as a novel, not yet fully realised, sociological paradigm – was designed as an antidote to positivist sociology. Eberle demonstrates that although Psathas maintains his separateness from ethnomethodology, he remains under the powerful influence of this tradition. The third approach – which oscillates between the two previous ones – is social phenomenology as developed by Grathoff. Contrary to Luckmann, Grathoff asserts strong connections between sociology and phenomenological life-world analysis. At the same time, he gives more attention to theoretical and philosophical questions than Psathas. Grathoff treated the idea of anchoring the social sciences in the life-world category as an open question deserving further exploration and discussion. As a proponent of middle-range theory and a researcher interested in the category of milieu, he emphasised that *Lebenswelt* is always experienced in a concrete and sensory manner. The influence of Grathoff's thought is as broad as his scholarly contacts and as rich as his academic résumé – it extends across the United States, Western and East-Central Europe, and Japan.

Tadeusz Szawiel's remarkably relevant and thought-provoking essay validates Grathoff's strong belief in the openness of the discussion about the category of *Lebenswelt* – its epistemological, existential, and ontological meanings. Szawiel suggests differentiating between the life-world as an object of theory and as a life-horizon. By doing so, he touches on a key question, perhaps even an aporia, of studying the human world: the rela-

tions between objectification – an indispensable component of theoretical cognition – and life, inscribed in some horizon and inseparable from it. Life, as long as it remains "live," defies complete cognitive objectification. Complex relations are thus revealed between exploring and experiencing the world ("being-in-the-world"), which cannot be reduced to the question of the world's cognitive "unclarity." Literary references to Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim* and Herman Melville's *Bartleby, the Scrivener*, Nietzschean reflections *On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*, and Heidegger's hermeneutics – including his interpretation of the biblical tree of life and cognition – create the background and substance of Szawiel's reflections. They lead to a conclusion that, in my opinion, it would be a form of disloyalty to Szawiel to reveal, as his original argument is worth pursuing with him.

A completely different perspective – not transcendental but material and corporeal – is introduced by Ingeborg Helling, who seeks to strengthen the phenomenological concept of intersubjectivity in contemporary neuroscience, particularly the theory of mirror neurons. Helling refers to the works of Vittorio Gallese, an outstanding Italian physiologist from Parma and co-discoverer of mirror neurons. Gallese points to the biological dimension of intersubjectivity – its (inter)bodily foundation, grounded in the prelinguistic, functional mechanism of "embodied simulation" which enables "social cognition." At the same time, Helling refers to the luminaries of phenomenological thought (Franz Brentano, Edmund Husserl, Aron Gurwitsch, Jan Patočka, Edith Stein, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty) and key thinkers for the category of intersubjectivity. One may wonder whether this is an attempt at the "naturalisation" of phenomenology or, as Hilling prefers to see it, a "phenomenologisation" of neuroscience. However, these references can be treated as a starting point for reflection on another historical re-evaluation – following the anti-positivist turn – of the relations between the life sciences and the social sciences and humanities. In my opinion, neuroscience presents us with much more significant and interesting challenges than sociobiology, which was prominent mostly in the 1970s but is still influential, and more recently, evolutionary psychology. Regrettably, the author does not refer to the ongoing critique of the theory of mirror neurons, which questions its propensity for making interspecies extrapolations (see Hickok 2014).

Gallina Tasheva, whose essay concludes the first part of the volume, aims to draw sociologists' attention to the Heideggerian category of "being with" – putting emphasis on the "with." The author refers to Grathoff's work *The Structure of Social Inconsistencies* (1970), which discusses the incon-

sistent and paradoxical character of human behaviour. The article attempts to overcome the dichotomies of individual and society, and of methodological individualism and holism, since the existing theoretical proposals, although formulated by outstanding scholars, seem insufficient to the author.

The second part of the book ("Symbolic Transcendence, State Power, and the Person") contains analyses of heterogenic material. The studies are concerned with questions such as the phenomenology of self-education, humiliation, self-transcendence, and transformations of state symbolism. Steven Vaitkus emphasises the cognitive relevance of the category of "symbolic transcendence" for the theoretical study and empirical analysis of culture. This concept served as a starting point for Schütz's and Karl Jaspers's symbol theory. Vaitkus follows the path where their thoughts meet. In this context, it is worth mentioning another of Schütz's works, entitled *Symbol, Reality and Society*, which he wrote at the end of his life and which is important for researchers of culture. Analysing personal documents, Fritz Schütze demonstrates the imposition of artificial stratification on the structures of everyday life by a socialist state (the GDR), and studies the consequences of these processes. Elżbieta Hałas, on the other hand, reports on the transformation of state symbolism. Dennis Smith, by analysing four cases of political prisoners in different places, times, and regimes (Oscar Wilde, Jean Améry, Nelson Mandela, and Aung San Suu Kyi), aims to arrive at a heuristic of humiliation. He examines individual reactions to humiliation and shows how it causes different – sometimes even drastic – reactions which are hard to predict or determine: from escapism, whose most extreme form is suicide, to conciliation. Lorenza Gattamorta addresses the question of self-transcendence in the age of contingency by comparing Peter L. Berger's and Hans Joas's scholarship (the latter is a well-known expert and propagator of pragmatism). The two scholars represent different intellectual traditions and thus differ in their analyses and opinions on contemporary cultural pluralism, secularisation, and universal values – questions discussed by Gattamorta. The term self-transcendence, in accordance with Joas's proposal, is understood here as a type of concrete experience which has the potential to become universalised.

The last part of the volume ("Communication and Various Cultures of Knowledge") considers the constructivist and communicative aspects of knowledge and its social status. According to Hubert Knoblauch, profound technological transformations are not limited to media changes, but they greatly impact the structures of contemporary society *in toto* (see Hałas

2016: 194). In referring to Berger's and Luckmann's social constructivism, Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative action, and Grathoff's suggestion to treat intersubjectivity as a necessary egological condition of socialisation and social phenomena, Knoblauch advances a concept of communicative constructivism and society. I assume that contemporary scholars of media and culture will find the proposal to confront communicative culture with communicative society both interesting and challenging. Marek Czyżewski proves that referring to Schütz's famous essay on *Don Quixote* (1964) is still worthwhile. Written over fifty years ago, this phenomenological study of the 400-year-old literary masterpiece remains a source of creative inspiration for sociological analyses of contemporary life. Czyżewski, who situates Schütz's interpretation on an extensive map of interpretations of Miguel de Cervantes's works, suggests that the originality of Schütz's analysis is insufficiently appreciated. Furthermore, Schütz's reading does not lose its value and significance for the phenomenological theory of multiple realities. In a paper full of biographical themes, Grathoff's friend, Ulf Matthiesen, demonstrates how to apply phenomenological categories in urban studies. Ewa Nowicka debates the opportunities and limitations of intercultural communication in conducting anthropological research. She compares two models of practising anthropology and their approaches to reflexivity by analysing Paul Rabinow's and Pierre Bourdieu's works based on their respective field studies in Morocco. It is worth noticing that at present Rabinow is distancing himself from interpretative anthropology, and it is difficult to define his position clearly (Rabinow 2006). Rafał Wierzchosławski discusses the role of experts in democratic societies, as well as the differences and similarities of the worlds inhabited by experts and citizens. He regards the works of Florian Znaniecki (author of *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge*) and Schütz (*The Well-Informed Citizen: An Essay on the Social Distribution of Knowledge*) as precursors of experts' studies.[2] Wierzchosławski applies the category of the life-world and Grathoff's milieu analysis in studying the roles played by experts in different domains of social life and before different audiences.

The authors of this volume prove that phenomenology still offers possibilities for thinking about social life and culture. They show that the challenges and transformations of the contemporary world – along with the present condition of the humanities and social sciences, which are of-

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[2] Bruno Latour refers to John Dewey and Walter Lipmann's discussion, which introduces interesting themes to the debate on the role of experts. See Dewey 1954 [1927]: 131–133, 143, 149, and Lippman 1993 [1925].

ten perceived as being in crisis – give validity to the postulate of rethinking the phenomenological category of *Lebenswelt* and intersubjectivity for epistemological and ontological justifications. Phenomenology underlines the experiential character of the social. The sense of experience cannot be explained, but it might be illuminated "from within." When reflecting on the relations between phenomenology and sociology, Lyotard remarked that "in any case of causation, research into *originary* sociality entails only that the definition of sociality come prior to the examination of its concrete forms" (1991: 104). I think in the case of this publication we are dealing with an attempt to articulate more comprehensively the sense of experiences which thus far have remained muted.

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**FORTHCOMING
AND CALL FOR PAPERS**

2018 /// The Future in the Social Sciences

"Savoir c'est prévoir," to know is to predict, declared Auguste Comte, the self-proclaimed priest of the Religion of Humanity. Despite these roots, sociology has abandoned this optimistic vision and speaks about the future reluctantly, by separating empirical knowledge about the past and present social world from futurology, which is based on speculation. As a result, sociology distrusts its own abilities to predict the future. In the name of value-free science, sociology has also withdrawn from designing the future social order, thus rejecting the inspiration of the great utopias. The pressing social need to anticipate the future is fulfilled by practices from beyond the bounds of sociology, or on its edges: from science fiction and post-apocalyptic fictions to futurology, technology assessment, trend analysis and modelling, to scenario planning and road mapping for particular organizations. The academic social sciences tend to disregard the applied methods of anticipating the future that have been developed at the request of governments, military agencies, and corporations rather than by academia.

However, in recent years, the theme of possible futures has entered the debate with new intensity: the division between science fiction and the near future falters. On the one hand, we witness billionaires' plans to create Martian colonies and human-machine hybrids – is this for real, this time? – and on the other hand, we hear prophecies about the climate apocalypse and the advent of non-human time in the Anthropocene, an epoch when human actions alter the planet for hundreds of thousands of years. We may say after John Urry (*What is the Future?*, Cambridge 2016) that the times call for social science to enter the discussion about possible futures – hence, to reveal the political and performative dimension of the collective imagination of the future. Sociology might thus look for new inspiration in futurology or science fiction, but it also might enrich reflection on the social future with new approaches and solutions. Sociology might then also ask questions that were previously left unstated.

**2018 /// *The Polish Peasant* from the perspective of a century
Special issue of the academic journal *State of Affairs* [*Stan Rzeczy*]**

There are not many works to which sociologists owe as much as to *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America.* Although a hundred years have passed since the publication of the first two volumes of this extensive book, it remains not only one of the most influential classics of sociology but also a mysterious work, in part forgotten and underutilised. Today there can be no doubt that the analyses contained in the book were constitutive for such subdisciplines as the sociology of migration, deviance, and social change. The work also played a fundamental role in establishing the methodology of qualitative research, including the biographical method, and in particular, the analysis of letters, official documents, and press clippings. The appearance of *The Polish Peasant* changed how applied sociological concepts were defined and to a large measure determined the critical nature of the contemporary social sciences. As Norbert Wiley observed, it was the first sociological work to have a clearly democratic and egalitarian character, and to treat ethnicity methodically as a cultural and not biological category. Eli Zaretsky, the editor of a popular, abridged version of the book, noted that *The Polish Peasant* was the first work to treat ethnicity as a worthy object of systematic study. It also contained the elaborated concepts of values, attitudes, and personality that lie at the basis of many theories claiming to provide a multidimensional explanation of the nature of human beings and the complexity of social control mechanisms. At the same time, William Thomas and Florian Znaniecki's book remains enigmatic; the authors' real input into their joint publication, their manner of connecting the work to their earlier research, and the problematics they formulated are all in dispute. The significance for theory of *The Polish Peasant* is overshadowed not only by the professional difficulties Thomas encountered while working on the book but also by the appearance of competing sociological theories, such as symbolic interactionism and the voluntaristic theory of action, which for long years dominated American and European sociology.

Today, ongoing revisions of the above-mentioned theoretical currents as well the growing role of the qualitative method of social research in creating sociological theories could be an opportunity to revive interest in *The Polish Peasant.*

In inviting scholars to send texts inspired by the work of Thomas and Znaniecki, we are seeking answers to the following questions, among other topics:

- How did the earlier work of the two authors affect their collaboration and joint research undertaking?
- Can Thomas and Znaniecki's theory and methodology still be a valuable source of sociological knowledge today? How can it contribute to expanding the techniques of social theoreticians and researchers?
- How was *The Polish Peasant* received in Poland and elsewhere in the world?

Aside from texts concerning interpretation of the work, we are interested in all articles inspired by the ideas of Thomas and Znaniecki, or referring to their roles in social theory in general.

/// Please submit your proposal including all authors' names, email addresses and affiliations and an abstract of around 500 words to redakcja@stanrzeczy.edu.pl by **23 July 2018**. The editors will decide upon acceptance or rejection of the proposals by **31 July 2018**.

/// Selected authors are invited to submit their manuscripts (max. 40,000 characters, including tables, figures, and references) until **7 January 2019**. All manuscripts will be peer-reviewed. Publication is planned for June 2019.

/// For any queries, please contact Prof. Michał Kaczmarczyk (wnsmka@ug.edu.pl), the guest editor of the issue.